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A story familiar to most readers goes like this: In the be-
ginning, the Constitution of the United States created the 
structures of national government and, in order to preserve the 
role of the states and to promote individual liberty, imposed 
limits on what that national government could do. To further 
prevent abuses by the new national government, the Bill of 
Rights added to the Constitution a series of additional protec-
tions. At its inception, the Bill of Rights did not apply to state 
governments because they were less likely to violate liberty, 
and if they did, there existed recourse in state constitutions 
and state laws. Reconstruction altered this basic equation: the 
Fourteenth Amendment transferred protections for individual 
liberties to the national constitutional level and, with the help 
of the courts, incorporated the provisions of the Bill of Rights 
against the states. While, therefore, the First Amendment 
(“Congress shall make no law . . . .”)1 once applied only to the 
national government, today First Amendment protections, like 
almost all of the other Bill of Rights provisions, constrain both 
state and national government, thereby better securing indi-
vidual rights at all levels. 
For legal scholars, a key chapter of this story is Chief Jus-
tice John Marshall’s decision for the United States Supreme 
Court in 1833 in Barron v. Baltimore.2 Barron, affirming the 
decision of the Maryland state court, rejected the claim of John 
Barron that the city of Baltimore violated the Takings Clause 
of the Fifth Amendment when it took his property for a public 
use without compensating him for the loss.3 Today, Barron is 
universally understood as standing for the proposition that in 
the pre–Civil War era, the Bill of Rights simply did not con-
strain the states: the protections the Bill secured were held on-
ly against the federal government. On this account, an impor-
tant effect of the Fourteenth Amendment was, therefore, to 
reverse the Barron decision. Today, in contrast to 1833, state 
 
 1. U.S. CONST. amend. I (emphasis added). 
 2. 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833). 
 3. Id. at 250. 
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government, like the federal government, is required to provide 
compensation if it takes an individual’s private property for a 
public use. 
This Article argues that the modern understanding of Bar-
ron is incorrect. The modern understanding misses what the 
Supreme Court did in the Barron case, how the case was un-
derstood at its time, and the impact of the Court’s decision. 
Further, because the prevailing modern understanding of Bar-
ron is wrong, the story with which I began—the story of the 
transformation of the Constitution after the Civil War—is also 
deficient. Barron, this Article suggests, did not hold, as it is 
conventionally believed, that the Bill of Rights did not in any 
circumstances apply to state government. Rather, Barron simp-
ly affirmed the unremarkable proposition that the federal 
courts would not apply the Bill of Rights to constrain state gov-
ernment. Both before and after Barron, even with the decision 
in place as binding precedent, state courts were free to apply 
the Bill of Rights to the states. 
In a series of cases that are largely forgotten or brushed 
aside today, early state courts regularly did apply the Federal 
Bill of Rights to invalidate state laws and otherwise constrain 
state government. Although, as a matter of federal constitu-
tional law enforced by the federal courts, the Bill applied only 
to the national government, the state courts understood the Bill 
to set out general constitutional principles applicable to state 
legislatures and executives alike—even when no provision of 
the applicable state constitution imposed any such constraint 
on state government. The jurisdictional limits of the 1789 Judi-
ciary Act protected these state court decisions applying the Bill 
of Rights from review by the United States Supreme Court. 
This Article is, however, more than about how modern 
scholars have misunderstood a single Supreme Court case and 
its implications. The analysis presented here points to a more 
general and more serious misconception about the very nature 
of constitutional law in the early American Republic. Modern 
constitutional lawyers and scholars tend to give short shrift to 
the decisions of the earliest courts on constitutional issues. Few 
people could name early state court decisions resolving ques-
tions of federal constitutional law. The predominant view, re-
flected in the arrangement of virtually every casebook, is that 
with the exception of some landmark Supreme Court decisions 
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like Marbury v. Madison,4 only in the mid-twentieth century 
did courts begin to produce a body of sophisticated constitu-
tional law that merits serious engagement. In particular, the 
development of constitutional law in the courts to protect ade-
quately the rights of individuals is considered a very recent in-
novation. 
This Article challenges that modern perspective. In the an-
tebellum era, four vibrant bodies of constitutional law protected 
the rights of individuals from government abuse. In addition to 
(i) the Federal Constitution and (ii) the constitutions of each of 
the states, the courts created and enforced two sets of general 
constitutional rules. Until the Supreme Court’s decision in Erie 
Railroad v. Tompkins,5 in diversity cases the federal courts 
crafted (iii) general constitutional laws that they applied to 
state government. As recounted in this Article, the state courts 
also developed and applied to state government (iv) general 
principles of constitutional law they derived from the Federal 
Bill of Rights. Early constitutional law was multifaceted, so-
phisticated, and innovative, with a diverse set of jurists invok-
ing and applying an array of constitutional rules to keep gov-
ernment in check. 
Setting the historical record straight leads to a normative 
assessment of constitutional law today. A full appreciation of 
the nature of constitutional practices in the early Republic 
points to an unsettling feature of the current state of constitu-
tional law. We pride ourselves on the achievements of Recon-
struction; we celebrate the Fourteenth Amendment and the 
new constraints it imposed on the states (and its reversal of 
Barron) as major advances in protecting rights. However, these 
modern victories may be at once bitter and sweet. Compared to 
the antebellum era, modern constitutional law is radically con-
solidated. While the post–Civil War Federal Constitution has 
enhanced individual liberties by placing limitations on how the 
states can treat their own citizens, two of the four original bod-
ies of constitutional law have disappeared. Since the Erie deci-
sion in 1938, federal courts are no longer permitted to apply 
general principles of constitutional law in diversity cases, but 
rather must adhere to the prior decisions of state supreme 
 
 4. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
 5. 304 U.S. 64 (1938) (overruling Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 
(1842)). 
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courts as to what state constitutions mean and require.6 Ab-
stention doctrine7 and certification by federal courts of state is-
sues8 are designed to promote deference to state court proceed-
ings when there are questions of state law. With the 
Fourteenth Amendment incorporating the Bill of Rights protec-
tions against the states, the early practice of state courts apply-
ing general principles of constitutional law embodied in the 
Federal Bill of Rights has also ended—notably, the Rehnquist 
Court’s federalism revolution did not re-empower state courts 
to engage in this once prevalent practice.9 Consolidation leaves 
individuals with fewer places to turn to protect their rights. 
Beyond the implications for individual liberties, the mod-
ern consolidation of constitutional law has significant conse-
quences for our legal system as a whole. Consolidation is incon-
sistent with federalism. Though they apply federal law, state 
courts are not lower federal courts anymore than the state leg-
islatures are subunits of Congress or the state governors agents 
 
 6. Id. at 78 (“[T]here is no federal general common law.”); cf. Caleb Nel-
son, The Persistence of General Law, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 503, 505–25 (2006) 
(exploring the continued reliance on general law as providing rules of decision 
in cases involving interstate boundary disputes, the contractual rights and ob-
ligations of the federal government, customary international law, maritime 
law, and interpretations of federal statutes). 
 7. See R.R. Comm’n of Tex. v. Pullman, 312 U.S. 496, 498–99 (1941) 
(holding that federal courts may abstain from ruling on a federal constitution-
al issue in a case where the state’s highest court has not given the challenged 
state statute a definitive interpretation, and the state court’s construction of 
the statute may resolve the constitutional issue); Julie A. Davies, Pullman and 
Burford Abstention: Clarifying the Roles of State and Federal Courts in Consti-
tutional Cases, 20 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1, 6 (1986) (noting that Pullman absten-
tion promotes “not only decisions on a state law ground, but also decisions by 
state courts”). 
 8. In accordance with procedures provided under state law, lower federal 
courts may certify questions to a state’s supreme court in diversity cases and 
when state action is challenged on federal constitutional grounds. UNIF. 
CERTIFICATION OF QUESTIONS OF LAW ACT § 3, 12 U.L.A. 73 (1995). The Unit-
ed States Supreme Court has at times certified questions to a state supreme 
court. See, e.g., Zant v. Stephens, 456 U.S. 410, 416 (1982) (per curiam) (certi-
fying a question about aggravating circumstances in a death penalty case to a 
state supreme court). The Supreme Court has also indicated that lower federal 
courts should, before ruling on the constitutionality of a state statute, give the 
state’s highest court an opportunity to interpret the statute. See Arizonans for 
Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 76–79 (1997). State courts are not re-
quired to accept certification. UNIF. CERTIFICATION OF QUESTIONS OF LAW ACT 
§ 1, 12 U.L.A. 71 & cmt. (1995). 
 9. See John C. Kilwein & Richard A. Brisbin, Jr., U.S. Supreme Court 
Review of State High Court Decisions: From the Warren Through the Rehn-
quist Courts, 89 JUDICATURE 146, 146 (2005). 
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of the federal executive branch. The historical practice of allow-
ing state courts leeway to interpret independently the Federal 
Constitution reflected the importance of state courts in our con-
stitutional design. Federalism works best when different politi-
cal units are able to try different approaches and solve prob-
lems in different ways. Allowing state courts to adopt more 
expansive readings of constitutional rights generates informa-
tion about how rights might be structured in various ways and 
the effects of different choices. Such experimentation produces 
systemic benefits: outcomes in one state can be watched by oth-
er states and federal courts can draw upon lessons developed 
locally. Consolidation undermines the capacity of our system to 
generate these benefits. 
Consolidation has also weakened state constitutional law 
as developed and applied by the state courts. Requiring state 
courts to enforce the Federal Bill of Rights as defined and po-
liced by the Supreme Court has left state constitutional law in 
the modern era relatively undeveloped. For one, the incorpora-
tion of federal constitutional protections, with the requirement 
that state courts apply those protections against state govern-
ment, has displaced state constitutional law as the principal 
source of individual rights. In addition, rather than decide in-
dependently what provisions of their own state constitution 
mean, state courts, operating in the shadow of the Supreme 
Court, have tended to hew to the Court’s understandings of 
analogous provisions in the Federal Constitution. State courts 
have lost their voices under the Federal Constitution and they 
are out of practice speaking under their state constitutions. 
Finally, consolidation helps account for the enormous ten-
sion that is characteristic of our current regime. When federal 
constitutional rights are, ultimately, dependent upon a single 
court, the United States Supreme Court and its review of a 
very small number of cases, the stakes in any decision by that 
Court are exceedingly high. The Court’s ruling sets the stan-
dards for the entire nation; there might not be another oppor-
tunity to revisit an issue for many decades. In this context, it is 
no surprise that modern confirmation battles are ferocious—
there is so much at stake. Were federal constitutional rights 
less in the hands of the Court (or, as is sometimes the case, a 
single justice) some energy would shift away from this single 
institution. 
Part I of this Article revisits Barron v. Baltimore, begin-
ning with an analysis of the original state court records. It 
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makes the case for understanding the Supreme Court’s decision 
in Barron to mean only that federal courts would not them-
selves apply the Bill of Rights to the states. Part II examines 
the practice of state courts, both before and after the Barron 
decision, in applying the Bill of Rights and its principles to 
state government. Part III locates this practice as one of four 
robust bodies of constitutional law that existed in the antebel-
lum era. Part IV draws on the historical discussion to offer a 
normative assessment of constitutional law today. 
I.  BARRON REVISITED   
Barron v. Baltimore is conventionally understood as estab-
lishing that in the antebellum era, the provisions of the Federal 
Bill of Rights did not apply to state government.10 On this ac-
count, the Fourteenth Amendment overturned Barron, making 
the states subject to the Bill of Rights protections.11 However, a 
close examination of Barron, and in particular of the decision in 
view of what the Maryland state courts had decided in the case, 
suggests a more precise and limited outcome than is conven-
tionally assumed. This Part suggests that while in Barron the 
Supreme Court declined to apply the Takings Clause of the 
Fifth Amendment to invalidate the application of a state law, 
the decision did not establish the more sweeping rule that the 
 
 10. See, e.g., PAUL BREST ET AL., PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL 
DECISIONMAKING: CASES AND MATERIALS 336 (2000) (describing Barron as 
“holding . . . that the Bill of Rights did not apply to the states”); Randy E. Bar-
nett, The Proper Scope of the Police Power, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 429, 433 
(2004) (“[Barron] held that the Bill of Rights applied only to the federal gov-
ernment and did not constrain the states.”); David J. Bodenhamer, Barron v. 
Baltimore, in THE OXFORD COMPANION TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
UNITED STATES 77, 77 (Kermit Hall et al. eds., 2d ed. 2005) (“Chief Justice 
John Marshall concluded that the first ten amendments restrained only the 
federal government . . . .”); Mark D. Rosen, The Surprisingly Strong Case for 
Tailoring Constitutional Principles, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1513, 1528 (2005) 
(“[Barron] famously held . . . that the proscriptions delineated in the Bill of 
Rights did not apply to the subfederal polities.”). 
 11. See, e.g., Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 72 (1947) (Black, J., dis-
senting) (“With full knowledge of the import of the Barron decision, the fra-
mers and backers of the Fourteenth Amendment proclaimed its purpose to be 
to overturn the constitutional rule that case had announced.”); MICHAEL KENT 
CURTIS, NO STATE SHALL ABRIDGE: THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE 
BILL OF RIGHTS 173–74 (1986) (discussing the Fourteenth Amendment as 
overturning Barron by preventing the states from abridging the privileges of 
citizens); Kurt T. Lash, The Second Adoption of the Free Exercise Clause: Reli-
gious Exemptions Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 88 NW. U. L. REV. 1106, 
1146 (1994) (describing the Fourteenth Amendment as overturning Barron). 
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protections of the Bill of Rights could never constrain state law. 
Instead, Barron should be understood to mean only that the 
federal judiciary, as a matter of federal constitutional law, 
would not itself apply the protections of the Bill of Rights 
against the states. State courts were, however, entirely free to 
apply the Bill of Rights protections as a matter of state law—
including state law as interpreted by the state court to include 
the provisions of the Federal Constitution. If a state’s supreme 
court declined to apply the Bill of Rights, Barron demonstrated, 
the United States Supreme Court would not override that state 
court decision and impose the Bill against the states. Likewise, 
the Court would not overrule a state court decision applying 
the provisions of the Bill of Rights to state government, but 
would accept that decision as a matter of state law. Subsequent 
parts of this Article will examine the larger importance of Bar-
ron when the decision is understood in this manner. For now, 
the task is to get the original story straight. 
A. JOHN BARRON’S WHARF 
To understand Barron properly, one should begin not with 
Chief Justice John Marshall’s holding for the United States 
Supreme Court in 1833, but with the dispute as it began in the 
Maryland state court. The case involved the efforts of John 
Barron, who, with his partner John Craig,12 operated a wharf 
along the Patapsco River in the Fell’s Point region of Baltimore 
Harbor, to recover economic damages from the city of Balti-
more.13 The city’s street-paving program, by diverting streams 
and dumping silt in the harbor, had lowered the water level 
around the wharf, rendering it too shallow for many ships, and 
therefore diminishing the wharf ’s economic value.14 Barron and 
Craig filed a lawsuit in Baltimore County Court alleging that 
the mayor and city council of Baltimore, through their paving 
project, had “wrongfully and unjustly” deprived them of the 
“use, benefit, and full enjoyment” of their property. They sought 
damages in the amount of $20,000.15 
 
 12. John Craig died before the litigation was concluded and his estate con-
tinued as a party. For ease, I refer to Barron and Craig as the plaintiffs 
throughout the litigation. 
 13. Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 244 (1833). 
 14. Id. 
 15. Transcript of Plaintiffs’ Declaration at 7, Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. 
(7 Pet.) 243 (1833) (No. 26), reprinted in U.S. SUPREME COURT, TRANSCRIPTS 
OF RECORDS 336 (Jan. Term 1833). 
MAZZONE_6FMT 12/13/2007 9:13 AM 
2007] BILL OF RIGHTS 9 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Map from Plaintiffs’ Complaint Showing Fell’s Point 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The text at the right edge reads: “Damages are Claimed for this accumulation 
of Deposits.” 
 
In their original lawsuit, the plaintiffs did not invoke the 
Fifth Amendment as a basis for relief.16 The Maryland Consti-
tution contained a general due process clause, but like most 
other early state constitutions, it did not explicitly give citizens 
a right to compensation when their property was taken for pub-
lic use.17 Nonetheless, at the trial, at the plaintiffs’ behest, 
Judge Stevenson Archer instructed the jury that 
 
 16. Id. at 336–37. 
 17. MD. CONST. of 1776, Declaration of Rights, art. XXI (“[N]o freeman 
ought to be taken, or imprisoned, or disseized of his freehold, liberties, or pri-
vileges, or outlawed, or exiled, or in any manner destroyed, or deprived of his 
life, liberty, or property, but by the judgment of his peers, or by the law of the 
land.”); see Jed Rubenfeld, Usings, 102 YALE L.J. 1077, 1081 & n.20 (1993) 
(reporting that, aside from the constitutions of Vermont and Massachusetts, 
the original state constitutions contained no compensation requirement). 
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the plaintiff is entitled to damages for the injury the jury shall find 
the plaintiff may have sustained, in as much as this general im-
provement [by the city’s paving scheme] would . . . be made for the 
benefit and advantage of the inhabitants of Baltimore, and it would 
be unjust that the property of the plaintiff shall be deteriorated, (and 
to the extent of such injury,) deprived of his property without remu-
neration.18  
The jury returned a verdict in the plaintiffs’ favor and 
awarded them $4500 plus costs.19 
Judge Archer thereafter denied the city’s motion to arrest 
the judgment.20 He took the view that if the city did something 
“for the public benefit of the inhabitants of Baltimore” which 
resulted in “the permanent injury and sacrifice of the plaintiff ’s 
property,” then “justice . . . demand[s] that he whose property 
has fallen a victim to the public service should be compensated 
in some way.”21 Citing the due process clause of the Maryland 
Constitution, Archer declared that the plaintiffs had a right to 
profit from their wharf and this right could not be taken away 
except “by the judgment of . . . [their] peers or the law of the 
land.”22 Archer, therefore, read the due process clause of the 
state constitution to include a compensation requirement: 
“[W]hen it is said that a man may be deprived of his property 
by the law of the land, it does not . . . mean that the legislature 
may deprive him of it at their pleasure and without compensa-
tion . . . .”23 All government powers, Archer reasoned, “are sub-
ject to the salutary restraints of our constitutions and of such 
laws as lie at the foundation of all social order.”24 While stating 
 
 18. Transcript of Defendant’s Second Bill of Exceptions at 26, Barron v. 
Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833) (No. 26), reprinted in U.S. SUPREME 
COURT, TRANSCRIPTS OF RECORDS 345 (Jan. Term 1833). 
 19. Transcript of Verdict at 25, Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 
(1833) (No. 26), reprinted in U.S. SUPREME COURT, TRANSCRIPTS OF RECORDS 
335 (Jan. Term 1833). 
 20. Transcript of Judgment of County Court at 10, Barron v. Baltimore, 
32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833) (No. 26), reprinted in U.S. SUPREME COURT, 
TRANSCRIPTS OF RECORDS 337 (Jan. Term 1833). 
 21. Stephenson [sic] Archer, C.J., Opinion, Barron v. Baltimore, reprinted 
in 2 AM. JURIST 205, 206 (1829). 
 22. Id. at 207. 
 23. Id. at 211. 
 24. Id. at 210. Archer explained this fundamental feature of government 
in the following way: 
The power of the state to compel the alienation of private property, is 
the law of force springing from necessity. The right in the citizen to 
indemnity for such force, is the law of natural equity and justice; the 
one is consequent upon the other, and like the shadow follows the 
substance. This restriction upon all legislation has a deeper founda-
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that he did not “deny to [government] the power to take or ap-
propriate private property to public use,” Archer took the view 
that the city had “no right . . . to take private property for the 
public service without providing a just indemnity.”25 
On Judge Archer’s account, the state constitution’s due 
process provision was only “declaratory” of a fundamental rule 
derived from the common law.26 To buttress this conclusion, 
Archer invoked the Fifth Amendment. Archer recognized that 
there existed “doubt” as to whether the provisions of the Feder-
al Bill of Rights applied directly to the states: “[t]he great object 
[of the amendments] . . . was a limitation of the powers of [the 
federal] government” and “some of [the amendments] are . . . in 
terms confined to [the federal government].”27 Nonetheless, Ar-
cher reasoned, beyond constraining the federal government, 
“another object of the framers of the [Federal C]onstitution . . . 
was to secure to the people of the Union, as one nation, certain 
rights essential to their existence as a free government, and the 
infringement of which, in any one state, would hazard its dura-
bility as a free state.”28 These “essential” rights, Archer argued, 
were contained in the Federal Bill of Rights. Specifically, the 
Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Eighth Amendments con-
tained broad liberties held against all government, constraining 
the states in the same way as state constitutions.29 Accordingly, 
the Maryland Constitution, the Federal Constitution, and prin-
ciples of fundamental law all required compensation when pri-
vate property was taken for public use.30 
B. THE COURT OF APPEALS AND THE FIFTH AMENDMENT 
Represented by local lawyer John Scott and Maryland At-
torney General Roger Brooks Taney, the city of Baltimore ap-
pealed to the Court of Appeals for the Western District, the 
state’s highest court. The city argued that it could not be held 
accountable for injuries that resulted when the city discharged 
 
tion in all free governments than constitution or laws; it rests upon 
the universal sense which all mankind feel of its equity and jus-
tice. . . . It is peculiarly applicable to free governments, instituted to 
protect the life, liberty, and property of the citizen.  
Id. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. at 211. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. 
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a “public duty.”31 Property rights, the city contended, were not 
“absolute” but were instead held “subject [to] the use[s] of the 
public.”32 Moreover, there was an important economic issue at 
stake: requiring the city to compensate Barron and Craig would 
make it liable “whenever it does anything” to improve local 
conditions.33 
Taking a cue from Judge Archer’s opinion, the plaintiffs 
specifically argued to the appellate court that they had suffered 
a Fifth Amendment violation.34 Their argument, though, was 
not a simple takings claim. Instead, the plaintiffs argued that 
the city exceeded its legitimate powers. Pursuant to its munici-
pal charter, the plaintiffs argued, the city was “prohibited from 
doing any thing against the Constitution of the State or of the 
United States,”35 and in this regard the city’s “power . . . is to be 
interpreted with reference to the common law.”36 While recog-
nizing the right to take property as “an incident of Sovereign 
power,” the plaintiffs contended that such power entailed a du-
ty of compensation.37 “[C]ommon honesty,” the plaintiffs urged, 
“requires that the invasion of private property should be paid 
for.”38 Invoking the Fifth Amendment,39 the plaintiffs argued 
that to allow the city government to take property without 
making compensation would be an “encroachment on natural 
justice,” from which “it is the business of the court to protect 
the citizen.”40 Accordingly, “eminent domain can only [ever] be 
exercised . . . upon occasions of great public emergency, and for 
the public good, and upon making just compensation.”41 
“[E]ternal principles of truth and justice” entitled Barron and 
Craig to relief when the city diminished the value of their 
wharf.42 
In response, the city argued that nothing in the state con-
stitution required compensation: according to the state consti-
 
 31. Notes on Argument for the Appellee at 136–38, Baltimore v. Barron, 
Nos. 129–30 (Md. Dec. 17, 1830). 
 32. Id. at 157. 
 33. Id. at 160. 
 34. Id. at 145. 
 35. Id. at 142. 
 36. Id. at 143. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. at 144. 
 39. Id. at 145. 
 40. Id.  
 41. Id. at 151. 
 42. Id. at 141. 
MAZZONE_6FMT 12/13/2007 9:13 AM 
2007] BILL OF RIGHTS 13 
 
tution, takings of property were subject only to the law of the 
land and the judgment of the property owner’s peers.43 The 
common law rule, the city argued, was that Parliament could 
take property for public purposes without compensating the 
owner; all property rights were held subject to this possibility.44 
The Maryland Constitution did not affect the common law 
standard.45 In contrast to other state constitutions, the city 
contended, “[t]he constitution of Maryland gives to the legisla-
ture the power to take private property for public use,” “there is 
no restraint upon the power,” and “the courts certainly cannot 
 . . . regulate [the legislature’s] discretion.”46 Accordingly, 
“when for public purposes a [taking] is necessary, it may be 
done without entitling the party to compensation.”47 As for the 
Fifth Amendment, it was, the city argued, “intended as [a] re-
striction[] upon the general government and not on the 
states.”48 It was not, therefore, a basis for granting Barron and 
Craig relief. 
The court of appeals reversed the judgment of the trial 
court. The appellate court’s one-paragraph opinion did not 
make clear the precise basis for the reversal. In particular, the 
court of appeals’s opinion made no specific mention of whether 
or not the Fifth Amendment applied in the case.49 
 
 43. Id. at 140. 
 44. Id. at 159. 
 45. Id. at 138. 
 46. Id. at 158–59. 
 47. Id. at 155. 
 48. Id. at 159. 
 49. Baltimore v. Barron, Nos. 129–30 (Md. Dec. 1830). The opinion stated 
only that the court disagreed with the trial judge’s rejection of the city’s first 
and second bills of exceptions. In the first bill of exception, the city argued that 
(i) it had acted within the scope of its legal authority and the plaintiffs were 
not entitled to compensation from acts performed in discharging public duties; 
(ii) the defendant was in reality the inhabitants of Baltimore who were not li-
able; (iii) the city was not liable for exercising discretionary powers over the 
harbor; and (iv) the city was not liable for committing a public nuisance. See 
Transcript of Defendant’s First Bill of Exceptions at 24–25, Barron v. Balti-
more, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833) (No. 26), reprinted in U.S. SUPREME COURT, 
TRANSCRIPTS OF RECORDS 345 (Jan. Term 1833). In the second bill of excep-
tions, the city asserted that (v) unless there had been permanent injury to the 
wharf, the plaintiffs were only entitled to recover lost income. Transcript of 
Defendant’s Second Bill of Exceptions at 26–27, Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. 
(7 Pet.) 243 (1833) (No. 26), reprinted in U.S. SUPREME COURT, TRANSCRIPTS 
OF RECORDS 346 (Jan. Term 1833). 
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C. THE SUPREME COURT’S DECISION 
John Barron, joined by the executor of John Craig’s estate, 
filed a writ of error with the United States Supreme Court un-
der section 25 of the 1789 Judiciary Act.50 Now represented by 
prominent Baltimore lawyer Charles F. Mayer, Barron initially 
included in his appeal several arguments involving the con-
struction and application of state law.51 But in his opinion for 
the Court, Chief Justice John Marshall narrowed things down 
to a single question: whether the Fifth Amendment “ought to be 
so construed as to restrain the legislative power of a state, as 
well as that of the United States.”52 For “[i]f this proposition be 
untrue,” Marshall explained, “the court can take no jurisdiction 
of the cause.”53 Once Barron’s claims were parsed down to that 
issue, Marshall, a member of the 1788 Virginia committee that 
proposed a federal bill of rights, had no difficulty dismissing the 
case.54 
The starting point for analyzing the issue, Marshall 
thought, was to recognize that the Federal Constitution was 
principally directed at the federal government: “[t]he 
[C]onstitution [of the United States] was ordained and estab-
lished by the people of the United States for themselves, for 
their own government, and not for the government of the indi-
vidual states.”55 Conversely, “[e]ach state established a consti-
tution for itself, and in that constitution, provided such limita-
tions and restrictions on the powers of its particular 
government, as its judgment dictated.”56 Accordingly, “the limi-
tations on power, if expressed in general terms [in the Federal 
Constitution], are . . . applicable to the government created by 
the instrument,” and do not apply to “distinct governments, 
framed by different persons and for different purposes.”57 True, 
Marshall noted, Article I, Section 10 of the Federal Constitu-
tion limited the states.58 But this only buttressed the conclu-
sion that the Federal Bill of Rights did not apply to state gov-
 
 50. Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 243 (1833). 
 51. Id. at 246. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. 
 54. See JEAN EDWARD SMITH, JOHN MARSHALL: DEFINER OF A NATION 
141–42 (1996). 
 55. Barron, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) at 246. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. at 247. 
 58. Id. at 249. 
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ernment.59 Marshall observed that the provisions of Article I, 
Section 10 “directly express” an intention to limit state gov-
ernment.60 By contrast, the provisions of the Bill of Rights con-
tained no specific language making them applicable to the 
states.61 Accordingly, the “safe and judicious course,”62 from the 
starting point that the Constitution limited the federal gov-
ernment, was to conclude that the Fifth Amendment was “in-
tended solely as a limitation on the exercise of power by the 
government of the United States, and is not applicable to the 
legislation of the states.”63 Whether a state had to provide com-
pensation for taking property was, therefore, exclusively a 
function of the state’s own constitution and laws.64 On this 
analysis, Barron’s claim did not involve the city doing anything 
that was “repugnan[t]” to any applicable provision of the Fed-
eral Constitution.65 Therefore, Marshall held, the Court lacked 
jurisdiction under section 25 of the Judiciary Act to hear the 
case, and it was dismissed.66 
 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. at 250–51. 
 64. Id. at 247–48. 
 65. Id. at 251. 
 66. Id. The Court reaffirmed Barron’s rule in subsequent cases. See, e.g., 
Brown v. New Jersey, 175 U.S. 172, 174 (1899) (rejecting a constitutional chal-
lenge to a state struck-jury law, citing, inter alia, Barron and noting that 
“[t]he first ten Amendments to the Federal Constitution contain no restric-
tions on the powers of the State, but were intended to operate solely on [the] 
Federal Government”); Twitchell v. Commonwealth, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 321, 325 
(1868) (finding a lack of jurisdiction and denying a writ of error involving a 
challenge to a state court conviction under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments 
because, after Barron, “the scope and application of these amendments are no 
longer subjects of discussion”); Fox v. Ohio, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 410, 434–35 
(1847) (holding that the Fifth Amendment Double Jeopardy Clause is “exclu-
sively [a] restriction[] upon federal power, intended to prevent interference 
with the rights of the States, and of their citizens” and explaining that “it is 
neither probable nor credible that the States should have anxiously insisted to 
ingraft upon the [F]ederal [C]onstitution restrictions upon their own authori-
ty”); Permoli v. New Orleans, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 589, 610 (1845) (declining to 
apply the First Amendment Free Exercise Clause to a municipality); Livings-
ton v. Moore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 469, 551–52 (1833) (holding, in a diversity case 
challenging the constitutionality of a state law imposing a lien against and 
sale of land to satisfy debts owed to the state, that the Fourth Amendment 
search and seizure provision and the Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial 
“do not extend to the states”). 
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D. BARRON RECONSIDERED 
Rather than seeing Barron as establishing that the Bill of 
Rights did not apply to state governments, let me suggest a 
more limited understanding of the case. Barron should be un-
derstood as establishing only that where the state’s highest 
court had held that a state law did not violate a provision or 
principle of the Federal Bill of Rights, the United States Su-
preme Court would not reverse that decision and apply the Bill 
of Rights to state government. At the same time, nothing about 
the Barron decision indicated that state courts could not them-
selves apply the Bill of Rights to state government. 
This understanding fits with the trajectory of the Barron 
litigation. Maryland’s highest court rejected the trial court’s 
holding that state constitutional law, fundamental law, and the 
Fifth Amendment required state government to pay compensa-
tion when it took private property for a public purpose.67 The 
only issue before the United States Supreme Court was the 
Fifth Amendment question. Given that Maryland’s highest 
court had ruled no compensation was required for the taking, 
the United States Supreme Court would not itself impose on 
state government the Fifth Amendment requirement of just 
compensation.68 The Fifth Amendment would not be “con-
strued” by the United States Supreme Court so “as to restrain 
 
 67. See Barron, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) at 244 (reciting lower court history). 
 68. Id. at 247. A central component of federalism and its commitment to 
states’ authority in the original Constitution was, of course, slavery. Barron 
did not present any issue involving slaves and Chief Justice Marshall makes 
no mention of slavery in his opinion. But the justices must have understood 
that were the federal courts to apply provisions of the Bill of Rights against 
the states, there would be significant consequences for state laws that pro-
tected the interests of slave owners and suppressed abolitionist activities. In 
this light, Roger Taney’s role in Barron is of particular interest. Taney became 
Chief Justice in 1836, just three years after the Supreme Court’s Barron deci-
sion. Two decades later, Taney’s opinion in the Dred Scott case, Scott v. Sand-
ford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857), which included sweeping statements about 
there being a federally protected constitutional right to own slaves, produced 
fears that, notwithstanding Barron, the Court was laying the groundwork for 
extending slavery throughout the nation. See, e.g., ABRAHAM LINCOLN, “House 
Divided” Speech at Springfield, Ill. (June 16, 1858), in SPEECHES AND 
WRITINGS 1832–1858: SPEECHES, LETTERS AND MISCELLANEOUS WRITINGS 
426, 432 (Library of Am. ed., 1989) (warning that “such decision is probably 
coming, and will soon be upon us” and that “[w]e shall lie down pleasantly 
dreaming that the people of Missouri are on the verge of making their State 
free, and we shall awake to the reality instead, that the Supreme Court has 
made Illinois a slave State” (emphasis omitted)). 
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the legislative power of a state.”69 Yet state courts remained 
free to construe the Fifth Amendment to constrain state gov-
ernment.70 
 
 69. Barron, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) at 247–48. 
 70. This is a good place to mention Justice William Johnson’s opinion for 
the Supreme Court in Bank of Columbia v. Okely, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 235, 240 
(1819). The case involved a 1793 Maryland statute giving the Bank of Colum-
bia a summary procedure against debtors who had executed instruments 
drawn by them negotiable at the bank. Id. at 235. In 1801, Congress made the 
laws of Maryland then in force applicable to the District of Columbia. Id. at 
238. A debtor subject to the summary procedure argued that he was entitled to 
a jury trial under the Maryland Constitution and the Constitution of the Unit-
ed States. Id. at 240. In a somewhat cryptic opinion, Justice Johnson held that 
the state law was constitutional. Id. at 246. Johnson reasoned that because 
the 1801 congressional statute only continued the laws of Maryland in force, it 
was necessary to determine whether the summary procedure was void under 
Maryland law. Id. at 242. “If it was [void],” Johnson wrote, “it must have be-
come so under the restrictions of the State, or of the United States.” Id. On 
that issue, Johnson concluded, “[b]y making the note negotiable at the [B]ank 
of Columbia, the debtor chose his own jurisdiction” and relinquished the right 
to a jury trial. Id. at 243. This construction, Johnson wrote, “is giving full ef-
fect to the [S]eventh [A]mendment of the [C]onstitution” because where the 
“right” to a jury trial is preserved, that right can also be voluntarily relin-
quished. Id. at 244. So, too, under the Maryland Constitution the right to a 
jury trial can be given up. Id. There are two possible interpretations of Justice 
Johnson’s opinion. One, adopted by William Crosskey, is that Johnson thought 
the issue of whether the statute was valid under Maryland law (if it were not 
valid it could not have been continued by the later congressional act) included 
the question of whether it was valid under the Seventh Amendment; therefore, 
Johnson believed the Bill of Rights applied to the states. See William Winslow 
Crosskey, Charles Fairman, “Legislative History,” and the Constitutional Li-
mitations on State Authority, 22 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 129 (1954) (concluding that 
because Johnson’s opinion drew no dissents, “the whole Court membership, in 
1819, were of the opinion the civil-jury provision of the Seventh Amendment 
applied to the states as well as the nation” (footnotes omitted)). A second in-
terpretation is that Johnson invoked the Seventh Amendment only to deter-
mine whether the statute could be enforced in the District of Columbia, where 
the Seventh Amendment did apply. Charles Fairman took this position. See 
Charles Fairman, The Supreme Court and the Constitutional Limitations on 
State Governmental Authority, 21 U. CHI. L. REV. 40, 76 (1953) (“Of course the 
test of the Seventh Amendment must be met; the question was as to the appli-
cability of the Maryland Constitution to a statute to be enforced in the District 
of Columbia—not as to the applicability of the Seventh Amendment to Mary-
land legislation in Maryland.”). The very next year Justice Johnson, in holding 
that the power of Pennsylvania to punish in a court martial militiamen who 
failed to report for federal duty did not conflict with any exclusive congres-
sional power, wrote that “[i]n cases affecting life or member, there is an ex-
press restraint upon the exercise of the punishing power[,] . . . a restriction 
which operates equally upon both governments.” Houston v. Moore, 18 U.S. (5 
Wheat.) 1, 34 (1820). Crosskey concluded that Johnson considered the Fifth 
Amendment to apply to the states. Crosskey, supra, at 129–30. Fairman 
thought the meaning was not clear. Fairman, supra, at 77. 
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The Supreme Court’s subsequent decision in Permoli v. 
Municipality No. 1 of New Orleans71 also makes sense from this 
perspective. In Permoli, the Louisiana Supreme Court had held 
that a municipal ordinance prohibiting display of corpses in 
churches did not violate the Free Exercise Clause of the First 
Amendment and that a Catholic priest could be fined for per-
forming funeral rites in violation of the ordinance.72 On review, 
the United States Supreme Court, holding that it lacked juris-
diction under section 25 of the 1789 Judiciary Act, dismissed 
the appeal.73 Justice John Catron explained: “The Constitution 
makes no provision for protecting the citizens of the respective 
states in their religious liberties; this is left to the state consti-
tutions and laws: nor is there any inhibition imposed by the 
Constitution of the United States in this respect on the 
states.”74 Like Barron, Permoli can be understood to leave open 
the possibility that a state court might apply the Federal Bill of 
Rights to state government. As Justice Catron put it, “the ques-
tion . . . is exclusively of state cognizance.”75 State cognizance 
might include the view that the Federal Bill of Rights con-
strained state government.76 
E. ONE-WAY REVIEW 
My reading of Barron best explains the numerous state 
court decisions, both before and after Barron, applying provi-
sions and principles of the Federal Bill of Rights to constrain 
state government. The next Part of this Article explores in de-
tail those state court decisions. Before getting to the specific 
state court cases, there is more to say up front about why they 
were consistent with the Supreme Court’s holding in Barron. 
The problem comes down to this: how could a state court review 
and invalidate state laws or executive actions on the ground 
 
 71. 44 U.S. (3 How.) 589 (1845). 
 72. See id. at 609. 
 73. Id. at 610. 
 74. Id. at 609. 
 75. Id. at 610. 
 76. So, too, in Fox v. Ohio, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 410, 435 (1847), in rejecting a 
defendant’s argument that a state conviction for counterfeiting coins was 
invalid under the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment, Justice 
Peter Daniel for the Court observed that in understanding the Bill of Rights, 
“it is neither probable nor credible that the States should have anxiously in-
sisted to ingraft upon the [F]ederal [C]onstitution restrictions upon their own 
authority.” Fox also left open the possibility that under the operations of state 
law, double jeopardy might apply. Id. at 420. 
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that they violated the Federal Bill of Rights when the United 
States Supreme Court, authoritative on matters of federal law, 
had held the Bill of Rights did not apply? 
The state courts relied upon the limited power Congress 
had given the Supreme Court to review state court decisions. 
The 1789 Judiciary Act, central to the Barron decision itself, 
gave the United States Supreme Court authority to review a 
decision of a state court “where is drawn in question the validi-
ty of a statute of, or an authority exercised under any State, on 
the ground of their being repugnant to the [C]onstitution . . . of 
the United States, and the decision is in favour of such their 
validity.”77 In other words, the Supreme Court could review 
state court cases that upheld state laws and executive actions 
against federal constitutional challenge. However, there was no 
review in the United States Supreme Court if the state court 
agreed that the challenged state law or conduct violated a pro-
vision of the Federal Constitution.78 The Supreme Court’s re-
view power was therefore one-way. At least this is how the ear-
ly courts understood the Judiciary Act—a necessary 
qualification given recent disputes over the correct reading of 
the Act.79 This basic distinction remained in place when the 
 
 77. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 25, 1 Stat. 73. See generally Wythe 
Holt, “To Establish Justice”: Politics, the Judiciary Act of 1789, and the Inven-
tion of the Federal Courts, 1989 DUKE L.J. 1421 (discussing the creation of the 
federal judiciary); Charles Warren, New Light on the History of the Federal 
Judiciary Act of 1789, 37 HARV. L. REV. 49 (1923) (describing the enactment of 
the Judiciary Act of 1789). 
 78. Section 25 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 stated in relevant part: 
[A] final judgment or decree in any suit, in the highest court of law or 
equity of a State in which a decision in the suit could be had, where is 
drawn in question the validity of a treaty or statute of, or an authori-
ty exercised under the United States, and the decision is against their 
validity; or where is drawn in question the validity of a statute of, or 
an authority exercised under any State, on the ground of their being 
repugnant to the constitution, treaties or laws of the United States, 
and the decision is in favour of such their validity, or where is drawn 
in question the construction of any clause of the constitution, or of a 
treaty, or statute of, or commission held under the United States, and 
the decision is against the title, right, privilege or exemption specially 
set up or claimed by either party, under such clause of the said Con-
stitution, treaty, statute or commission, may be re-examined and re-
versed or affirmed in the Supreme Court of the United States upon a 
writ of error. 
Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 25, 1 Stat. 73, 85–86. 
 79. Akhil Amar has presented an unconventional reading of section 25 of 
the 1789 Judiciary Act. See Akhil Reed Amar, The Two-Tiered Structure of the 
Judiciary Act of 1789, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1499 (1990). In his view, properly 
construed, section 25 would never have prevented the Supreme Court from 
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Judiciary Act was amended in 186780 and reenacted in 187381 
and 1911.82 Only in 1914 did Congress give the United States 
Supreme Court jurisdiction over state court decisions holding 
that a state law or action did not violate the Federal Constitu-
 
considering any issue of federal law decided in a state’s highest court. See id. 
at 1530–32. According to Amar, if the state court wrongly enforced a federal 
right, the losing party could present the appeal to the Supreme Court as in-
volving the state court’s failure to protect that party from application of the 
federal right enforced. Id. at 1531–32. Amar contends that the third clause of 
section 25, which allowed either party to contend that a federal “right, privi-
lege, or exemption” was denied, “could easily have been read to uphold the Su-
preme Court’s appellate jurisdiction” in cases where the state had lost in state 
court. Id. (internal quotations omitted). “Thus, in virtually every case in which 
a state court errs in adjudicating a federal law, appellant can plausibly pack-
age her claim of error as one deriving from a violation of her own federal 
‘right, privilege, or exemption’ under the precise language of section 25.” Id. at 
1530. Amar gives an example: “[A]n overexpansive state court interpretation 
of . . . the attainder clause of [A]rticle I, [S]ection 10—that is, one that gives 
the individual more than her due and the state less—can be seen as a state 
court denial of the state’s [T]enth [A]mendment rights, rights arising under 
federal law.” Id. at 1531. Thus, Amar says, the state could appeal. Id. at 1530. 
The one-way review the language of section 25 suggests was, therefore, an 
“optical illusion,” though an illusion that deceived even the early Supreme 
Court, which declined improperly to exercise jurisdiction over appeals brought 
by state government. Id. at 1531 (citing Commonwealth Bank of Ky. v. Grif-
fith, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 56 (1840)). 
I join other commentators who are not persuaded by Amar’s reading of the 
1789 Act. See, e.g., Daniel J. Meltzer, The History and Structure of Article III, 
138 U. PA. L. REV. 1569 (1990) (critiquing Amar’s approach). I see no plausible 
understanding of section 25 that would allow a state to appeal to the United 
States Supreme Court where the state court had held the state violated a fed-
eral constitutional right. The language of the second clause of section 25 clear-
ly distinguishes between cases where the state court has and has not held a 
state statute or executive action unconstitutional. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 
20, § 25. As for the third clause of section 25, which bears much of the weight 
of Amar’s theory, I read the “either party” language to reflect the unremarka-
ble notion that both parties in a case might be private parties, and as private 
parties, might have a federal “right, privilege or exemption” at stake rather 
than the more convoluted notion that state government had a “right, privilege 
or exemption” against enforcement of federal constitutional provisions. Judi-
ciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 25. In any event, for purposes of the present Article, 
what matters ultimately is that, as Amar and his critics agree, the Supreme 
Court (and the state courts), at the time, believed section 25 allowed for only 
limited review. See Amar, supra, at 1532–33 (adopting this understanding); 
Meltzer, supra, at 1589 & n.68 (showing that cases in line with Amar’s reading 
did not appear until 1908); Ann Woolhandler & Michael G. Collins, State 
Standing, 81 VA. L. REV. 387, 422 n.129 (1995) (noting that even if Amar’s 
reading is correct, “the [Supreme] Court apparently did not perceive § 25 as 
reaching claims of overvindication of federal rights”). 
 80. Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 28, § 2, 14 Stat. 385. 
 81. Act of Dec. 1, 1873, ch. 11, § 709, 18 Stat. 1, 132. 
 82. Act of Mar. 3, 1911, ch. 231, § 237, 36 Stat. 1087, 1156. 
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tion.83 By operation of the 1789 Judiciary Act, there was also 
necessarily no review if the United States Supreme Court did 
not consider a state court decision to raise an issue under any 
applicable provision of the Federal Constitution—regardless of 
how the state court had actually ruled on the plaintiffs’ claim. 
Thus, in Barron, the Supreme Court dismissed the plaintiffs’ 
appeal for lack of jurisdiction: though the state court had re-
jected the plaintiffs’ claim that the city had violated the Federal 
Constitution, the United States Supreme Court saw no appli-
cable constitutional provision at stake. In short, where a plain-
tiff in state court had challenged state law or action as violat-
ing the Federal Constitution, the Supreme Court lacked 
jurisdiction if either the state court had accepted the plaintiff ’s 
argument (and invalidated the state law or action) or the state 
court’s decision did not involve any constitutional provision the 
United States Supreme Court considered applicable to state 
government. 
The 1789 Judiciary Act therefore left state courts free to 
extend constitutional protections beyond those the United 
States Supreme Court recognized—by expanding on the Su-
preme Court’s own understandings of applicable constitutional 
provisions or applying provisions of the Federal Constitution 
that the Supreme Court itself did not apply to state govern-
ment. State courts took the position that, with respect to the 
Federal Constitution, they were only required to follow the rul-
ings of the United States Supreme Court where it had “jurisdic-
tion” to review what the state court had done.84 By jurisdiction, 
the state courts did not mean all of the cases to which the fed-
eral “judicial Power . . . extend[ed]” under Article III of the 
Constitution.85 Instead, the state courts meant the jurisdiction 
of the Supreme Court as provided for under the 1789 Judiciary 
Act. Accordingly, state courts concluded they did not need to 
follow prior rulings of the United States Supreme Court on fed-
 
 83. Act of Dec. 23, 1914, ch. 2, 38 Stat. 790. In a comparable manner, 
while the 1789 Act gave the federal courts diversity jurisdiction, see Judiciary 
Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 11, Congress did not assign the federal courts general 
federal question jurisdiction until 1875. See Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 137, § 1, 
18 Stat. 470, 470 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2000)) (assigning 
federal trial courts’ jurisdiction over “all civil actions arising under the Consti-
tution, laws, or treaties of the United States”). 
 84. Under Article III, the Supreme Court’s “appellate Jurisdiction” is sub-
ject to “such Exceptions [and] Regulations as the Congress shall make.” U.S. 
CONST. art. III, § 2. 
 85. Id. 
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eral constitutional issues if the state court decision was not 
subject to later review.86 State courts could not deny or narrow 
protections the Supreme Court had recognized under the Unit-
ed States Constitution—that could trigger review—but state 
courts could impose more stringent constitutional requirements 
on state government than the Supreme Court elected to im-
pose.87 In dozens of cases, state courts articulated this differ-
ence between cases in which they were and were not bound to 
follow the United States Supreme Court on issues of federal 
constitutional law.88 The principle paralleled the notion that 
 
 86. See, e.g., Skelly v. Jefferson Branch of the State Bank of Ohio, 9 Ohio 
St. 606, 614 (1859), rev’d, 66 U.S. (1 Black) 436 (1861). 
 87. In a clear statement of this principle, one state court (though conclud-
ing that it was not bound by the United States Supreme Court’s understand-
ing of whether a legislative act was a contract for purposes of the Constitu-
tion’s Contract Clause) emphasized how section 25 allowed for nonuniform 
rulings by the state courts in one direction but not the other: 
[T]he limited and qualified character of the appellate jurisdiction, 
conferred by the 25th section of the [J]udiciary [A]ct, does not coun-
tenance the idea . . . that Congress had in view a uniformity of deci-
sions upon questions arising under the [C]onstitution and laws of the 
United States, and that the Supreme Court was the common arbiter 
for the decision of such questions. To place the arbiter in a proper po-
sition, care should have been taken that either party to a case in 
which a question arose, might call for its interposition. The object in 
view appears to have been the enforcement of the [C]onstitution and 
laws, rather than a uniformity of decisions. The provisions of the sec-
tion look entirely to the extension, and not to the restriction, of the 
operation of the [C]onstitution and laws of the United States. The 
steps which are permitted all point in one direction. The jurisdiction 
of the Supreme Court can only be invoked when the decision of a case 
is in one way—that is, when it is against the validity of a provision of 
the [C]onstitution or laws, and not when it is in favor of the validity. 
Id. at 612–13. 
 88. See, e.g., Linn v. President of the State Bank of Ill., 2 Ill. (1 Scam.) 87, 
89 (1833) (holding that bills issued by the Bank of Illinois were unconstitu-
tional bills of credit and stating that “the Supreme Court of the United States 
is the proper and constitutional forum to decide and finally to determine all 
suits where is drawn in question the validity of a statute . . . on the ground of 
its being repugnant to the Constitution, treaties, or laws of the United States, 
and the decision is in favor of such validity” and, therefore, “[w]hen the Su-
preme Court of the United States have decided that a State law violates the 
Constitution of the United States, the judges of the respective States have no 
right to overrule or impugn such decision” but must “simply . . . ascertain 
what the Supreme Court of the United States has decided” (internal quotation 
marks omitted)); Braynard v. Marshall, 25 Mass. (8 Pick.) 194, 196–97 (1829) 
(explaining that Supreme Court decisions on the Contract Clause of the Con-
stitution are “binding upon this Court” where a contrary holding “may be car-
ried to [the Supreme Court] by writ of error, and our judgment be reversed; it 
being a question, of which, by section 25 of the [J]udiciary [A]ct of the United 
States . . . that court has jurisdiction”); Bailey v. Fitzgerald, 56 Miss. 578, 586–
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where there was only an issue of construing state law or a state 
constitution, the state court did not need to defer to the United 
States Supreme Court, because it had no jurisdiction to review 
the state court’s holding.89 
II.  STATE COURTS AND THE FEDERAL BILL OF RIGHTS   
Consistent with the understanding of the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Barron I have presented, the early state courts reg-
ularly invoked and applied the Federal Bill of Rights to limit 
the powers of state government. This Part examines these state 
court practices. 
A. OVERVIEW 
State court reliance on the Federal Bill of Rights was an 
important mechanism for protecting individual rights in the 
antebellum era. State courts regularly applied to state govern-
ment the Federal Bill of Rights protections, particularly the 
 
88 (1879) (recognizing, in a Contracts Clause case, that the state court was ob-
ligated to follow Supreme Court precedent where the Supreme Court could re-
view the decision under the Judiciary Act provision allowing for review of a 
state ruling upholding the validity of a state statute against a federal constitu-
tional challenge); Susquehanna Canal Co. v. Commonwealth, 72 Pa. 72, 78 
(1872) (stating, in a Contracts Clause case, that “[w]e are not bound by the de-
cisions of our Supreme Court, except in cases arising under the Constitution of 
the United States, or where the Federal judiciary has superior jurisdiction. 
Should these courts hold that . . . [the challenged statute] impairs the obliga-
tions of the contract . . . our judiciary must give way”); see also Thurston v. 
Fisher, 9 Serg. & Rawle 288, 293 (Pa. 1823) (writing, in a case involving an 
interpretation of a statute of limitations, that “all the decisions of [the United 
States Supreme Court] are entitled to great respect; but unless in cases where 
it has appellate jurisdiction, and may revise and correct the decisions of the 
state courts, its opinions are not conclusive”). 
 89. See, e.g., Doe ex dem. Shelton v. Hamilton, 23 Miss. 496, 498 (1852) 
(stating in a land sale dispute that “[w]hile we entertain a proper respect for 
the opinions of the [United States Supreme Court], and are willing to yield . . . 
the deference [to] which [it is] due . . . when its decisions . . . conflict with 
those of this court, . . . [on] questions, over which the jurisdiction of this court 
is ample and its decisions final, we feel bound to adhere to our own decisions”). 
Some state courts drew a distinction between the entire approach to judicial 
review under a state constitution and under the Federal Constitution. In 1825, 
Justice John Gibson of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court urged that, because 
the 1789 Judiciary Act did not allow the United States Supreme Court to re-
view state court decisions invalidating state laws on federal constitutional 
grounds, state courts should be especially careful in striking down state legis-
lation as violating the Federal Constitution. Eakin v. Raub, 12 Serg. & Rawle 
330, 335–57 (Pa. 1825) (Gibson, J., dissenting). Some state courts expressed 
the view that the Federal Constitution was “enabling” while state constitu-
tions were restraining. See, e.g., In re Dorsey, 7 Port. 293, 400–02 (Ala. 1838). 
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Second, Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments; state courts also 
applied with less frequency the First and Seventh Amend-
ments.90 In scores of other cases, lawyers (perhaps unaware 
even of Barron)91 argued the state had violated their clients’ 
rights under the Federal Bill of Rights.92 To be sure, there were 
 
 90. See infra Parts II.C.1–7. 
 91. Crosskey, supra note 70, at 141 (writing that Barron was “a little-
known case” in the antebellum era). 
 92. See, e.g., Elliott v. Mayfield, 4 Ala. 417, 420 (1842) (summarizing the 
lawyer’s argument that a state statute governing execution of bonds violated 
the Seventh Amendment civil jury provision); Davis v. Tuscumbia, Courtland 
& Decatur R.R. Co., 4 Stew. & P. 421, 427, 433 (Ala. 1833) (noting the lawyer’s 
argument that the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause required that when a 
state exercised its eminent domain power, the property owner should receive 
compensation equal to the value of the property at the time of the taking as 
determined by a jury); People v. McNealy, 17 Cal. 332, 333 (1861) (outlining 
the argument that a second trial following dismissal because of error in in-
dictment violated the Fifth Amendment Double Jeopardy Clause); Rowe v. 
Yuba County, 17 Cal. 61, 62 (1860) (setting forth an argument invoking the 
Sixth Amendment right to counsel in a case involving a lawyer seeking fees 
when appointed to represent an indigent state defendant); Jones v. Cent. R.R. 
& Banking Co., 21 Ga. 104, 106 (1857) (presenting a lawyer’s argument that a 
state statute imposing liability when railroads injured livestock violated the 
Eighth Amendment); Sanders v. Iowa, 2 Iowa 230, 231, 251–70 (1855) (laying 
out an argument citing the Fourth Amendment warrant requirements in chal-
lenging prosecution for liquor possession); Fortier v. McDonogh, 4 Mart. (o.s.) 
718, 731 (La. 1817) (summarizing the lawyer’s argument that if the state re-
quisitioned slaves to perform work on a levee, the Fifth Amendment required 
compensating the slave owner); Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 23 
Mass. (6 Pick.) 376, 380–81, 386–88 (1828) (describing the legal argument in a 
complaint by a bridge operator for compensation under the Fifth Amendment 
when the legislature authorized a second bridge across the same river); In re 
Ross, 19 Mass. (2 Pick.) 165, 168 (1824) (presenting the argument that a stat-
ute increasing a criminal sentence when information showed that the defen-
dant was convicted of a prior offense violated the Fifth Amendment right to a 
jury trial and the Sixth Amendment right to call and confront witnesses); 
Lambeth v. Mississippi, 23 Miss. 322, 337–38 (1852) (outlining the lawyer’s 
argument that the admission of a dying declaration violated the Sixth 
Amendment right to confront witnesses); McGunnegle v. State, 6 Mo. 367, 367 
(1840) (setting forth the legal argument invoking the Seventh Amendment civ-
il jury provision in a case involving the constitutionality of a statute exempt-
ing fire company members from jury service); In re Prime, 1 Barb. Ch. 340, 
342–43 (N.Y. Ch. 1847) (summarizing the argument that imprisonment of a 
debtor violated the Eighth Amendment); Specht v. Commonwealth, 8 Pa. 312, 
317 (1848) (laying out the lawyer’s argument that a statute prohibiting work 
on Sunday violated the First Amendment); Philips v. Gratz, 2 Pen. & W. 412, 
413 (Pa. 1831) (noting the lawyer’s argument that a trial court’s failure to 
grant a continuance to accommodate a Jewish witness’s observance of the 
Sabbath violated the First Amendment); Conner v. Commonwealth, 3 Binn. 
38, 40 (Pa. 1810) (presenting the argument that an arrest pursuant to a war-
rant not supported by an oath or affirmation violated the Fourth Amendment); 
Harding v. Goodlett, 11 Tenn. (3 Yer.) 41, 42 (1832) (noting the lawyer’s argu-
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plenty of cases, prior to and after Barron, in which state courts 
held that the Federal Bill of Rights did not apply to state gov-
ernment.93 For example, in 1824, the Supreme Court of New 
York, rejecting a claim that an anti-dueling statute violated the 
Eighth Amendment prohibition on cruel and unusual punish-
ments, explained that the point of the Bill of Rights was “not to 
limit the power of the states, but to limit the power of the un-
ion, and by new provisions to give security to rights, which 
were supposed to be in danger from the new and untried sys-
tem of national government.”94 The court noted that the states 
remained free to include liberty-protecting provisions in their 
own state constitutions—and most states had elected to do so.95 
To read the provisions of the Federal Bill of Rights to operate 
on the states would “render nugatory and null, the like provi-
 
ment that a taking of property to establish a mill was not a taking for a “pub-
lic use” and therefore violated the Fifth Amendment even though compensa-
tion was paid); Brainard v. Stilphin, 6 Vt. 9, 10 (1834) (providing the lawyer’s 
argument that the power of militia officers to assess and collect fines violated 
the Sixth Amendment jury trial right); Hood v. Maxwell, 1 W. Va. 219, 223, 
231 (1866) (providing a legal argument based on the Second Amendment in a 
case involving liability for wheat taken for use by the militia); see also Cross-
key, supra note 70, at 142 n.266 (collecting additional cases). 
 93. See, e.g., Colt v. Eves, 12 Conn. 243, 251–52 (1837) (holding that the 
Seventh Amendment did not apply in state courts); Reed v. Rice, 25 Ky. (2 J.J. 
Marsh.) 44, 45 (1829) (holding that the Fourth Amendment applied only to the 
federal government); Renthorp v. Bourg, 4 Mart. (o.s.) 97, 130 (La. 1816) (hold-
ing that the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause did not apply to states); Barker 
v. People, 3 Cow. 686, 701 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1824) (holding that the Eighth 
Amendment, like the other provisions of the Bill of Rights, applied only to the 
federal government); Murphy v. People, 2 Cow. 815, 818 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1824) 
(holding that the Fifth and Sixth Amendments did not apply to the states); 
State v. Newsom, 27 N.C. (5 Ired.) 250, 251 (1844) (holding, in a case challeng-
ing a statute prohibiting free blacks from carrying firearms, that the Second 
Amendment applied only to the federal government); James v. Common-
wealth, 12 Serg. & Rawle 220, 221 (Pa. 1825) (reporting that at oral argument 
the court rejected plaintiff’s claim that the Eighth Amendment applied to a 
state law providing for punishment by ducking, the practice of securing an of-
fender to a stool and, in view of the public, submerging the offender a pre-
scribed number of times in a pond or other body of water); State v. Paul, 5 R.I. 
185, 195 (1858) (holding that the Fifth and Sixth Amendments did not apply to 
the states); State v. M’Lemore, 20 S.C.L. (2 Hill) 680, 681 (S.C. 1835) (reason-
ing that the Double Jeopardy Clause applied only in federal courts); Com-
monwealth v. Murray, 4 Va. (2 Va. Cas.) 504, 507 (1826) (writing that the 
Fourth Amendment “was intended to afford security to the people of all the 
States, against the encroachments of their Federal Legislature, Executive and 
Judiciary, and all of the officers created by, or dependent on them” and is “not 
. . . a rule for the State authorities”). 
 94. Barker, 3 Cow. at 701. 
 95. Id. at 701–02. 
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sion[s] in the constitutions of very many of the states; and at 
the same time, to force upon all the states which have not 
adopted such . . . provision[s], a rule which they may think in-
expedient, and which they at least, have thought unnecessary, 
in their own internal economy.”96 Similarly, in 1858, the Su-
preme Court of Rhode Island explained in detail why the Fed-
eral Bill of Rights did not apply to state government.97 None-
theless, as explored in this Part, state courts applied the Bill of 
Rights to state government with sufficient frequency that the 
practice, largely overlooked in modern times, was a significant 
element of the judicial landscape of antebellum America.98 
B. TEXTUAL SUPPORT  
Before examining the practices of the state courts, it is use-
ful to note how the text of the Bill of Rights facilitated their ap-
plication of the Bill of Rights to state government. Textually, 
the First Amendment is limited to the national government: 
“Congress shall make no law . . . .”99 However, the subsequent 
 
 96. Id. at 702. 
 97. In State v. Paul, the court wrote: 
From the history of these amendments, as well as from the necessary 
import of most of them, they have no reference to the state govern-
ments, but are restricted in their operation to the government of the 
United States. The states had already provided, or could provide, by 
their local constitutions, for the preservation of the rights . . . and the 
articles in question originated in the well-known jealousy of the pow-
er of the general government which so nearly prevented the adoption 
of the [F]ederal [C]onstitution. 
5 R.I. at 196.  
 98. Modern commentators have not entirely ignored how state courts ap-
plied the Bill of Rights to state government. See, e.g., AKHIL REED AMAR, THE 
BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 145–62 (1998) [hereinafter 
AMAR, CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION] (discussing the “Barron contra-
rians”); CURTIS, supra note 11, at 22–56 (collecting early cases and discussing 
the emergence of arguments by congressional Republicans, at the time of con-
sideration of the Fourteenth Amendment, that the Bill of Rights already 
bound the states). The practice, however, was more widespread and more ref-
lective of a serious theory of constitutional government than is commonly ac-
knowledged. Akhil Amar, the commentator who has made the most serious 
modern attempt to understand these antebellum state courts, calls them “Bar-
ron contrarians.” AMAR, CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION, supra, at 22–56. 
Yet that label, treating as it does these state courts from the perspective of the 
United States Supreme Court (as mavericks, essentially) does not adequately 
capture the phenomenon. In applying the Federal Bill of Rights, antebellum 
state courts did not see themselves as doing something contrary to Barron or 
inconsistent with any other applicable ruling of the United States Supreme 
Court. 
 99. U.S. CONST. amend. I (emphasis added). 
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provisions of the Bill do not contain the same limiting lan-
guage. The Second through Eighth Amendments, taken alone, 
appear to be free-floating, generally applicable protections for 
individual liberties. Thus, the Second Amendment says that 
“the right . . . to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed,” 
but does not specify who may not infringe the right.100 The 
Fifth Amendment ensures that “[n]o person shall” be prosecut-
ed without grand jury indictment or put in double jeopardy, but 
the Amendment gives no indication that it constrains only the 
federal government.101 The Eighth Amendment says 
“[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines im-
posed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted,” but it 
does not explain who may not require, impose, or inflict these 
things.102 In applying the Bill of Rights provisions to constrain 
state government, antebellum state courts were at least not de-
fying specific language against application; they could even in-
voke the ambiguous text of the Bill in support of application.103 
 
 100. Id. amend. II. 
 101. Id. amend. V. 
 102. Id. amend. VIII. 
 103. State courts were not alone in this understanding. The author of a 
prominent early treatise on the Constitution also took the view that the states 
were bound by at least some provisions of the Bill of Rights. See WILLIAM 
RAWLE, A VIEW OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
115–38 (Philadelphia, Nicklin 2d ed. 1829). Rawle wrote that while the First 
Amendment 
expressly refers to the power of [C]ongress alone . . . some of those 
[amendments] which follow are to be more generally construed, and 
considered as applying to the state legislatures as well as that of the 
Union. The important principles contained in them are now incorpo-
rated by adoption into the instrument itself; they form parts of the 
declared rights of the people, of which neither the state powers nor 
those of the Union can ever deprive them. 
Id. at 124–25. Rawle identified the Second and Fourth Amendments as appli-
cable equally to state government. Id. at 125, 127. More recently, University of 
Chicago law professor William Winslow Crosskey took the view that in the 
House, “there was sentiment . . . for extending all of the amendments to the 
states” and that “the decision in the Senate was to extend to the states all the 
amendments, save . . . the matters dealt with in the First Amendment.” 
Crosskey, supra note 70, at 123. In his view, while the early Supreme Court 
was receptive to the view that the Bill of Rights constrained the states, by the 
time of Barron, it feared Congress might impose further limitations on the 
Court’s appellate powers were it to review aggressively state court decisions. 
Id. at 131 n.238; see also 2 WILLIAM WINSLOW CROSSKEY, POLITICS AND THE 
CONSTITUTION IN THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 1057–64 (1953) (ar-
guing that the text and historical origins of the Bill of Rights indicate that the 
First Amendment and the Seventh Amendment prohibition on re-examining 
in any court of the United States facts tried by juries except in accordance 
with the common law applied only to the federal government but that the oth-
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The blame for the ambiguous text of the Bill of Rights lies 
with the House of Representatives.104 When originally offered 
on June 8, 1789, James Madison’s proposed amendments were 
to be integrated into the existing Constitution in a way that 
would make clear which government they were limiting.105 By 
August 18, 1789, the House Committee of the Whole had ap-
proved an initial version of amendments that took this textual-
ly clear form.106 However, Roger Sherman of Connecticut and 
Thomas Tudor Tucker of South Carolina, aghast at the pros-
pect of altering any of the original language of the Constitution, 
led an opposition movement that ultimately resulted in the rep-
resentatives’ grudging decision to tack the amendments onto 
the end of the original Constitution.107 While that concession 
(necessary to muster the two-thirds vote in the House in favor 
of approving the slate of proposed amendments)108 preserved 
the Constitution’s original language, it came at the cost of tex-
tual clarity. Simply reading the provisions did not immediately 
reveal that the Second through Eighth Amendments applied 
only to the federal government.109 
 
er amendments applied also to the states); id. at 1081 (calling Barron a 
“sham” and “one of the most extensive and indefensible of all the various fail-
ures of the Court to enforce the Constitution against the states as the docu-
ment is written”). 
 104. See generally Jason Mazzone, Unamendments, 90 IOWA L. REV. 1747, 
1774–94 (2005) (describing congressional debates on where to place the 
amendments within the Constitution). 
 105. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 437–42 (Joseph Gales ed., 1789). 
 106. Id. at 707–63. 
 107. Id. at 757–66. 
 108. See Letter from James Madison, Member, U.S. House of Representa-
tives, to Alexander White, Representative, Va. State Legislature (Aug. 24, 
1789), in CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS: THE DOCUMENTARY RECORD FROM 
THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS 287–88 (Helen E. Veit et al. eds., 1991) (“It be-
came an unavoidable sacrifice to a few who knew their concurrence to be ne-
cessary . . . to give up the form by which the amen[dmen]ts when ratified 
would have fallen into the body of the Constitution, in favor of the project of 
adding them by way of appendix to it.”). 
 109. A very close reading of the amendments in conjunction with the Con-
stitution, however, does so reveal. Reading the amendments in connection 
with Article I provides a textual clue: each of the Second through Eighth 
Amendments are of the same passive syntax as Article I, Section 9. Thus, just 
as in Section 9, “[t]he Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be sus-
pended” and “[n]o Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall be passed,” so too 
in the Second Amendment, “the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, 
shall not be infringed” and in the Third Amendment, “[n]o Soldier shall . . . be 
quartered in any house.” Compare U.S. CONST. art I, § 9, with id. amends. II  
& III. By contrast, the prohibitions on the states in Article I, Section 10 take 
the active form: “No State shall . . . .” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10. A very careful 
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Moreover, in the entire scheme of things, it was not prepos-
terous for state courts to read the Bill of Rights as general pro-
hibitions on all government. Modern commentators, emphasiz-
ing the dramatic reconfiguration that occurred with the 
Reconstruction amendments, contend that, as a historical mat-
ter, in the early Republic the Federal Constitution did not pro-
tect individual rights from infringement by the states.110 Yet 
this view exaggerates the divide between the pre– and post– 
Civil War Federal Constitution and it overlooks the degree to 
which early Americans viewed all government, federal and 
state, with suspicion.111 Article I, Section 10 of the Constitution 
already contained, among its slew of prohibitions on the states, 
three provisions specifically protecting individuals: the states 
were prohibited from passing bills of attainder and ex post facto 
laws (both also prohibited by Section 9 to the federal govern-
ment) and from impairing contractual obligations.112 Early 
state courts routinely invoked these Section 10 prohibitions in 
reviewing state laws and limiting the actions of state govern-
ment.113 If the Federal Constitution so clearly prohibited the 
 
reader, who did not know beforehand that the Second through Eighth 
Amendments belonged with the Section 9 prohibitions on the national gov-
ernment, would reach the proper conclusion from the syntax. Chief Justice 
Marshall saw the point. See Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 249 
(1833) (“[I]n every inhibition [in the 1789 Constitution] intended to act on 
state power, words are employed, which directly express that intent.”). Signifi-
cantly, the Fourteenth Amendment, which clearly does constrain the states, 
uses the same “No state shall” language of Article I, Section 9. Compare U.S. 
CONST. art I, § 9, with id. amend. XIV. Note, though, that Article IV of the 
Constitution applies to the states but it uses the indirect language of Section 
10. Compare U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1 (“Full Faith and Credit shall be given in 
each State . . . .”), and id. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1 (“The Citizens of each State shall be 
entitled to all Privileges and Immunities . . . .”), and id. art. IV, § 2, cl. 2 (stat-
ing that fugitives and runaway slaves “shall be delivered up”), with id. art. I,  
§ 10. Perhaps the distinction is that Article IV imposes obligations on the 
states (rather than restricts them). 
 110. See, e.g., AMAR, CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION, supra note 98; 
CURTIS, supra note 11, at 23 (describing how, with the decision in Barron, 
“states [were] free to nullify basic rights”); Denise C. Morgan & Rebecca E. 
Zietlow, The New Parity Debate: Congress and Rights of Belonging, 73 U. CIN. 
L. REV. 1347, 1367 (2005) (“[P]rior to the Civil War, with few exceptions, only 
states protected [citizens’ individual] rights.”). 
 111. See generally MARC W. KRUMAN, BETWEEN AUTHORITY AND LIBERTY: 
STATE CONSTITUTION MAKING IN REVOLUTIONARY AMERICA 49–53, 155–63 
(1997) (discussing structural mechanisms in state constitutions to constrain 
legislatures and executive officials). 
 112. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10. 
 113. See, e.g., Alridge v. Tuscumbia, Courtland, & Decatur R.R. Co., 2 
Stew. & P. 199, 205 (Ala. 1832) (holding that, in affirming a state’s power to 
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states from passing bills of attainder and ex post facto laws, it 
was not harebrained to understand the Constitution also to 
protect individuals from double jeopardy, conviction without a 
jury trial, and self-incrimination.114 If the Federal Constitution 
limited states from interfering with contracts, it was not im-
possible to imagine the Constitution also limited the ability of 
states to take a person’s property.115 Indeed, in recognizing the 
 
grant eminent domain authority to a railroad, while ex post facto state laws 
were unconstitutional, the ban applied only in criminal prosecutions); Randel 
v. Shoemaker, 1 Del. (1 Harr.) 565, 576 (1835) (holding that an attachment of 
tolls in satisfaction of judgment did not violate prohibitions on ex post facto 
laws or laws impairing contractual obligations); Doe ex dem. Gaines v. Buford, 
31 Ky. (1 Dana) 481, 509–10 (1833) (explaining state-level application of the 
prohibition on bills of attainder in a case holding a forfeiture statute unconsti-
tutional); Lapsley v. Brashears, 14 Ky. (4 Litt.) 47, 51–65 (1823) (holding that 
a state statute extending retroactively the period for payment of judgment was 
a law impairing the obligation of contracts and therefore void under Section 
10); Boston Water Power Co. v. Boston & Worcester R.R., 40 Mass. (23 Pick.) 
360, 394 (1839) (holding that the state charter authorizing a railroad across 
land that the state had previously granted to a water power company did not 
violate the contracts provision of Section 10); In re Ross, 19 Mass. (2 Pick.) 
165, 169–70 (1824) (explaining that if a statute is ex post facto, it is the court’s 
duty under the Federal Constitution to invalidate the statute, but a law sub-
jecting a repeat offender to an additional penalty is constitutional even though 
the law was passed after the defendant’s commission of the first offense); State 
v. Cummings, 36 Mo. 263, 272 (1865) (holding that while the Ex Post Facto 
Clause of Section 10 applied to state laws, state constitutional prohibition on 
attorneys practicing in state courts without having taken a loyalty oath was 
constitutional); Shepherd v. People, 25 N.Y. 406 (1862) (invalidating a state 
law altering the penalty in capital cases as violating the Ex Post Facto 
Clause); Hartung v. People, 22 N.Y. 95 (1860) (similar); Jones v. Crittenden, 4 
N.C. (1 Car. L. Rep.) 55, 57 (1814) (striking down a state law suspending en-
forcement of a judgment against a debtor as a violation of the Contracts 
Clause and explaining that “the restrictive clause in the [C]onstitution . . . an-
nul[s] every act of a State legislature which . . . produces . . . [the prohibited] 
effect”); State v. Antonio, 7 S.C.L. (2 Tread.) 776, 785 (1816) (holding that al-
though Section 10 prohibited states from “coin[ing] money,” states retained 
power to prosecute counterfeiting); Byrne v. Stewart, 3 S.C.Eq. (3 Des. Eq.) 
466, 477 (1812) (upholding a state law regulating lawyers as consistent with 
the Ex Post Facto Clause); Von Baumbach v. Bade, 9 Wis. 559, 575–82 (1859) 
(holding that while states were bound by the Contracts Clause of Section 10, a 
statute prohibiting a mortgagee from selling mortgaged property for six 
months following judgment in the mortgagee’s favor in a foreclosure action 
was constitutional).  
 114. U.S. CONST. amends. V & VI. 
 115. Id. amend. V. But see Michael W. McConnell, Contract Rights and 
Property Rights: A Case Study in the Relationship Between Individual Liber-
ties and Constitutional Structure, 76 CAL. L. REV. 267, 283–93 (1988) (explor-
ing why, in light of the perceived risks and predicted consequences, it made 
sense for the ratifying generation to prevent the federal government, but not 
the states, from taking property without just compensation, and to prevent 
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existence of rights beyond those specifically enumerated, the 
Ninth Amendment referred not to rights enumerated in the Bill 
of Rights, but to “[t]he enumeration in the Constitution of . . . 
rights.”116 Besides the Bill of Rights, rights, including rights 
held against the states, were enumerated in the Constitution in 
Article I.117 In this context, the ambiguities of the Bill of Rights 
provisions were resolved in favor of the reading that they, like 
the Article I provisions, operated as a constraint on state gov-
ernment.118 
 
state governments, but not the national government, from interfering with 
contracts). 
 116. U.S. CONST. amend. IX (emphasis added). Commentators sometimes 
overlook this point. For example, Laurence Tribe and Michael Dorf write of 
the Ninth Amendment: 
It tells each reader: whatever else you’re going to do to explain why 
“liberty” does not include the grandmother’s right to live with her 
grandchild—whatever else you’re going to say to conclude that the 
“privileges or immunities” of national citizenship do not include the 
right to use contraceptives—you cannot advance the argument that 
those rights are not there just because they are not enumerated in the 
Bill of Rights. 
LAURENCE H. TRIBE & MICHAEL C. DORF, ON READING THE CONSTITUTION 54 
(1991). 
 117. Article IV, Section 2 can also be read as enumerating rights—to enjoy 
equally privileges and immunities within the states and to recover fugitive 
slaves. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2 (stating that “[t]he Citizens of each State 
shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several 
States” and that escaped slaves “shall be delivered up on Claim of the [slave 
owner]”). 
 118. See, e.g., Paxson v. Sweet, 13 N.J.L. 196, 199 (1832) (assuming that 
the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment would apply to state government). 
Notably, many abolitionists ignored Barron or stated explicitly that the deci-
sion was incorrect. JACOBUS TENBROEK, EQUAL UNDER LAW 128 (1965). Re-
publican leaders in Congress in 1866, including John Bingham, the author of 
Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment, would come to assert that, notwith-
standing Barron, the states had always been bound by the Bill of Rights and 
that what the Fourteenth Amendment changed was to give Congress authority 
to enforce this requirement. See CURTIS, supra note 11, at 46–56. Without ex-
aggerating the similarities, some of Bingham’s statements suggest an under-
standing of Barron that fits with the approach I have offered in this Article. 
For example, on February 28, 1866, Bingham described Barron as “involving 
the question whether [the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment was] bind-
ing upon the State of Maryland and to be enforced in the Federal courts.” 
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1089 (1866). Bingham’s description of 
Barron as involving, in addition to the issue of whether the Fifth Amendment 
applied to the states, whether it would be “enforced in the Federal courts” fits 
nicely with how I have presented Barron. Emphasizing the difference between 
state court and federal court enforcement of the Bill of Rights also renders 
other statements by Bingham less cryptic. For instance, Bingham stated on 
February 28, 1866, that “although as ruled [in Barron] the existing amend-
ments are not applicable to and do not bind the States, they are nevertheless 
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C. APPLICATIONS OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS 
The remainder of this Part examines cases in which state 
courts applied the provisions and principles of the Bill of Rights 
to state government. 
1. Second Amendment 
Early state courts applied the Second Amendment to state 
legislation. Justice Joseph Henry Lumpkin of the Georgia Su-
preme Court119 provided the most extensive explanation as to 
why the Second Amendment applied to state government in the 
1846 case of Nunn v. State.120 Writing for the court in Nunn, 
Justice Lumpkin held unconstitutional a state statute, “An Act 
to guard and protect the citizens of this State against the un-
warrantable and too prevalent use of deadly weapons,” that 
made it a misdemeanor to sell or carry knives, pistols, and oth-
er weapons.121 The defendant had been indicted for carrying a 
pistol.122 A section of the statute exempted certain weapons if 
carried openly, but the exemption did not apply to pistols.123 No 
provision in the state constitution protected a right to carry 
arms.124 
Justice Lumpkin held that while the state legislature could 
prohibit the carrying of concealed weapons, a general prohibi-
tion on possessing weapons violated the Second Amendment.125 
Without mentioning Barron by name, Lumpkin recognized that 
 
to be enforced and observed in [the] States . . . .” Id. at 1090. He described the 
Fourteenth Amendment as “giv[ing] . . . to the People of the United States the 
power, by legislative enactment to punish officials of States for violations of 
the oaths enjoined upon them by their Constitution.” Id. He also claimed that  
[t]he adoption of the proposed amendment will take from the States 
no rights that belong to the States . . . but if . . . [the state legisla-
tures] . . . enact laws refusing equal protection to life, liberty, or prop-
erty, the Congress is thereby vested with power to hold them to an-
swer before the bar of the national courts for the violation of their 
oaths and the rights of their fellow-men. 
Id. 
 119. Lumpkin became Georgia’s first Chief Justice when the position was 
created in 1864. PAUL DEFOREST HICKS, JOSEPH HENRY LUMPKIN: GEORGIA’S 
FIRST CHIEF JUSTICE 3 (2002). 
 120. Nunn v. State, 1 Ga. 243 (1846). 
 121. Id. at 243. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. at 246. 
 124. See GA. CONST. of 1798; cf. GA. CONST. of 1861, art. I (“The right of the 
people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed.”). 
 125. Nunn, 1 Ga. at 251. 
MAZZONE_6FMT 12/13/2007 9:13 AM 
2007] BILL OF RIGHTS 33 
 
“it has been decided, that this, like other amendments adopted 
at the same time, is a restriction upon the government of the 
United States, and does not extend to the individual States.”126 
Lumpkin noted, however, there remained “disagreement” on 
this issue—Lumpkin cited with approval New York Chief Jus-
tice Ambrose Spencer’s view in 1820, in People v. Goodwin, that 
the Fifth Amendment “‘extend[s] to all judicial tribunals, 
whether constituted by the Congress of the United States or 
the States individually’” because “‘[t]he provision is general in 
its nature and unrestricted in its terms; and the sixth article of 
the [Federal] Constitution declares, that that Constitution shall 
be the supreme law of the land.’”127 State courts were, in other 
words, required to enforce the Federal Constitution and it in-
cluded the Bill of Rights. Textually, Lumpkin observed, “[t]he 
language of the [S]econd [A]mendment is broad enough to em-
brace both Federal and State governments,” and there is 
“[nothing] in its terms which restricts its meaning.”128 Moreo-
ver, as a historical matter, the right to bear arms was part of 
the English Constitution and, therefore, among the “‘rights and 
liberties of English subjects’—whether living 3,000 or 300 miles 
from the royal palace.”129 
As for the argument that, historically, the Federal Bill of 
Rights was ratified as a constraint only on the federal govern-
ment, Lumpkin was not impressed. While true that the Bill of 
Rights “originated in the fear that the powers of the general 
government were not sufficiently limited,” it was, Lumpkin 
thought, wrong to read the Bill as therefore supporting a power 
of the state governments to restrict individual rights.130 The 
fact that “the people refused to delegate to the general govern-
ment the power to take from them the right to keep and bear 
arms” did not mean that “they designed to rest it in the State 
governments.”131 Rather, even after the ratification of the 
Second Amendment, the right to bear arms remained where it 
had begun: with the people. Lumpkin wrote: 
Is it not an unalienable right, which lies at the bottom of every free 
government? . . . This right is too dear to be confided to a republican 
 
 126. Id. at 250. 
 127. Id. (quoting People v. Goodwin, 18 Johns. Cas. 187, 201 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
1820)). 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. at 249. 
 130. Id. at 250. 
 131. Id.  
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legislature. . . . If a well-regulated militia is necessary to the security 
of the State of Georgia and of the United States, is it competent for 
the General Assembly to take away this security, by disarming the 
people? What advantage would it be to tie up the hands of the nation-
al legislature, if it were in the power of the States to destroy this bul-
wark of defence? In solemnly affirming that a well-regulated militia is 
necessary to the security of a free State, and that, in order to train 
properly that militia, the unlimited right of the people to keep and 
bear arms shall not be impaired, are not the sovereign people of the 
State committed by this pledge to preserve this right inviolate? Would 
they not be recreant to themselves, to free government, and false to 
their own vow, thus voluntarily taken, to suffer this right to be ques-
tioned?132 
Bearing arms, in other words, was a “natural right,”133 a 
right “inestimable to freemen,”134 “one of the fundamental prin-
ciples, upon which rests the great fabric of civil liberty.”135 
Therefore, “any law, State or Federal, is repugnant to the Con-
stitution, and void” if it “contravenes this right.”136 The same 
principle extended, Lumpkin concluded, to the other provisions 
of the Bill of Rights.137 
The Georgia Supreme Court was not alone in considering 
the Second Amendment applicable to state government. The 
Arkansas Supreme Court applied the Second Amendment to a 
state law prohibiting concealed weapons.138 Chief Justice Da-
niel Ringo reasoned that the Second Amendment applied be-
cause it “provides an additional security for the public liberty 
and the free institutions of the State.”139 Nonetheless, because 
the Second Amendment did not “operate as an immunity to 
those, who should . . . keep or bear their arms as to injure or 
endanger the private rights of others, or in any manner preju-
dice the common interests of society,” Ringo concluded that the 
concealed weapons law was constitutional.140 In the same case, 
 
 132. Id. at 250–51. 
 133. Id. at 251. 
 134. Id. at 249 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. at 251. 
 137. Id. (stating that other rights of the Bill of Rights are “as perfect under 
the State as the national legislature, and cannot be violated by either”). Per-
haps Lumpkin’s unusually cosmopolitan biography explains his expansive 
view of federal constitutional principles constraining state government. See 
generally HICKS, supra note 119 (describing, among other things, Lumpkin’s 
speeches and other activities in the northern states and his travels in Europe). 
 138. State v. Buzzard, 4 Ark. 18, 28 (1842). 
 139. Id. at 24. 
 140. Id. at 25. 
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Justice Townsend Dickinson thought the Second Amendment 
applied to the state for reasons of supremacy. He viewed the 
Second Amendment as limiting state laws that interfered with 
federal powers to organize, arm, and discipline the militia.141 In 
his opinion, state laws that “weaken the arm of the Federal 
Government, impair its power, or lessen its means to protect 
and sustain itself, and preserve inviolate the freedom of the 
States” were void.142 However, since the concealed weapons law 
was “a mere police regulation of the State for the better securi-
ty and safety of its citizens, having reference to weapons and 
arms of a wholly different character from such as are ordinarily 
used for warlike purposes,” it was not within the Second 
Amendment’s scope.143  
The Supreme Court of Louisiana in 1856, and again in 
1858, also took the view that the Second Amendment applied to 
the states but it too upheld concealed weapons laws against 
Second Amendment challenges.144 In 1859, in a challenge to a 
state statute imposing a heightened penalty for homicides 
committed with a bowie knife or dagger, the Texas Supreme 
Court applied a line of reasoning similar to Lumpkin’s Second 
Amendment analysis in Nunn but ultimately held that the 
Texas statute did not infringe the right to bear arms.145 
2. Fourth Amendment 
Dozens of antebellum state court decisions applied the 
Fourth Amendment to state laws and state executive action.146 
 
 141. Id. at 29–30. 
 142. Id. at 31. 
 143. Id. at 32. Justice Thomas Lacy took a similar approach but concluded 
that carrying concealed weapons was within the scope of the Second Amend-
ment protection, and the state statute was therefore unconstitutional. See id. 
at 39–43. 
 144. See State v. Jumel, 13 La. Ann. 399 (1858); State v. Smith, 11 La. 
Ann. 633 (1856). 
 145. Cockrum v. State, 24 Tex. 394, 401–04 (1859). 
 146. See, e.g., Rohan v. Swain, 59 Mass. (5 Cush.) 281, 285 (1850) (conclud-
ing that when a police officer with probable cause arrested a suspect without 
obtaining a warrant there was no “violation of the great fundamental prin-
ciples of our national and state constitutions, forbidding unreasonable 
searches and arrests . . . [because] these provisions . . . had another and differ-
ent purpose, being in restraint of general warrants”); Stone v. Dana, 46 Mass. 
(5 Met.) 98, 102 (1842) (observing that an arrest warrant that does not name 
the subject is inconsistent with the state constitution and the Fourth Amend-
ment); Wells v. Jackson, 17 Va. (3 Munf.) 458, 474 (1811) (invoking the parti-
cularity requirement of the Fourth Amendment in finding terms of a warrant 
inadequate); see also Hodgson v. Millward, 3 Grant 406, 409, 410 (Pa. 1863) 
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Decisions from Massachusetts, Louisiana, and New Hampshire, 
all after Barron, demonstrate the pattern. 
In 1838, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts va-
cated a directed verdict for the plaintiff in a trespass action.147 
The trial judge had held that the defendant acted unlawfully 
when, pursuant to a warrant, he broke into the plaintiff ’s shop 
and seized allegedly stolen goods.148 Reviewing the judgment, 
the court held that the trial judge had failed to apply the cor-
rect standard regarding searches and seizures.149 Both the 
Fourth Amendment and an analogous provision of the state 
constitution imposed a reasonableness requirement on searches 
and seizures: “these provisions [of the Federal and state consti-
tutions] are intended to shield [personal rights] from the effects 
of arbitrary power and to secure to them the protection of equal 
and uniform laws.”150 Under this standard, “[a] warrant, 
founded upon oath, duly describing the person to be arrested, 
the place to be searched, or the property to be seized, and is-
sued with the formalities and in cases prescribed by law, is in 
exact conformity with both constitutional provisions.”151 The 
trial judge’s error was the failure to recognize that under the 
Fourth Amendment and under the state constitutional analog, 
“any seizure of person or property made in pursuance of such 
warrant, would manifestly be legal and valid.”152 
The Supreme Court of Louisiana also understood the 
Fourth Amendment to limit searches and seizures by state gov-
ernment. In 1847, that court affirmed a jury award of $2000 in 
damages to the owner of a cigar shop searched during the ex-
ecution of a warrant that authorized a search only of a neigh-
boring cabaret.153 The court reasoned that sanctioning the 
search of the cigar shop would violate the Fourth Amendment 
prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures.154 The court 
 
(in a case involving a federal statute requiring the President to seize property, 
describing the Fourth Amendment as “the written expression of the unwritten 
or customary law of the people, known to everybody, descended through a long 
line of ancestry and of popular disturbances, and recognized by everybody in 
times when a quiet reason holds the control of the passions”). 
 147. Banks v. Farwell, 38 Mass. (21 Pick.) 156, 157, 159–60 (1838). 
 148. Id. at 157. 
 149. Id. at 158. 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. at 159. 
 152. Id. 
 153. Larthet v. Forgay, 2 La. Ann. 524, 525 (1847). 
 154. Id. 
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viewed the Fourth Amendment as an expression of preexisting 
common law protections. It was “an affirmance of a great con-
stitutional doctrine of the common law, which had nevertheless 
been occasionally violated by general warrants; and to prevent 
this abuse the solemn written prohibition was framed.”155 Ac-
cordingly, it was the court’s duty to apply the Fourth Amend-
ment to the state: “A principle so indispensable to the full en-
joyment of personal security and private property, should be 
enforced in its full spirit and integrity.”156 
In 1852, the justices of the Superior Court of New Hamp-
shire issued an advisory opinion to the state senate concluding 
that a proposed state statute “for the suppression of drinking 
houses and tippling shops” would violate the Federal Bill of 
Rights.157 The statute allowed for the conviction of a principal 
based on the conviction of the principal’s agent.158 This, the jus-
tices concluded, violated the Sixth Amendment right of confron-
tation.159 In addition, the justices concluded, provisions of the 
proposed statute allowing for searches without a warrant based 
on probable cause and sworn to under oath violated the Fourth 
Amendment.160 
3. Fifth Amendment—Takings 
Although in Barron the United States Supreme Court re-
jected John Barron’s claim against the city of Baltimore under 
the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment, state courts ap-
plied the Clause to limit the actions of state government. In 
1847, the Supreme Court of Georgia held that a property owner 
was entitled to compensation when the state built a bridge over 
his property,161 even though the state constitution provided no 
such right.162 Writing for the court, Justice Hiram Warner rea-
soned that while the Fifth Amendment may have applied di-
rectly only to the federal government, it stated a general prin-
ciple applicable also to state government. Warner wrote: 
 
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. 
 157. Opinion of the Justices of the Superior Court of Judicature, 25 N.H. 
537, 541–42 (1852). 
 158. Id. 
 159. Id. 
 160. Id. at 542. 
 161. Young v. McKenzie, 3 Ga. 31, 45 (1847). 
 162. Id. (“Most of the states have embodied [the Takings Clause] in their 
State Constitutions; but the State of Georgia has not . . . .”); see also GA. 
CONST. of 1798. 
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[S]ome of the amendments [to the Federal Constitution] create new 
restrictions upon the general government, and are applicable to Con-
gress alone, while others are declaratory of great fundamental prin-
ciples, then existing and recognized. The amendments were proposed 
and adopted, because a number of the States had expressed a desire, 
to prevent misconstruction or abuse, that further declaratory and re-
strictive clauses should be added. The clauses to be added were not all 
declaratory nor were they all restrictive; but some of the clauses to be 
added were restrictive, and some declaratory; of which latter class is 
the [Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment].163 
Warner explained that the Bill of Rights did not create any 
new protections because the requirement that the government 
provide compensation when it took property “was distinctly as-
serted, as a part of the common law, long anterior to its adop-
tion into the amended [C]onstitution of the United States.”164 
Indeed, Congress’s resolution transmitting the Bill of Rights to 
the states recognized as much by stating that “[t]he convention 
of a number of States having . . . expressed a desire . . . that 
further declaratory and restrictive clauses should be added.”165 
That is, the Bill of Rights simply “declared” rights that already 
existed—the Fifth Amendment recognized “the existence of a 
great common law principle, founded in natural justice.”166 
Since this very principle was already “applicable to all republi-
can governments,” it “derived no additional force . . . from being 
incorporated into the Constitution of the United States”167 
through an explicit amendment. On this logic, even without a 
state constitutional provision, the principle declared by the 
Fifth Amendment imposed a compensation requirement upon 
state government. The Bill of Rights was a “plain” and “simple 
declaration” of the “great constitutional principle[s],” the “fun-
damental” rules that applied “universal[ly].”168 This did not 
mean that if a state took private property without compensat-
ing the owner, the state violated the Fifth Amendment per se—
only that the taking violated the underlying principle expressed 
in the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause. “[W]e only say,” 
Warner explained, that an uncompensated taking “is a viola-
tion of the fundamental law of the land, as asserted or declared 
 
 163. Young, 3 Ga. at 44. 
 164. Id. at 42. 
 165. Id. at 44 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting U.S. CONST. 
amends. I–X pmbl.). 
 166. Id. 
 167. Id. 
 168. Id. at 45. 
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by the Constitution of the United States.”169 On this logic, the 
state court was not doing anything inconsistent with Barron: 
state courts were permitted to impose more stringent require-
ments on state governments. 
Thus, it made perfect sense for the Georgia Supreme Court 
in 1851 to strike down a state law allowing public roads to be 
built across unenclosed private land without compensating the 
landowner.170 Although no state constitutional provision man-
dated compensation when the state exercised its power of emi-
nent domain, Justice Eugenius Nisbet, writing for the court, 
explained that the compensation requirement was a common 
law principle, affirmed by the Magna Carta and made “true by 
the special ordainment of the Constitution of the United 
States.”171 As to Barron, Nisbet acknowledged that “[t]he Con-
stitution of the United States upon this point . . . has been held 
to be a restraint upon federal legislation alone, and not to apply 
to the States.”172 But that did not end the matter: even when 
“that [holding] be admitted . . . [the Constitution] is still au-
thority, most significant, for the application of the rule in the 
States.”173  
According to Nisbet, the Takings Clause was merely a 
statement of the principle that when government took property 
it had to compensate the owner—the Fifth Amendment was “af-
firmation of the rule in the most solemn form,” a “declaration of 
the opinion of the American people, that the governmental 
right of appropriating property, is subject to that limitation.”174 
It was, therefore, consistent with Barron for the Georgia Su-
preme Court to follow the Fifth Amendment’s declaration and 
impose on the state a compensation requirement.  
Moreover, Justice Nisbet thought there was an even better 
justification for his decision. According to Nisbet, the Bill of 
Rights only contained preexisting principles of the common 
law.175 Nisbet reasoned that it would be odd to read a compen-
sation requirement in the Federal Constitution as excusing 
state government from a similar obligation. That would require 
the “weak reasoning . . . that because the people of the States 
 
 169. Id. 
 170. Parham v. Justices of Inferior Court, 9 Ga. 341, 348 (1851). 
 171. Id. at 344. 
 172. Id. at 351. 
 173. Id. 
 174. Id. 
 175. Id. 
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have denied to the Federal Government the right to assume 
private property for public use without compensation, they 
have thereby conceded it to the State Governments.”176 In other 
words, emphasizing that the Federal Bill of Rights limited only 
the federal government risked putting individual rights at the 
mercy of the states. Indeed, Nisbet reasoned, the fact that the 
Fifth Amendment Takings Clause originated as a limit only on 
the federal government was proof that the states were already 
under a preexisting obligation to compensate property owners: 
“[T]he people, feeling protected in the States by this limitation 
on the power of the State Governments, were induced to make 
sure of the same protection from the Federal Government.”177 
That is to say, the Fifth Amendment made clear that the feder-
al government faced the same restrictions as did the states: the 
Takings Clause was “a solemn avowal, by the people, that a 
power to take private property, without compensation, does not 
belong to any government.”178 
From a modern perspective, Nisbet’s argument easily 
seems outlandish. To accept his claim—that the very fact that 
the provisions of the Bill of Rights did not originally constrain 
the states demonstrates that the states were already con-
strained by the very same provisions—would turn the Bill of 
Rights on its head and make a mockery of Barron. Yet if Bar-
ron is understood in the way I have suggested, Justice Nisbet is 
on more solid ground. Nothing about Barron precluded a state 
court from extending any or all of the provisions of the Bill of 
Rights to state government. The Georgia Supreme Court was 
entitled to take a more expansive view of the Federal Bill of 
Rights than did a federal court. 
New Jersey courts also considered the principles of the 
Fifth Amendment Takings Clause to constrain the state gov-
ernment. The 1776 New Jersey Constitution did not provide 
specifically for a right of compensation when the government 
took private property.179 In 1832, however, in a case involving a 
city ordinance requiring lot owners to create a footway in front 
of their lots, the New Jersey Supreme Court held that a jury 
was required to determine the amount of compensation due to 
the owners under the Fifth Amendment.180 Also in 1832, in ac-
 
 176. Id. 
 177. Id. 
 178. Id. (emphasis added). 
 179. See N.J. CONST. of 1776. 
 180. Paxson v. Sweet, 13 N.J.L. 196, 199 (N.J. 1832). 
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cordance with this understanding, the New Jersey Court of 
Chancery applied the Fifth Amendment in reviewing a gov-
ernmental taking of farmland to permit a corporation to build a 
waterpower system.181 The decision in Barron the very next 
year did not significantly alter the New Jersey courts’ view 
about the applicability of the Takings Clause. In 1839, in a case 
involving a statute authorizing the construction of a dam that 
ended up overflowing onto a neighboring meadow, New Jersey 
Supreme Court Justice William Dayton rejected the argument 
that, in the absence of a compensation provision in the state 
constitution, the state was entitled to take property without 
compensating the owner.182 Dayton explained: 
Th[e] power to take private property reaches back of all constitutional 
provisions; and it seems to have been considered a settled principle of 
universal law, that the right to compensation, is an incident to the 
exercise of that power: that the one is so inseparably connected with 
the other, that they may be said to exist not as separate and distinct 
principles, but as parts of one and the same principle . . . . This prin-
ciple . . . has been made by express enactment, a part of the Constitu-
tion of the United States; . . . but it has been decided [in Barron] that 
as a constitutional provision, it does not apply to the several States. 
Still[,] . . . it is operative as a principle of universal law; and the legis-
lature of this State, can no more take private property for public use, 
without just compensation, than if this restraining principle were in-
corporated into, and made part of its State Constitution.183  
Whether bound directly by the Fifth Amendment or by the 
amendment’s underlying principles, state government could not 
take property without compensating the owner for the loss. 
New York courts also invoked the Fifth Amendment to re-
quire the state government to compensate property owners for 
takings. In 1816, the New York Court of Chancery held that, 
even in the absence of a state constitutional provision, the Tak-
ings Clause of the Fifth Amendment required the state to com-
pensate a landowner deprived of the use of a stream.184 The re-
quirement was “of high[] authority,”185 included in the Federal 
Bill of Rights because it was “decisive of the sense of the people 
of this country,”186 and it existed as an “indispensable atten-
 
 181. Scudder v. Trenton Del. Falls Co., 1 N.J. Eq. 694, 720–29 (N.J. Ch. 
1832). 
 182. Sinnickson v. Johnson, 17 N.J.L. 129, 144–46 (N.J. 1839). 
 183. Id. at 145–46 (citations omitted). 
 184. Gardner v. Trs. of Newburgh, 2 Johns. Ch. 162, 163–64 (N.Y. Ch. 
1816). 
 185. Id. at 167. 
 186. Id. 
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dant on the due and constitutional exercise of . . . [government] 
power.”187 To deny compensation, the court reasoned, would be 
“unjust”188 and “contrary to the first principles of govern-
ment.”189 Other New York courts also imposed a compensation 
requirement when the government took property.190 For exam-
ple, in holding in 1851 that the government could not retain 
title to land taken without compensating the owner and not 
used for public purposes, the New York Supreme Court de-
scribed the compensation and public use principles as aspects 
of “unwritten constitutional law.”191 
In addition to these practices in Georgia, New Jersey, and 
New York, the highest courts in South Carolina and Iowa took 
the view that the Takings Clause reflected fundamental prin-
ciples applicable to state government.192 Other state courts 
read the due process clause of their state constitutions in light 
of the Fifth Amendment—and held that even in the absence of 
a more specific state constitutional requirement, due process 
gave property owners a right to compensation when the gov-
ernment took their property.193 This practice—reading due 
process to include substantive limitations—paralleled the 
United States Supreme Court’s own later incorporation of the 
 
 187. Id. at 167–68. 
 188. Id. at 168. 
 189. Id. 
 190. See, e.g., Stuyvesant v. Mayor of New York, 7 Cow. 588, 606 (N.Y. Sup. 
Ct. 1827) (citing the Fifth Amendment as expressing “a fundamental principle 
of civilized society, that private property shall not be taken even for public use, 
without just compensation”); Bradshaw v. Rodgers, 20 Johns. 103, 106 (N.Y. 
Sup. Ct. 1822) (holding that while the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause “re-
late[s] to the powers of the national government, and was intended as a re-
straint on that government . . . [it is] declaratory of a great and fundamental 
principle of government; and any law violating that principle must be deemed 
a nullity, as it is against natural right and justice”). 
 191. People v. White, 11 Barb. 26, 30 (N.Y. Gen. Term 1851) (stating that 
while Barron held that the Fifth Amendment applied only to the federal gov-
ernment, “the clause . . . was only declaratory of a previously existing and uni-
versal principle of law; and it was recognized by the courts of this country long 
before it was incorporated into our state constitution” (citation omitted)). 
 192. See Hall v. Wash. County, 2 Greene 473, 478 (Iowa 1850) (holding that 
the Takings Clause required the state government to compensate an attorney 
appointed to defend an indigent defendant); L.C. & C.R.R. Co. v. Chappell, 24 
S.C.L. (Rice) 383, 387, 389 (1838) (upholding a lower court decision applying 
the Takings Clause, a “principle of universal law,” when property was taken to 
build a railroad). 
 193. See, e.g., State v. Glen, 52 N.C. (7 Jones) 321, 330–31 (1859) (holding 
that the government could not take a mill without compensating the owner). 
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Takings Clause against the states via the Due Process Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment.194 
4. Fifth Amendment—Double Jeopardy 
Antebellum state courts held that Fifth Amendment double 
jeopardy rules applied in state criminal proceedings. In 1849, 
the Georgia Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice Nisbet, re-
fused on Fifth Amendment double jeopardy grounds to hear the 
state’s appeal from a judgment (representing a final disposition 
of the case) to quash an indictment.195 Nisbet explained that, 
under the English common law, following the acquittal of a 
criminal defendant, the Crown was entirely precluded from 
seeking a new trial, even on the basis of errors of law commit-
ted in the trial process.196 So too, when a state indictment was 
quashed, there could be no new trial, because the Fifth 
Amendment, “for greater caution and in stricter vigilance over 
the rights of the citizen,” applied the common law rule “against 
the State.”197 
In 1838, the Virginia General Court also applied the 
Double Jeopardy Clause to the state.198 The case involved the 
government seeking a second criminal trial when on the ninth 
day of deliberations one of the jurors fell ill and the trial judge 
ended the proceeding.199 Explaining why the Double Jeopardy 
 
 194. Chicago Burlington & Quincy Railroad v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 
(1897), is conventionally thought of as incorporating the Fifth Amendment 
Takings Clause against state government. In a recent article, however, Profes-
sor Karkkainen makes the persuasive case that the decision (which did not 
overrule Barron) was based on Fourteenth Amendment due process restraints 
on state police powers. Bradley C. Karkkainen, The Police Power Revisited: 
Phantom Incorporation and the Roots of the Takings “Muddle”, 90 MINN. L. 
REV. 826 (2006). After Chicago Burlington, he observes, just compensation law 
proceeded on two tracks: Fifth Amendment just compensation (applicable to 
the federal government) and Fourteenth Amendment due process (applicable 
to state government). Id. at 855. On this view, not until Penn Central Trans-
portation Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978), did the Court actually 
apply the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause directly to the states. Id. at 875–
78; see also Michael G. Collins, October Term, 1896—Embracing Due Process, 
45 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 71, 77, 88–92 (2001) (discussing how through incorpora-
tion, “[t]he Court wound up applying constitutional principles and a methodol-
ogy that, for the most part, it was already quite used to applying as a matter 
of general constitutional law in diversity cases”). 
 195. Georgia v. Jones, 7 Ga. 422, 423–24 (1849). 
 196. Id. at 424. 
 197. Id. 
 198. Commonwealth v. Fells, 36 Va. (9 Leigh) 613, 619 (1838). 
 199. Id. at 613–14. 
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Clause applied to state proceedings, the court noted that “this 
provision of the [Federal C]onstitution is no more than the 
adoption, in that instrument, of a well-established principle of 
the common law.”200 As a common law rule, the prohibition on 
double jeopardy applied even if there was no double jeopardy 
provision in the state constitution.201 
Similarly, in 1823, the Mississippi Supreme Court held 
that the Double Jeopardy Clause applied in state court but that 
the Clause did not prohibit a new trial following a hung jury.202 
The Tennessee Supreme Court reached the same conclusion in 
1827.203 The following year, the Supreme Court of North Caro-
lina applied the Double Jeopardy Clause and ruled that it pre-
vented a second trial in a capital case when the trial court’s 
term expired and the jury had not reached a verdict.204 
The New York Supreme Court applied the Fifth Amend-
ment Double Jeopardy Clause in 1820 in People v. Goodwin.205 
In that case, the jury declared it had reached a verdict and the 
foreperson pronounced the defendant guilty, but when the ju-
rors were polled one of them disagreed with the verdict and the 
judge declared a mistrial.206 The defendant argued that to retry 
him would violate the Fifth Amendment.207 The state con-
tended that the Fifth Amendment applied only to the federal 
government and no corresponding state constitutional provision 
barred a new trial.208 Though ultimately finding that a second 
trial following a mistrial did not violate double jeopardy, Chief 
 
 200. Id. at 619. 
 201. Id. Nonetheless, there was no double jeopardy violation because the 
case had not been tried to a jury verdict. Id. 
 202. State v. Moor, 1 Miss. (1 Walker) 134, 138–39 (1823) (“[T]his provision 
of the [C]onstitution was binding in the United States, as well as the state 
courts of the Union, for . . . the [C]onstitution of the United States is the pa-
ramount law of the land, any law usage or custom of the several states to the 
contrary notwithstanding.”). 
 203. Tennessee v. Waterhouse, 8 Tenn. (Mart. & Yer.) 278, 279–80 (1827) 
(applying the Double Jeopardy Clause but holding that a second trial following 
a hung jury was constitutional); id. at 283–84 (Catron, J., concurring) (“[The 
Double Jeopardy Clause] is binding entirely upon all the State courts in the 
Union, and secures the privilege of not being twice put in jeopardy, to every 
citizen of every State, notwithstanding the State Constitution may have no 
such provision . . . . [The Federal Constitution] is the paramount law of every 
State, over the Constitution and laws of the States.”). 
 204. In re Spier, 12 N.C. (1 Dev.) 491 (1828). 
 205. 18 Johns. 187 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1820). 
 206. Id. at 187. 
 207. Id. at 189–93. 
 208. Id. 
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Justice Ambrose Spencer rejected the state’s position that the 
Fifth Amendment had no application.209 Spencer stated at the 
outset that he did not think “it material whether . . . [the Fifth 
Amendment Double Jeopardy] provision be considered as ex-
tending [specifically] to the state tribunals or not.”210 Even if 
the Fifth Amendment did not apply “upon state courts proprio 
vigore,”211 Spencer wrote, the “principle is a sound and funda-
mental one of the common law, that no man shall be twice put 
in jeopardy of life or limb for the same offence.”212 That said, 
Spencer was “inclined to the opinion, that the . . . [Fifth 
Amendment] does extend to all judicial tribunals in the United 
States, whether constituted by the Congress of the United 
States, or the states individually.”213 In reaching that conclu-
sion, Spencer noted that “[t]he provision is general in its na-
ture, and unrestricted in its terms.”214 In addition, the Supre-
macy Clause of the Federal Constitution consisted of “general 
and comprehensive expressions” that “extend the provisions of 
the [C]onstitution of the United States to every article which is 
not confined, by the subject matter, to the national government, 
and is equally applicable to the states.”215 Nevertheless, Spenc-
er reasoned that there was a more general rule in play: “the 
principle is undeniable, that no person can be twice put in jeo-
pardy of life or limb, for the same offence.”216 Accordingly, a 
criminal defendant was “entitled to the protection afforded by 
the [Fifth Amendment], whether we regard it as binding upon 
us by its own force, or as an acknowledged axiom of the com-
mon law.”217 The Fifth Amendment stated a “maxim”218 that 
was “universally acknowledged.”219 That the Bill of Rights ori-
ginated as a limit on the federal government was of no signific-
ance. The Bill arose out of “a jealousy or extreme caution, on 
the part of the state governments, as to require an explicit 
avowal in that instrument, of some of the plainest and best es-
tablished principles in relation to the rights of the citizens, and 
 
 209. Id. at 201. 
 210. Id. 
 211. Id. 
 212. Id. 
 213. Id. (emphasis added, emphasis omitted). 
 214. Id. 
 215. Id. 
 216. Id. 
 217. Id. 
 218. Id. at 202. 
 219. Id. 
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the rules of the common law.”220 The Bill’s provisions reflected 
the “apprehension that . . . fundamental rights might be im-
pugned”;221 those rights were explicitly protected in order to 
“leave no doubt that . . . no new principle was intended to be in-
troduced.”222 In other words, the Bill of Rights represented a 
belt and suspenders approach—making explicit restrictions 
that already bound all government. 
In 1863, the highest court in Maryland also held that the 
Double Jeopardy Clause applied to state proceedings.223 Accord-
ing to that court, the Clause merely embodied the common law 
principle applicable to all government that there could be no 
second prosecution following a conviction or acquittal.224 In 
scores of cases, other antebellum state courts likewise took the 
view that the Double Jeopardy Clause, or the underlying prin-
ciples it embodied, applied in state proceedings.225 
 
 220. Id. 
 221. Id. 
 222. Id. 
 223. Hoffman v. Maryland, 20 Md. 425, 430–32 (1863). 
 224. Id. at 434. However, the court concluded double jeopardy did not bar a 
second prosecution when, following the failure of the state’s witness to appear, 
the trial court discharged the first jury. Id. at 435. 
 225. See, e.g., State v. Slack, 6 Ala. 676, 677 (1844) (describing the Double 
Jeopardy Clause as expressing a “humane maxim of the common law”); State 
v. Seay, 3 Stew. 123, 129 (Ala. 1830) (holding that a statute criminalizing the 
transportation of stolen property into Alabama did not violate the Double  
Jeopardy Clause but voiding the conviction on other grounds); id. at 132 
(Crenshaw, J., concurring) (concluding also that the prosecution violated the 
Double Jeopardy Clause); People v. Olwell, 28 Cal. 456, 462 (1865) (describing 
the Double Jeopardy Clause as reflecting “a maxim of the common law for cen-
turies”); State v. Ellis, 3 Conn. 185, 188 (1819) (Peters, J., dissenting) (reason-
ing that a prosecution for transporting to Connecticut a horse stolen outside of 
the state violated the Double Jeopardy Clause); Reynolds v. State, 3 Ga. 53, 
59–61 (1847) (discussing the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment 
as enacting a common law principle); State v. Redman, 17 Iowa 329, 331 
(1864) (assuming, but not deciding, that the Double Jeopardy Clause applied 
but upholding a second trial after an imprecise verdict in the first trial); State 
v. Cheevers, 7 La. Ann. 40, 41 (1852) (stating that while the Double Jeopardy 
Clause “is not, perhaps, applicable, as a constitutional principle, to offences 
against a State; yet, it is but the enunciation of a well established common law 
principle, and, as such, is expressly adopted by [a state statute]”); State v. 
Hornsby, 8 Rob. 583, 588 (La. 1845) (holding that the Double Jeopardy Clause 
did not prohibit a second prosecution after the entry of a nolle prosequi before 
the jury had been empanelled); Commonwealth v. Roby, 29 Mass. (12 Pick.) 
496, 501 (1832) (describing the Double Jeopardy Clause as “equivalent to a 
declaration of the common law principle, that no person shall be twice tried for 
the same offence” and applying the principle although the state constitution 
contained no prohibition on double jeopardy); Commonwealth v. Purchase, 19 
Mass. (2 Pick.) 521, 522–24 (1824) (applying the Fifth Amendment and com-
MAZZONE_6FMT 12/13/2007 9:13 AM 
2007] BILL OF RIGHTS 47 
 
Consistent with the notion that the Fifth Amendment ex-
pressed broad principles of universal law, some state courts 
viewed the risk of prosecution in another state to bar a trial. In 
1848, the Alabama Supreme Court held that a defendant could 
not be convicted under a state law prohibiting the transporta-
tion of stolen goods into Alabama from another state—in this 
case, slaves from Florida—without proof that the stolen goods 
were transported across the state line.226 Otherwise, the court 
reasoned, the conviction would be for stealing goods, and, since 
this was subject to prosecution in Florida, it would run afoul of 
the Double Jeopardy Clause.227 
5. Fifth Amendment—Due Process and Self-Incrimination 
On occasion, early state courts applied the other provisions 
of the Fifth Amendment to state government. In 1838, the De-
laware Court of Errors and Appeals held that a slave who had 
been illegally exported was entitled to freedom (as were the 
slave’s children) and that the Fifth Amendment Due Process 
Clause prohibited state government from refusing to recognize 
this freedom on the ground that the slave had failed to assert a 
timely claim.228 In 1845, the Supreme Court of Illinois held that 
a summary sale of land to recoup taxes did not violate the Fifth 
Amendment Due Process Clause, but stated that the Clause 
was “obligatory upon all the States of the Union.”229 In 1851, 
the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania applied the Due Process 
Clause, along with an analogous state constitutional provision, 
to invalidate a state law directing the sale of a testator’s 
land.230 The Wisconsin Supreme Court also thought the Due 
Process Clause applied to the state.231 The Georgia Supreme 
 
mon law principles of Double Jeopardy but holding valid a new trial after a 
mistrial resulting from a hung jury). 
 226. State v. Adams, 14 Ala. 486, 490–91 (1848). 
 227. Id. 
 228. Allen v. Sarah, 2 Del. (2 Harr.) 434, 436–37 (1838). 
 229. Rhinehart v. Schuyler, 7 Ill. (2 Gilm.) 473, 522 (1845). This court 
hedged its bets, suggesting that even if the Fifth Amendment did not apply 
directly to the states, it applied in Illinois because a state constitutional provi-
sion that “[n]o freeman shall be . . . deprived of his life, liberty or property, but 
by the judgment of his peers, or the law of the land” corresponded to Fifth 
Amendment Due Process. Id. at 517–18, 522. 
 230. Ervine’s Appeal, 16 Pa. 256, 263–68 (1851). 
 231. State v. Bielby, 21 Wis. 206, 206–09 (1866) (applying the Due Process 
Clause but holding constitutional a statute allowing for an arrest without a 
demonstration of actual guilt). 
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Court thought that the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination applied in state proceedings.232 
6. Sixth Amendment 
Early state courts applied Sixth Amendment provisions 
and principles to state proceedings. Georgia was active in this 
regard. In 1846, the Georgia Supreme Court ordered a new 
criminal trial on the ground that a defendant’s right to an im-
partial jury was violated where one of the jurors had stated un-
der oath that he had formed an opinion about the defendant’s 
guilt.233 Six years later, the Georgia Supreme Court considered 
whether a defendant’s right to confront witnesses was violated 
because a victim’s dying declaration identifying the defendant 
was admitted into evidence.234 While holding that, under the 
circumstances, there was no violation of the defendant’s right, 
Justice Lumpkin provided an extensive discussion of the appli-
cability of Sixth Amendment principles to the states. Lumpkin 
conceded that the Sixth Amendment did not explicitly bind the 
states: “[L]ike the other nine [amendments] adopted at the 
same time, [the Sixth Amendment] was primarily introduced 
for the purpose of preventing an abuse of power by the Federal 
Government.”235 At the same time, in a now familiar argument, 
Lumpkin thought the Federal Bill of Rights embodied universal 
standards applicable to all government. “The principles embod-
ied in these [Constitutional A]mendments,” he explained, “for 
better securing the lives, liberties, and property of the people, 
were declared to be the ‘birthright’ of our ancestors, several 
centuries previous to the establishment of our government.”236 
Accordingly, every court was bound to abide by them: “It is not 
likely . . . that any Court could be found in America of sufficient 
 
 232. See Higdon v. Heard, 14 Ga. 255, 259 (1853) (holding that a state sta-
tute compelling disclosure of gaming transactions did not violate the Fifth 
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination and stating that “literally, the 
Constitution does not go as far as the Common Law; but its spirit and intent 
covers the whole ground”). 
 233. Reynolds v. Georgia, 1 Ga. 222, 229 (1846). While the court here refers 
to “the Constitution,” it does not specifically reference the United States Con-
stitution or the Sixth Amendment, but the language the court quotes is exactly 
the language of the Sixth Amendment and the state constitution did not con-
tain a parallel provision. See GA. CONST. of 1798. 
 234. Campbell v. Georgia, 11 Ga. 353, 364 (1852). 
 235. Id. at 365. 
 236. Id. 
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hardihood to deprive our citizens of these invaluable safe-
guards.”237 
In Lumpkin’s view, the addition to the Federal Constitu-
tion of rights that were preexisting was made in order to un-
derscore the importance of these protections. “[O]ur patriotic 
forefathers, out of abundant caution, super-added these 
amendments to the Constitution, so as to place the matter 
beyond doubt or cavil, misconstruction or abuse.”238 In other 
words, the federal government, like every government, was al-
ready bound by the protections in the Bill of Rights—the Bill 
simply made explicitly clear what everyone assumed. Accor-
dingly, the issue became “whether it is competent for a State 
Legislature, by virtue of its inherent powers, to pass an Act di-
rectly impairing the great principles of protection to person and 
property, embraced in these amendments?”239 That is to say, 
accepting that with the ratification of the Bill of Rights, “the 
power to pass any law infringing on these principles, is taken 
from the Federal Government,” the question was whether “it 
[is] a part of the reserved rights of a State to do this?”240 
Framed that way, the answer suggested itself: if the enumera-
tion of the Bill of Rights to limit the federal government were to 
mean that the states had reserved powers to infringe those pro-
tections, then “of what avail . . . is the negation of these powers 
to the General Government?”241 The underlying commitment to 
individual liberty would be thwarted.242 State governments had 
no “right to do wrong”;243 authority to violate the protections of 
the Bill of Rights was not “a part and parcel of the original jur-
isdiction of the State governments, reserved to them in the dis-
tribution of power under the Constitution.”244 The Federal Bill 
of Rights, then, was declaratory of the underlying protections 
citizens held against all government—including the govern-
ments of the states.245 Simply put, the Bill of Rights was “our 
American Magna Charta,”246 and the task of courts was to en-
 
 237. Id. 
 238. Id. 
 239. Id. 
 240. Id. 
 241. Id. at 366. 
 242. Id. 
 243. Id. (emphasis omitted). 
 244. Id. 
 245. Id. at 367. 
 246. Id. at 368 (emphasis omitted). 
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force vigorously those protections against federal as well as 
state government.247 
The fact that many state constitutions included prohibi-
tions echoing those in the Bill of Rights did not alter Lumpkin’s 
conclusion.248 In Lumpkin’s view, what the states included in 
their own constitutions was a poor guide to construing the Fed-
eral Constitution.249 Moreover, Lumpkin thought, a written 
constitution did not set out every way in which government was 
constrained or specify every individual liberty, because natural 
limits constrained all governments.250 Lumpkin recognized that 
in some instances principles of “natural justice” might be  
“vague and uncertain, regulated by no fixed standard,”251 there-
by making difficult a reliance on the judiciary to enforce them. 
But in his view, there was no such concern when it came to 
preventing the states from violating the principles specifically 
embodied in the Federal Bill of Rights. Lumpkin wrote: 
The people of the several States, by adopting these amendments, have 
defined accurately and recorded permanently their opinion, as to the 
great principles which they embrace; and to make them more emphat-
ic and enduring, have had them incorporated into the Constitution of 
the Union—the permanent law of the land.252  
In other words, the Bill of Rights was a clear statement as 
to the contours of “justice” and “liberty,” setting out in precise 
terms the “vital truths [that] lie at the foundation of our free, 
republican institutions,” and the basis of “our social com-
pact.”253 Whatever the outer scope of natural rights, the Bill of 
Rights represented the core.254 
 
 247. Id. 
 248. See id. (citing Barker v. People, 3 Cow. 686 (N.Y. 1824)). 
 249. Id. at 369. 
 250. Id. 
 251. Id. at 371. 
 252. Id. at 372. 
 253. Id. 
 254. That said, Lumpkin concluded in the case that admitting a victim’s 
dying declaration did not violate the Sixth Amendment confrontation right be-
cause dying declarations have always been treated as an exception to hearsay 
and, therefore, outside the Sixth Amendment protection. Id. at 373–75; see al-
so State v. Chapin, 17 Ark. 561, 564 (1856) (invoking the jury provisions of Ar-
ticle III and the Sixth Amendment in holding an out-of-state defendant could 
be tried in Arkansas court); Williams v. Georgia, 19 Ga. 402, 403 (1856) (hold-
ing that the Sixth Amendment did not prohibit introduction of written testi-
mony from an absent witness because “[t]he practice intended to be prohibited 
by that provision, was the secret examinations, so much abused during the 
reign of the Stuarts, and was not intended to disturb any general rule of crim-
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The Georgia Supreme Court was not alone in believing 
Sixth Amendment principles applied to state proceedings.255 
The courts of Iowa and Pennsylvania are two additional exam-
ples. In 1848, the Supreme Court of Iowa, in an opinion by 
Chief Justice Joseph Williams, thought that the Sixth Amend-
ment’s requirement that a defendant be informed of the nature 
and cause of the accusation governed state proceedings.256 Ap-
plying that requirement, the court went on to hold constitu-
tional a state statute allowing an accessory before the fact to be 
deemed a principal and charged in the indictment with having 
committed the principal offence.257 Two years later, in a deci-
sion holding that the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause re-
quired the state government to compensate an attorney ap-
pointed to defend an indigent defendant, the Iowa Supreme 
Court again expressed the view that Sixth Amendment protec-
tions applied to the states.258 
In 1865, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania applied the 
Sixth Amendment in upholding a double-murder conviction by 
a jury that included two jurors who were also witnesses for the 
prosecution on incidental matters.259 The defendants argued 
that allowing jurors to testify violated their Sixth Amendment 
right to an impartial jury.260 The defendants also contended 
that because of the obvious risk in aggressively challenging the 
testimony of a witness who would also sit in judgment, their 
rights of confrontation under the Sixth Amendment and the 
 
inal evidence”); Durham v. Georgia, 9 Ga. 306, 308 (1851) (describing a state 
statute as carrying into effect Sixth Amendment speedy trial requirement). 
 255. See, e.g., Iowa v. Nash, 7 Iowa 347, 377 (1858) (holding that admission 
of dying declarations did not violate the right of confrontation under the Sixth 
Amendment and the Iowa Constitution); Hall v. Wash. County, 2 Greene 473, 
478 (Iowa 1850) (writing that the Sixth Amendment gives a defendant in state 
court rights to assistance of counsel and a speedy trial); In re Yates, 4 Johns. 
317, 326–29 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1809) (suggesting that the jury requirements of Ar-
ticle III and the Fifth Amendment, as the “constitution[ ] and laws of the land,” 
and the Sixth Amendment provision for compelling witnesses to testify, ap-
plied to state criminal defendants), rev’d sub. nom. Yates v. People, 6 Johns. 
337 (N.Y. 1810). Some confederate state courts also applied the analogous 
speedy trial right contained in the Confederate Constitution. See, e.g., Ex  
parte Turman, 26 Tex. 708, 709–13 (1863); Ex parte Turner, Robards 8 (Tex. 
1863). 
 256. Bonsell v. United States, 1 Greene 111, 115 (Iowa 1848). 
 257. Id. at 114. 
 258. Hall, 2 Greene at 477–78. 
 259. Howser v. Commonwealth, 51 Pa. 332 (1865). 
 260. Id. at 334. 
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state constitution had been infringed.261 Writing for the court, 
Chief Justice George Woodward held that, under the circum-
stances presented, there was no constitutional violation.262 The 
state’s jury selection procedures allowed for examination of and 
challenge to prospective jurors and, therefore, fully protected a 
defendant’s right to impartiality.263 Further, while “material 
witnesses, those . . . upon whose testimony the event is essen-
tially dependent,” should not also serve as jurors, there was no 
general requirement that jurors not be witnesses; they could be 
cross-examined like any other witness.264 Though the Sixth 
Amendment therefore applied in state court, it was not violated 
by this conviction.265  
7. First and Seventh Amendments 
The First Amendment is explicitly directed at Congress.266 
However, at least one antebellum state supreme court applied 
the First Amendment in considering the validity of a state law. 
In 1844, the Tennessee Supreme Court reasoned that the reli-
gion clauses of the First Amendment protected a testator’s 
right to bequeath property to a church.267 
State courts also occasionally took the position that the  
Seventh Amendment civil jury provision applied to the states. 
In 1822, the Supreme Court of Indiana applied the Seventh 
Amendment to hold unconstitutional a state statute that al-
lowed for a summary nonjury proceeding against sheriffs and 
sureties.268 Justice Lumpkin of Georgia applied the Seventh 
Amendment jury trial provision to the state, though in the case 
before him he upheld a summary proceeding for steamboat em-
ployees to recover lost wages.269 In other instances, courts in 
Louisiana and Massachusetts also took the position that the 
 
 261. Id. at 334–35. 
 262. Id. at 338. 
 263. Id. at 337. 
 264. Id. 
 265. Id. 
 266. U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . .”). 
 267. Green v. Allen, 24 Tenn. (5 Hum.) 170, 214 (1844) (invoking the reli-
gion clauses of the First Amendment in support of a testator’s authority to be-
queath property to a church, but ultimately concluding that under state law 
the bequest was void for lack of specificity). 
 268. Dawson v. Shaver, 1 Blackf. 204, 204–07 (Ind. 1822) (per curiam) (cit-
ing Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803)). 
 269. Flint River Steamboat Co. v. Foster, 5 Ga. 194, 204, 217 (1848). 
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Seventh Amendment jury trial right governed state proceed-
ings.270 
8. The Broader Influence of the Bill of Rights 
Even when early state courts did not apply the Federal Bill 
of Rights to state law, they regularly relied upon its provisions 
to determine the meaning of analogous provisions in their own 
state constitutions.271 The practice further illustrates the close 
connection the courts perceived between federal and state con-
stitutional law. 
 
 270. See City of New Orleans v. Cannon, 10 La. Ann. 764, 764–65 (1855) 
(applying the Seventh Amendment but upholding a state tax proceeding); 
O’Neil v. Glover, 71 Mass. (5 Gray) 144, 160 (1855) (applying the Seventh 
Amendment but upholding a state insolvency proceeding). 
 271. See, e.g., Atkins v. State, 16 Ark. 568, 575 (1855) (citing the Fifth 
Amendment in explaining the state constitution’s double jeopardy provision); 
Jackson v. Bulloch, 12 Conn. 38, 43 (1837) (describing a state constitutional 
provision as “almost a transcript” of the Fourth Amendment); Reynolds v. 
State, 3 Ga. 53, 63 (1847) (comparing the state double jeopardy provision to 
the federal provision); State v. Cummings, 5 La. Ann. 330, 331 (1850) (compar-
ing the state constitutional provision providing for the right to counsel to the 
Sixth Amendment); State v. Hornsby, 8 Rob. 554 (La. 1844) (explaining that 
compulsory process provisions in the state and federal constitutions both ori-
ginated as a response to English practices); Jones v. Robbins, 74 Mass. (8 
Gray) 329, 346 (1857) (explaining that while the Fifth Amendment Grand 
Jury Clause only applies to the national government, it informs the “less pre-
cise and explicit terms of our own declaration of rights”); Kohlheimer v. State, 
39 Miss. 548, 552–53 (1860) (invoking the Fifth Amendment in construing the 
state constitution’s double jeopardy provision); Polly v. Saratoga & Wash. R.R. 
Co., 9 Barb. 449, 458 (N.Y. Gen. Term 1850) (describing the takings clause of 
the state constitution as borrowed from the Federal Constitution); Griffin v. 
Martin, 7 Barb. 297, 300 (N.Y. Gen. Term 1849) (describing the takings clause 
of the state constitution as derived from the Fifth Amendment); Work v. State, 
2 Ohio St. 296, 303 (Ohio 1853) (construing a state jury trial provision in light 
of the Sixth Amendment); State v. Mount, 1 Ohio Dec. Reprint 89, 95 (Ohio 
Comm. Pl. 1844) (holding a state constitutional provision providing “nor shall 
he be twice put in jeopardy for the same offence” to be “identical in meaning” 
to the Fifth Amendment double jeopardy clause so that a state provision ap-
plied to death as well as to lesser penalties); Green v. Allen, 24 Tenn. (5 Hum.) 
170, 214 (1844) (citing the First Amendment in construing a state constitu-
tional provision protecting religious freedom); Aymette v. State, 21 Tenn. (2 
Hum.) 154, 156 (1840) (explaining that a provision of the state constitution 
providing “that the free white men of this State have a right to keep and bear 
arms for their common defence,” like the Second Amendment to the United 
States Constitution, was a response to restrictions on arms-bearing under 
English law and the oppressions of standing armies); Lincoln v. Smith, 27 Vt. 
328 (1855) (explaining that the state and federal constitutional provisions 
against unreasonable searches respond to the problem of general warrants); In 
re Keenan, 7 Wis. 695, 696–98 (1859) (invoking the Federal Double Jeopardy 
Clause in explaining a state constitutional provision). 
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For example, in 1826, the General Court of Virginia, in re-
jecting a prisoner’s challenge to a warrant of commitment, in-
voked the Fourth Amendment to construe the analogous state 
constitutional provision.272 The court recognized that the 
Fourth Amendment applied only to federal officials and that 
state constitutions existed to prevent abuses by state govern-
ment.273 Nonetheless, the court thought the underlying prin-
ciple was universal: like its federal counterpart, the state con-
stitutional provision derived from the Wilkes cases274 and 
“establishe[d] a most important safeguard to the rights of the 
people, against the abuse of power by our own State officers.”275 
The court noted that the Fourth Amendment did not extend to 
warrants of commitment.276 Similarly, the court found that the 
state constitutional provision should be understood to apply on-
ly to searches and seizures.277 
In 1846, the Court of Appeals of South Carolina held that a 
Charleston ordinance prohibiting the sale of goods on Sundays 
did not violate a Jewish merchant’s free exercise rights under 
the state constitution.278 In construing the state constitutional 
provision—protecting a “privilege to worship”—to reach that 
result, the court invoked the First Amendment and the shared 
history of the federal and state constitutional protections.279 
Similarly, in 1854, in holding void under state law a deceased 
man’s bequest to his niece on the condition that she remain a 
member of the Society of Friends (including by marrying 
 
 272. Commonwealth v. Murray, 4 Va. (2 Va. Cas.) 504, 507–08 (1826). 
 273. Id.  
 274. In a series of decisions between 1763 and 1769, English courts held 
that officers of the Tory government had violated English law and had become 
liable in civil actions by executing general warrants to search the homes of 
outspoken opposition politician John Wilkes and his supporters. See, e.g., 
Wilkes v. Wood, (1763) 98 Eng. Rep. 489 (K.B.). The cases were celebrated in 
the American colonies as a protection of free speech and a condemnation of 
general warrants. See generally Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 527–29 
(1969) (discussing the impact of the Wilkes cases); Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth 
Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757, 772 n.54 (1994) (“The 
Wilkes case was a cause célèbre in the colonies, where ‘Wilkes and Liberty’ be-
came a rallying cry for all those who hated government oppression.”). 
 275. Murray, 4 Va. (2 Va. Cas.) at 507–08. 
 276. Id. at 508. 
 277. Id. 
 278. City Council of Charleston v. Benjamin, 33 S.C.L. (2 Strob.) 508, 521–
29 (1846); see also Gabel v. City of Houston, 29 Tex. 335, 346–47 (1867) (hold-
ing that a city ordinance prohibiting business on Sundays did not violate the 
federal or state constitutional protections for religious freedom). 
 279. Benjamin, 33 S.C.L. (2 Strob.) at 524–26. 
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another Friend), the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia ex-
plained how the provisions protecting religious freedom in both 
the state and federal constitutions had a common origin.280 
More generally, state courts frequently emphasized how state 
constitutions served to prevent abusive government at the state 
level, just as the Federal Constitution prevented abuses at the 
national level.281 In particular, courts viewed state constitu-
tions as a check on a potentially abusive state legislative 
branch, just as the Federal Bill of Rights constrained Con-
gress.282 
D. SUMMARY 
Early state courts applied the provisions and principles of 
the Federal Bill of Rights to limit state government. Though in 
Barron the United States Supreme Court held that states were 
not subject to the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment, 
state courts considered themselves free to apply the Bill of 
Rights to their states. Where a ruling was not subject to subse-
quent review—because the ruling favored a federal constitu-
tional right—the state courts were free to enforce the Federal 
Constitution more vigorously than did the United States Su-
preme Court. 
III.  BODIES OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW   
This Part locates the practice of state courts in invoking 
the Bill of Rights to limit state government within the constitu-
tional landscape of the antebellum United States. 
A. OVERVIEW 
In the era prior to the Civil War, four vibrant bodies of 
constitutional law protected the rights of individuals from gov-
ernment abuse. These bodies of constitutional law are summa-
 
 280. Maddox v. Maddox’s Adm’r, 52 Va. (11 Gratt.) 804, 813 (1854). 
 281. See, e.g., State v. Waters, 39 Me. 54, 64 (1854) (describing state and 
federal constitutional provisions as designed to “mark distinctly the line be-
tween the legitimate powers of the government, and the personal rights of the 
citizen”). 
 282. For example, in explaining why it had authority to review the consti-
tutionality of a taking of property, a judge of the New Jersey Chancery Court 
wrote: “The legislature, in this state, is not omnipotent, as was the British 
parliament. It is subordinate to the [C]onstitution; and if it transcend its pow-
er, its acts are void, and it is the duty of the judiciary to declare them so.” 
Scudder v. Trenton Del. Falls Co., 1 N.J. Eq. 694, 727 (N.J. Ch. 1832). 
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rized in Table 1. The first body of constitutional law was de-
rived from the Federal Constitution, the supreme law of the 
United States.283 The states also had their own state constitu-
tions, the source of a second body of constitutional law. A third 
body of constitutional law consisted of the general constitution-
al rules that federal courts applied in diversity lawsuits, in 
which the Federal Constitution itself did not apply. The fourth 
body of constitutional law consisted of the practices of state 
courts examined in this Article: a set of constitutional rules 
that the state courts derived from the Federal Bill of Rights 
and applied to their state governments. 
 
Table 1: The Four Bodies of Constitutional Law in the  
Early United States 
B. FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS 
The first two of these four bodies of constitutional law re-
quire only brief treatment. The place of the Federal Constitu-
tion in the early Republic is well known. For present purposes 
it is important to note only that, in addition to Chief Justice 
Marshall’s assertion in Marbury v. Madison284 that the federal 
judiciary had power to review congressional legislation, state 
courts also enforced the Federal Constitution’s limitations on 
the powers of the federal government.285 Likewise, both federal 
 
 283. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2. 
 284. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
 285. See, e.g., Ferris v. Coover, 11 Cal. 175, 178–79 (1858) (holding section 
25 of the 1789 Judiciary Act constitutional); Griffin v. Wilcox, 21 Ind. 370, 397 
(1863) (holding unconstitutional a federal statute prohibiting actions for 
wrongful imprisonment); Wetherbee v. Johnson, 14 Mass. (14 Tyng) 412, 421 
(1817) (holding that the federal statute allowing for removal of cases from 
SOURCE APPLIED TO ENFORCED BY 
1. Federal 
Constitution 
Federal government & 
state governments 
Federal courts &  
state courts 
2. State 
constitutions 
State 
governments 
Federal courts in  
diversity & state courts 
3. General 
constitutional law 
State 
governments 
Federal courts in 
diversity 
4. Federal Bill of 
Rights 
State 
governments 
State courts 
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and state courts enforced the Contracts Clause286 and other 
provisions of the Federal Constitution that limited state gov-
ernments.287 Where, under the provisions of section 25 of the 
1789 Judiciary Act, the United States Supreme Court had ul-
timate authority, state courts viewed themselves to be bound 
by the Supreme Court’s rulings288 (though there was occasional 
opposition to this notion).289 
 
state court after final judgment violated the Seventh Amendment); Common-
wealth v. Lewis, 6 Binn. 266, 270–71 (Pa. 1814) (upholding the 1797 federal 
public debt statute). Unsurprisingly, southern state courts vigorously invali-
dated federal laws during the Civil War era. See, e.g., Corbin v. Marsh, 63 Ky. 
(2 Duv.) 193, 193 (1865) (holding the federal emancipation statute unconstitu-
tional); Norris v. Doniphan, 61 Ky. (4 Met.) 385, 400–01 (1863) (holding that 
the federal statute providing for the seizure of rebels’ property violated the 
Fifth Amendment). 
 286. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10. 
 287. See, e.g., State v. Fullerton, 7 Rob. 219, 224–25 (La. 1844) (holding 
that a Louisiana tax on passengers arriving in New Orleans from out of state 
did not interfere with Congress’s Commerce Clause power). Because the feder-
al courts lacked general federal question jurisdiction until 1875, they most of-
ten confronted constitutional claims against the states in diversity cases. See, 
e.g., Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213 (1827) (applying the Con-
tracts Clause of Article I, Section 10, in a diversity case). See generally Ann 
Woolhandler, The Common Law Origins of Constitutionally Compelled Reme-
dies, 107 YALE L.J. 77, 89–99 (1997) (tracing the Supreme Court’s expansive 
reading of diversity jurisdiction in Contracts Clause cases). 
 288. See, e.g., Ex parte Bushnell, 9 Ohio St. 77 (1859) (upholding the Fugi-
tive Slave Act of 1850). Chief Justice Joseph Swan wrote that where there are 
“decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States settling the power of 
Congress . . . the judges of a state court have no judicial right to interpose 
their own individual opinions” and, therefore, cannot assume independent au-
thority “over the interpretation of the [C]onstitution of the United States.” Id. 
at 191. At the same time, Swan suggested that it would be “the duty of a state 
to deny the authority of the Supreme Court of the United States to enforce 
upon a state an interpretation of the [C]onstitution which palpably and clearly 
violated reserved rights or state sovereignty.” Id. at 197. 
 289. Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816), upheld sec-
tion 25 of the 1789 Judiciary Act, which empowered the Supreme Court to re-
view the final judgments of the highest state courts on federal statutes and 
treaties and state decisions upholding a state law against a claim of a federal 
constitutional violation, and affirmed that state courts are obliged to follow 
Supreme Court precedent on federal issues. However, state courts sometimes 
rejected outright the idea that they were required to follow rulings of the 
United States Supreme Court. For example, Justice Henry Benning of the Su-
preme Court of Georgia took the view that “the Supreme Court of Georgia is 
co-equal and co-ordinate with the Supreme Court of the United States, and . . . 
as a consequence, the Supreme Court of the United States has no jurisdiction 
over the Supreme Court of Georgia; and cannot, therefore, give it an order, or 
make for it a precedent.” Padelford, Fay & Co. v. Mayor of Savannah, 14 Ga. 
438, 506 (1854) (holding, contrary to the Supreme Court’s ruling in Brown v. 
Maryland, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419 (1827), that a state sales tax on imported 
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Many authors have also dealt with the second body of con-
stitutional law: state constitutions and their role in structuring 
and limiting state governments.290 State courts enforced state 
constitutional provisions291—as did federal courts when they 
reviewed challenges to state laws in diversity cases. State 
courts took the position that with respect to an issue of state 
law, they were authoritative and, therefore, did not need to fol-
low the United States Supreme Court’s rulings and interpreta-
tions of state constitutional law issues.292 Indeed, as a matter of 
comity, state courts considered their view of state law to bind 
the federal courts: if a state court was required to adhere to the 
Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Federal Constitution, 
then federal courts should follow the state court on state consti-
tutional issues.293 
 
goods did not violate the Commerce Clause); see also Johnson v. Gordon, 4 Cal. 
368, 371–74 (1854) (holding that the Supreme Court does not have authority 
to exercise appellate jurisdiction over state courts); Weatherbee v. Johnson, 14 
Mass. 412 (1817) (expressing doubts about constitutionality of section 25 of the 
1789 Judiciary Act); In re Booth, 3 Wis. 1, 66 (1854) (stating that the state 
courts have the right to decide independently of federal courts whether laws 
are constitutional and holding unconstitutional the 1850 Fugitive Slave Act), 
rev’d sub. nom. Ableman v. Booth, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 506, 526 (1858).  
 290. See generally WILLI PAUL ADAMS, THE FIRST AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTIONS: REPUBLICAN IDEOLOGY AND THE MAKING OF THE STATE 
CONSTITUTIONS IN THE REVOLUTIONARY ERA (Rita & Robert Kimber trans., 
Univ. of N.C. Press 1980) (1973); KRUMAN, supra note 111. 
 291. See McClure v. Owen, 26 Iowa 243, 249–50 (1868). 
 292. See, e.g., id. (“We can not . . . be expected to conform our rulings to the 
opinion of [the United States Supreme Court] upon questions of [state law] 
when they are in conflict with the adjudications of this court.”); Deans v. 
McLendon, 30 Miss. 343, 361 (1855) (“The right to expound, definitively and 
conclusively, their statutes . . . belong[s] exclusively to the state courts.”); 
Towle v. Forney, 14 N.Y. 423, 429 (1856) (reasoning that “[i]f a question [of 
state law] is found to have been settled by the highest appellate court of a 
state, that decision is binding upon the courts of the United States to the same 
extent as upon the courts of the state in which it was made” and finding that 
in addressing such questions, “the highest court of the Union has no legal 
preeminence over any of the courts of this state”); Wilkins v. Philips, 3 Ohio 
49, 50 (1827) (“Highly as we respect the opinions of [the United States Su-
preme Court], we can not adopt them, in the construction of our own statutes, 
where they are at a variance with our own judgments.”); Peck v. City of San 
Antonio, 51 Tex. 490, 493 (1879) (“Although we entertain the very greatest re-
spect for the opinions of [the United States Supreme Court] . . . we feel it our 
duty, upon a question which involves the proper construction of a local statute 
under the Constitution of Texas, to follow the latest decisions of this court.”). 
 293. See, e.g., Bailey v. Fitz-Gerald, 56 Miss. 578, 588–89 (1879) (holding 
unconstitutional a statute allowing guardians and trustees to invest in Con-
federate bonds). Writing for the court in Bailey, Chief Justice Horatio F. Si-
mrall explained that while “[t]his court has been prompt to follow the judicial 
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C. GENERAL CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
The third body of constitutional law was derived from the 
practice of early federal courts applying general constitutional 
law in diversity cases. In accordance with Swift v. Tyson,294  
 
leadings of the Supreme Court of the United States” on federal constitutional 
questions, “it will maintain . . . its right to declare the rules of law on all sub-
jects arising under the Constitution, statutes, and customary laws of the State 
. . . [even when] at variance with the Federal judiciary.” Id. at 588–89. Like-
wise, the Supreme Court of Nebraska understood itself to be a peer of the 
United States Supreme Court. See Franklin v. Kelley, 2 Neb. 79, 85 (1872) (re-
jecting the federal court construction of a state deed statute). Therefore, it was 
bound by United States Supreme Court “decisions upon questions arising out 
of the Federal [C]onstitution and Federal statutes” but “decisions upon ques-
tions . . . of [Nebraska’s] State constitution and . . . statutes” similarly bound 
the United States Supreme Court. Id. Further, in Levy v. Mentz, 23 La. Ann. 
261, 262 (1871), the Louisiana Supreme Court held that “in construing local 
statutes respecting real property, the federal courts are governed by the deci-
sions of the State tribunals.” Also, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania stated 
that the United States Supreme Court “has no more right to overrule a judg-
ment of a state court, on a question of state law, than the state court has to 
overrule the United States court on a question of United States law.” Mott v. 
Mott, 30 Pa. 9, 32 (1858). State courts also rejected the Supreme Court’s prior 
interpretation of state statutory law when the interpretation would be incon-
sistent with the state constitution. See, e.g., Mayor of Balt. v. Balt. & Ohio 
R.R. Co., 6 Gill 288, 298–99 (Md. 1848) (refusing to follow the Supreme Court’s 
understanding that banking franchises were subject to a special tax where the 
state constitution prohibited such taxes). 
At the same time, some state courts occasionally suggested that on some 
questions, state courts and federal courts operated equally. See, e.g., Franklin 
v. Kelley, 2 Neb. 79, 85 (1872) (after noting that state supreme court is author-
itative on state constitutional law while the United States Supreme Court is 
authoritative on federal constitutional law, stating that “upon that wide do-
main which is presented by general jurisprudence, the Federal Supreme Court 
and the State Supreme Court hold an equal and divided jurisdiction. Our opi-
nions are not binding upon it, nor its opinions on us”). 
A further issue was the interaction between a state court’s construction of 
state law and the Supreme Court’s adjudication of the constitutionality of the 
law under the Federal Constitution. The issue arose in Contracts Clause cas-
es, with some state courts taking the view that whether there was a contract 
was solely a question of state law. See, e.g., Skelly v. Jefferson Branch of the 
State Bank of Ohio, 9 Ohio St. 606, 609–10 (1859) (holding that a state court is 
not required to follow Supreme Court precedent on whether a statute creates a 
contract within the meaning of the United States Constitution). The Supreme 
Court eventually rejected this position. Jefferson Branch Bank v. Skelly, 66 
U.S. (1 Black) 436 (1861) (holding that the Supreme Court has the power to 
determine independently whether a contract exists for purposes of the Consti-
tution’s Contracts Clause). 
 294. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842), overruled by Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 
U.S. 64 (1938). Swift was a private law case in which New York defendants 
were sued in federal court in New York by out-of-state defendants on a bill of 
exchange. Id. at 14. Although the bill was defective under the decisions of the 
New York state courts, Justice Joseph Story held that those decisions were not 
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nineteenth-century federal courts, sitting in diversity and 
asked to rule on the validity of state legislation or state execu-
tive action under a state constitutional provision, generated 
and applied general principles of constitutional law, rather 
than simply adhering to the state courts’ interpretation of state 
constitutional law.295 
This body of general constitutional law stood apart from 
the simple application of state constitutional provisions. For 
example, although the 1776 Virginia Constitution permitted 
uncompensated takings of property if approved by the legisla-
ture,296 in the 1815 case of Terrett v. Taylor, Justice Joseph 
Story for the United States Supreme Court invoked the “fun-
damental laws of every free government” to prohibit the state 
of Virginia from confiscating lands of the Episcopal Church.297 
In 1829, just four years before Barron, the Supreme Court 
heard a diversity case in which the plaintiff challenged a Rhode 
Island statute as working an impermissible transfer of property 
 
binding on federal courts. Id. at 18–19. Construing section 34 of the 1789 Ju-
diciary Act (the Rules of Decisions Act), which provided that “the laws of the 
several states . . . shall be regarded as rules of decision in trials at common 
law in the courts of the United States,” but did not specify the source of state 
law, Story reasoned that the decisions of the New York courts were not “law” 
but only the courts’ interpretations of “general commercial law,” applicable to 
interstate commercial transactions. Id. at 18. Accordingly, federal courts were 
not bound by the state court decisions Story considered incorrect, but were in-
stead free to apply their own understanding of the “general principles and doc-
trines of commercial jurisprudence.” Id. at 19. While Swift authorized federal 
courts to develop substantive rules in private law matters, the decision also 
set the stage for federal courts to develop and apply their own principles of 
public law in diversity cases. See Michael G. Collins, Before Lochner—
Diversity Jurisdiction and the Development of General Constitutional Law, 74 
TUL. L. REV. 1263, 1264–65 (2000). 
As Ann Woolhandler and Michael Collins have traced, early federal judges 
also developed independent federal standards with respect to other aspects of 
diversity cases, including standards used to determine whether a right to civil 
juries was “preserved” under the Seventh Amendment, rather than simply fol-
lowing existing state laws. Ann Woolhandler & Michael G. Collins, The Article 
III Jury, 87 VA. L. REV. 587, 612–13 (2001).  
 295. Collins, supra note 294, at 1265. Note that general constitutional 
principles did not create federal question jurisdiction, but rather were applied 
in cases in which the federal courts had diversity jurisdiction, and, therefore, 
the Supreme Court could not hear a case on this basis on direct appeal from a 
state court. See id. at 1304–06. 
 296. VA. CONST. of 1776, Bill of Rights, § 6 (stating that persons cannot be 
“deprived of their property for public uses, without their own consent, or that 
of their representatives so elected”). 
 297. 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 43, 52 (1815). 
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from the owner to another private party.298 In his opinion for 
the court, Justice Story, determining that the statute did not 
divest the plaintiff of any protected rights, rejected the plain-
tiff ’s challenge.299 However, Justice Story also made clear that 
even in the absence of any applicable state constitutional provi-
sion300 or application of the Federal Constitution, a state legis-
lature would be prohibited from transferring private property 
from one person to another.301 Such a transfer, Story reasoned, 
would be “inconsistent with the great and fundamental prin-
ciple of a republican government,”302 “repugnant to the common 
principles of justice and civil liberty,”303 and an 
“[un]constitutional exercise of legislative power.”304 So too, in 
1871, in Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., Justice Samuel Miller for 
the Court held that under the Wisconsin Constitution, a plain-
tiff whose land had been flooded by a dam authorized by state 
law had suffered a taking of property and was entitled to com-
pensation.305 Although the decisions of the Wisconsin state 
courts pointed against compensation where the plaintiff, follow-
ing the alleged taking, had retained title to the land,306 the 
Pumpelly Court invoked decisions from other states to inde-
pendently interpret the Wisconsin Constitution in light of “set-
tled principle[s] of universal law,” and held that, under those 
standards, the plaintiff was entitled to relief.307 
In dozens of other diversity cases federal courts relied upon 
general principles of constitutional law when asked to interpret 
and apply provisions of state constitutions.308 Defending this 
 
 298. Wilkinson v. Leland, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 627 (1829). 
 299. Id. at 658–61. 
 300. Rhode Island did not replace its Royal Charter of 1663 with a consti-
tution until 1842. R.I. CONST. of 1842. 
 301. See Wilkinson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) at 656–58. 
 302. Id. at 657. 
 303. Id. 
 304. Id. at 658. 
 305. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 166, 181 (1871). 
 306. See id. at 180. 
 307. Id. at 178 (quotation omitted). 
 308. See, e.g., Yates v. Milwaukee, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 497, 506–07 (1870) 
(holding that notwithstanding contrary state court decisions, general common 
law required compensation for takings of property); Gelpcke v. City of Dubu-
que, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 175, 205–06 (1863) (construing independently the Iowa 
Constitution in a federal diversity bond issuance case); Rowan v. Runnels, 46 
U.S. (5 How.) 134, 137 (1847) (rejecting binding nature of state court decision 
that state constitution barred import of slaves for sale); Groves v. Slaughter, 
40 U.S. (15 Pet.) 449, 499–503 (1841) (maintaining an independent under-
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practice, Justice Noah Swayne, in a case upholding the validity 
of a municipal bond issuance, explained why the Supreme 
Court was not bound to follow a state supreme court’s contrary 
interpretation of state constitutional provisions: 
With all respect for the eminent tribunal by which the judgments 
were pronounced, we must be permitted to say that they are not satis-
factory to our minds. . . . The question before us belongs to the domain 
of general jurisprudence. In this class of cases this court is not bound 
by the judgment of the courts of the States where the cases arise. It 
must hear and determine for itself.309  
In other words, because state constitutions needed to be 
construed against generally recognized principles, a state 
court’s construction was not the last word on what the state 
constitution required. So too, where a state constitution was 
entirely silent on an issue, federal diversity courts invoked 
general principles of constitutional law to limit the activities of 
state government.310 
 
standing of a provision of the Mississippi Constitution regulating importation 
of slaves for sale); Hollingsworth v. Parish of Tensas, 17 F. 109, 116–18 
(C.C.W.D. La. 1883) (rejecting contrary state court decisions and holding that 
the state constitution required compensation for property takings); Soc’y for 
the Propagation of the Gospel v. Wheeler, 22 F. Cas. 756, 766–69 (C.C.D.N.H. 
1814) (Nos. 16,919–20) (departing from state court decisions and invalidating 
a state statute under a state constitutional provision prohibiting retrospective 
laws). 
 309. Twp. of Pine Grove v. Talcott, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 666, 677 (1873). 
 310. See, e.g., Loan Ass’n v. Topeka, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 655, 663–65 (1874) 
(invoking “limitations on [government] power which grow out of the essential 
nature of all free governments” to hold in a diversity case that even without a 
specific provision, the state constitution implied that taxation must be for pub-
lic purposes and therefore cities could not impose taxes to subsidize private 
corporations); Commercial Natl’l Bank v. Iola, 6 F. Cas. 221, 223 (C.C.D. Kan. 
1873) (No. 3061) (stating that even where a state constitution is silent on the 
issue, “[t]he courts everywhere have agreed that taxes can lawfully be imposed 
for public purposes only,” and therefore a bond issuance paid by taxation to 
benefit a private enterprise is void), aff ’d, 154 U.S. 617 (1875); Cole v. City of 
La Grange, 19 F. 871, 873 (C.C.E.D. Mo. 1884) (stating that even though the 
state constitution was silent on the matter, “the elemental thought underlying 
American constitutional law [is] that an attempt, through the guise of the tax-
ing power, to take one man’s property for the private benefit of another is void, 
an act of spoliation, and not a lawful use of legislative or municipal functions” 
and voiding bond issuance paid by taxation to benefit private enterprise); cf. 
Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U.S. 97, 105 (1877) (affirming the decision of the 
state supreme court that tax assessment against a land owner for swamp 
drainage did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause but 
noting that unequal state taxation, while not specifically prohibited by the 
Federal Constitution, “may possibly violate some of those principles of general 
constitutional law, of which we could take jurisdiction if we were sitting in re-
view of a Circuit Court of the United States, as we were in Loan Association v. 
Topeka”). 
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Importantly, these general principles applied by federal di-
versity courts were not federal principles. That is, the prin-
ciples did not apply because they reflected norms underlying 
the Federal Constitution, which had no bearing on these cases. 
Rather, federal courts applied general constitutional principles 
as a matter of state law—the law that was applicable in diversi-
ty cases.311 The practice, therefore, also stood apart from the 
notion that the Federal Constitution, in addition to its specific 
provisions, imposed limitations on state government based on 
natural rights or other unwritten sources,312 a view associated 
with Justice Samuel Chase in Calder v. Bull,313 with Justice 
 
 311. Ann Woolhandler and Michael Collins have usefully documented how 
the Supreme Court in the nineteenth century generously interpreted federal 
diversity requirements so as to create opportunities for federal courts to apply 
general constitutional law principles, particularly in cases involving the inter-
ests of out-of-state investors. Woolhandler & Collins, supra note 294, at 606–
08. 
 312. The notion of unwritten federal constitutional limitations on govern-
ment has a long pedigree. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER G. TIEDEMAN, THE 
UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 16–18 (New York, G.P. 
Putnam’s Sons 1890). More generally, natural law as a limitation on all gov-
ernment has long been a feature of American legal thought (and was given ex-
pression in the Declaration of Independence). See generally STEPHEN M. 
FELDMAN, AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT FROM PREMODERNISM TO 
POSTMODERNISM: AN INTELLECTUAL VOYAGE 49–74 (2000); Edward S. Cor-
win, The “Higher Law” Background of American Constitutional Law, 42 HARV. 
L. REV. 149 (1928); Thomas C. Grey, Origins of the Unwritten Constitution: 
Fundamental Law in American Revolutionary Thought, 30 STAN. L. REV. 843 
(1978); Philip A. Hamburger, Natural Rights, Natural Law, and American 
Constitutions, 102 YALE L.J. 907 (1993); Suzanna Sherry, Natural Law in the 
States, 61 U. CIN. L. REV. 171 (1992). Early state courts invoked natural law in 
construing their own state laws and constitutions. See, e.g., In re Albany St., 
11 Wend. 149, 150 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1834) (construing a state constitution’s com-
pensation clause as limiting takings to public uses because otherwise the 
clause would be “in violation of natural rights”); Currie’s Adm’rs v. Mut. As-
surance Soc’y, 14 Va. (4 Hen. & M.) 315, 346 (1809) (writing that state laws 
are “limited . . . by considerations of justice”). 
 313. See Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 388 (1798) (invoking, in a case 
challenging a state law that granted a new hearing in a probate trial as violat-
ing the Ex Post Facto Clause of Article I, Section 10, “the great first principles 
of the social compact” as limiting the “rightful exercise of legislative authority” 
and writing that even without constitutional limitations, some legislative ac-
tions, including ex post facto laws and taking private property to give to 
another person, would be invalid). The extent to which Justice Chase thought 
that judges had authority to apply natural principles to invalidate legislative 
action is unclear. Chase, who did not apply those principles in his opinion in 
Calder, was in the Court’s majority holding that the Ex Post Facto Clause did 
not apply in the case because the clause was limited to retroactive criminal 
punishments. Id. at 388. Justice James Iredell in the same case seemed to un-
derstand Chase to mean judges could invalidate laws on the basis of natural 
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Marshall in Fletcher v. Peck,314 and also expressed by some 
modern commentators.315 The practice was further distinct 
from a straight-up application of a state constitutional provi-
sion—our second body of constitutional law—because the gen-
eral principles that federal courts applied in diversity cases 
were derived from sources outside of the state constitution it-
self. 
D. THE FOURTH BODY 
The practice, discussed in this Article, of state courts in-
voking the Federal Bill of Rights to limit state government 
rounds out a diverse set of sources for protecting the rights of 
individuals in the pre–Civil War period. Together, the four bod-
ies of constitutional law represented quite different ways in 
which government was restrained and liberty secured. 
The United States Supreme Court’s decision in Proprietors 
of Charles River Bridge v. Proprietors of Warren Bridge316 nice-
ly illustrates some of the relevant differences. The case con-
cerned the 1785 Massachusetts charter granted to the Charles 
River Bridge Corporation to create and operate a bridge and 
charge tolls to passengers crossing between Boston and Char-
 
rights, a notion Iredell himself rejected. See id. at 399. For a useful perspective 
on Calder and other cases involving federal court invocation of natural prin-
ciples, see Suzanna Sherry, The Founders’ Unwritten Constitution, 54 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 1127–77 (1987). 
 314. Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 139 (1810) (holding unconsti-
tutional a Georgia law rescinding the Yazoo land grant and stating that in ad-
dition to the Contracts Clause of Article I, Section 10, a law revoking land 
titles violates the “general principles which are common to our free institu-
tions”). Inasmuch as the Lochner-era decisions invoked general principles of 
rights rooted in contract and other common law doctrines, those decisions too 
might be considered part of this tradition. See James A. Gardner, The Positiv-
ist Revolution that Wasn’t: Constitutional Universalism in the States, 4 ROGER 
WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 109, 120–21 (1998). Note also that Fletcher was a diversi-
ty case. See Fletcher, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) at 87–88. Nine years later in Dart-
mouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 624–54 (1819), a Con-
tracts Clause case on appeal from state court, Marshall, in holding for the 
Court that Dartmouth College’s corporate charter, though commissioned by 
the state, was a contract between private parties with which the legislature 
could not interfere, hewed to the text of the Federal Constitution and placed 
no reliance on general principles. 
 315. For a modern perspective, see RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE 
LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY 259 (2004) (presenting 
the view that the Ninth Amendment is a source of individual liberties beyond 
those specifically protected under other constitutional provisions). 
 316. 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 420 (1837). 
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lestown.317 In 1828, the Massachusetts legislature authorized 
the Warren Bridge Corporation to build a competing, toll-free 
bridge.318 Writing for the Supreme Court, Chief Justice Roger 
Taney rejected the argument by the proprietors of the Charles 
River Bridge that the Warren Bridge charter violated the Con-
tracts Clause of the Federal Constitution.319 Taney’s conclusion 
rested on his understanding that the Charles River Bridge 
charter was an instrument for economic growth, rather than a 
contract creating vested rights.320 If the Court were to construe 
the first charter to prohibit a second, he reasoned, “[w]e shall 
be . . . obliged to stand still, until the claims of the . . . corpora-
tions shall be satisfied; and they shall consent to permit these 
states to avail themselves of the lights of modern science.”321 
Affirming the state supreme court’s decision, Taney held that 
no impairment of a contract had occurred.322  
As in Barron, focusing only on what happened in the Unit-
ed States Supreme Court in Charles River Bridge misses the 
full import of the case. In the state supreme court, the plaintiffs 
had argued that, in addition to violating the Constitution’s 
Contract Clause, the charter granted to the competing bridge 
company was also a taking of the plaintiffs’ property without 
just compensation in violation of the Fifth Amendment Takings 
Clause and the analogous provision of the state constitution 
that prohibited uncompensated appropriations of property.323 
Writing for the state court, Chief Justice Isaac Parker rejected 
the plaintiffs’ takings argument. While the provisions of both 
the federal and state constitutions “are to have a . . . liberal 
construction,”324 and it was clear that the state had not pro-
vided compensation to the Charles River Bridge proprietors,325 
Parker concluded that no property had been taken.326 Parker 
explained: 
The claim of the plaintiffs is, in reality, to a mere naked right; to the 
exclusion of the public from the use of the navigable waters of the 
 
 317. Id. at 428. 
 318. Id. at 427–28. 
 319. Id. at 458–59, 539. 
 320. Id. at 547–50. 
 321. Id. at 553. 
 322. Id. 
 323. Proprietors of Charles River Bridge v. Proprietors of Warren Bridge, 
24 Mass. (7 Pick.) 344, 400–05 (1829), aff ’d, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 420 (1837). 
 324. Id. at 401. 
 325. Id. at 400–01. 
 326. Id. at 405. 
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commonwealth for the purpose of transportation. Such a right cannot 
be property, within any known or practical meaning of the term, nor, 
if infringed, is there a taking or appropriating of property within the 
intent of either constitution. The community, in their sovereign capac-
ity, being the owners of these navigable waters, possess the right of 
using them at their pleasure.327  
In their appeal to the United States Supreme Court, 
brought under section 25 of the Judiciary Act, the plaintiffs 
dropped the argument that there had been a Fifth Amendment 
violation, asserting that “the only . . . [issue] of which this 
Court has jurisdiction, is, whether the . . . act [granting the 
second charter] . . . does, or does not, impair the obligation of a 
contract.”328 The defendants agreed that the Court lacked jur-
isdiction to decide any takings claim: “[T]he question whether a 
state law violates a state constitution, is not to be raised in this 
Court”;329 the claim did not present a ground “for the interfer-
ence of this Court; but it is only a ground of application to the 
commonwealth of Massachusetts.”330 Further, “[i]f Massachu-
setts has taken the property of the plaintiffs for public use, her 
honour is solemnly pledged in her constitution, to make ade-
quate compensation.”331 The Supreme Court itself also saw no 
basis for deciding the Fifth Amendment question.332 Charles 
River Bridge, therefore, followed the same general approach as 
Barron:333 under the operation of the Judiciary Act, the United 
States Supreme Court would not review a state court denial of 
a claim under a provision of the Federal Constitution the Court 
thought inapplicable to state government. 
There was, therefore, a basic difference between diversity 
cases, where the Supreme Court could rule on the basis of gen-
eral principles of constitutional law, and nondiversity cases, 
where the Court accepted the holdings of the state courts on 
 
 327. Id. 
 328. Charles River Bridge, 36 U.S. at 429 (syllabus reporting plaintiffs’ ar-
gument). 
 329. Id. at 471 (syllabus). 
 330. Id. at 470. 
 331. Id. at 473. 
 332. Id. at 553. 
 333. However, Barron was not mentioned in any of the opinions in Charles 
River Bridge, nor raised by any of the lawyers in the case—even though the 
case, initially argued in March 1831, was reargued in January 1837, after 
Barron had been decided. See Elizabeth B. Monroe, Charles River Bridge v. 
Warren Bridge, in THE OXFORD COMPANION TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
UNITED STATES, supra note 10, at 158 (reporting that the case was reargued 
because the decision was delayed as a result of the Justices’ divergent views 
and because of illnesses and vacancies on the bench). 
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whether to extend to state government the Bill of Rights and 
its underlying principles. As the defendants in Charles River 
Bridge argued: “[T]he legislature is limited by the principles of 
natural justice; . . . and . . . it ought not to take property with-
out compensation: but the [C]onstitution of the United States 
no where gives this Court a right to inquire whether the legis-
lature, and the state courts have disregarded the principles of 
natural justice.”334 In other words, while in a diversity case the 
Supreme Court could apply principles of natural law and ex-
tend Fifth Amendment-type protections, in a nondiversity case 
the Court deferred to the rulings of the state courts unless the 
state court’s ruling had denied or narrowed a Supreme Court 
holding as to what the Federal Constitution protected.335 
IV.  MODERN DEVELOPMENTS   
In the preceding parts of this Article, I have sought to 
demonstrate the richness of constitutional decision making in 
the early American republic. In this final Part, I draw on this 
history to assess the current state of constitutional law. I argue 
that the modern consolidation of constitutional decision making 
and the accompanying disappearance of practices of state 
courts described in this Article leave constitutional law today 
less vibrant than it might otherwise be—with significant costs 
to individuals and to the legal system as a whole. 
A. CONSOLIDATION 
For much of this nation’s history, constitutional law was 
multifaceted and constitutional decision making was dispersed. 
The Federal Constitution and the constitutions of each state ex-
isted as separate bodies of constitutional rules, interpreted and 
applied by federal judges and their state counterparts. In addi-
tion, federal courts sitting in diversity crafted and applied to 
the states general rules of constitutional law; state courts also 
applied the provisions of, and principles derived from, the Fed-
eral Bill of Rights. Accordingly, citizens could invoke the Fed-
eral Constitution in federal court and in state court to prevent 
the federal government or (where applicable) state government 
 
 334. Charles River Bridge, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) at 503 (emphasis added). 
 335. Cf. Earl M. Maltz, Fourteenth Amendment Concepts in the Antebellum 
Era, 32 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 305, 307 (1988) (stating that Charles River Bridge 
“eviscerated the concept of natural law as an element of federal constitutional 
constraints on state action”). 
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from interfering with their liberties. Citizens could seek relief 
from state government under the state’s constitution in state 
court and, in diversity cases, in federal court—where general 
constitutional law principles also applied. State courts could 
invalidate state laws and executive actions by invoking the 
provisions and principles of the Federal Bill of Rights. 
Today, things look very different. While the Federal Con-
stitution and state constitutions exist as distinct bodies of con-
stitutional law, constitutional law has otherwise been consoli-
dated. In place of the four bodies of constitutional law that 
existed in the early Republic, there are now just two. Since 
Erie, federal courts are no longer permitted to apply general 
principles of constitutional law in diversity cases, but must de-
fer to state courts on the meaning of state constitutional provi-
sions.336 While this development, described favorably as pro-
ducing a “judicial federalism,”337 may represent greater respect 
for state courts, it can also result in aggrieved citizens losing 
out. If the state court rejects a constitutional claim, a federal 
court cannot later accept the claim under principles of general 
constitutional law. The converse is also true—a federal court 
cannot reject a claim accepted by the state court—but the over-
all effect might be to narrow constitutional rights, because a 
federal diversity court can never expand on what the state 
court has done.338 
 
 336. See, e.g., Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 691 (1975) (noting the 
Court’s deference to state interpretations of state law); Minnesota v. Nat’l Tea 
Co., 309 U.S. 551, 557 (1940) (“It is fundamental that state courts be left free 
and unfettered by us in interpreting their state constitutions.”). On occasion, 
federal courts have rejected state court interpretations of state law where they 
seemed incredible or conflicted with federal interests. See, e.g., Bush v. Gore, 
531 U.S. 98, 115 (2000) (declining “[t]o attach definitive weight to the pro-
nouncement of a state court . . . when the very question is whether the court 
has actually departed from the statutory meaning”); Henry v. Mississippi, 379 
U.S. 443, 447–54 (1965) (overriding a state court’s ruling on procedural default 
under state law when a federal claim was at issue). See generally Henry Paul 
Monaghan, Supreme Court Review of State–Court Determinations of State Law 
in Constitutional Cases, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1919 (2003). 
 337. Lehman Bros. v. Schein, 416 U.S. 386, 391 (1974). See generally Brad-
ford R. Clark, Ascertaining the Laws of the Several States: Positivism and 
Judicial Federalism After Erie, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 1459, 1462 (1997) (explor-
ing the principles of judicial federalism in Erie and discussing how to protect 
those principles when state law fails to provide determinate answers to par-
ticular legal questions faced by federal courts). 
 338. For a recent argument in favor of more frequent federal court adjudi-
cation of state constitutional law claims in order to protect state constitutional 
rights and encourage a dialogue between the federal and state courts, given 
the historical reluctance of state courts to give expansive interpretations to 
MAZZONE_6FMT 12/13/2007 9:13 AM 
2007] BILL OF RIGHTS 69 
 
Similarly, incorporation through the Fourteenth Amend-
ment of most of the protections of the Bill of Rights against the 
states entails a consolidation of constitutional law. Incorpora-
tion means plaintiffs can now bring claims under the Federal 
Bill of Rights against state government339—a federal court to-
day would have jurisdiction to hear John Barron’s Fifth 
Amendment claim against the city of Baltimore. However, in-
corporation can also operate to curtail other kinds of claims. 
Because the protections of the Bill of Rights apply equally—
“with full force”340—to the states as they apply to the federal 
government,341 state courts no longer interpret the Bill inde-
pendently342 or interpret it to derive general principles of con-
stitutional law applicable to their state governments.343 In-
stead, state courts are bound by whatever the United States 
Supreme Court says the Bill of Rights requires—no more, no 
less.344 If, for example, the Court holds that the death penalty 
 
state constitutional provisions, see Robert A. Schapiro, Polyphonic Federalism: 
State Constitutions in the Federal Courts, 87 CAL. L. REV. 1409, 1411 (1999). 
 339. See GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 740 (5th ed. 
2005). 
 340. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 580 (1992). 
 341. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 847 
(1992) (“We have held that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment incorporates most of the Bill of Rights against the States.”). The only 
provisions of the Bill of Rights the Supreme Court has not incorporated 
against the states are the Second Amendment, the Third Amendment, the 
Fifth Amendment grand jury requirement, and the Seventh Amendment civil 
jury requirement. STONE, supra note 339, at 740. 
 342. See, e.g., Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 795 (1969) (“Once it is de-
cided that a particular Bill of Rights guarantee is ‘fundamental to the Ameri-
can scheme of justice,’ the same constitutional standards apply against both 
the State and Federal Governments.” (citation omitted)). For the case for tai-
loring constitutional protections to different levels of government, see Rosen, 
supra note 10. 
 343. There is, therefore, a displacement of what Professor James Gardner 
calls “constitutional universalism,” the tradition of belief by the state courts 
(and to a lesser extent the federal courts) that all American constitutions re-
flect a common set of general principles. See Gardner, supra note 314, at 117–
28. 
 344. See, e.g., Osborne v. Commonwealth, 43 S.W.3d 234, 241 (Ky. 2001) 
(noting that in light of the requirements of the Sixth Amendment Confronta-
tion Clause, “we are bound by the United States Supreme Court’s interpreta-
tion of what constitutes an admissible out-of-court ‘statement’ under the hear-
say exception for statements against penal interest”); Commonwealth v. 
Bryant, 390 Mass. 729, 741 (1984) (“[W]e are bound by the Supreme Court’s 
construction of Miranda’s scope . . . .”); People v. Kin Kan, 574 N.E.2d 1042, 
1045 (N.Y. 1991) (“All courts are, of course, bound by the United States Su-
preme Court’s interpretations of . . . the Federal Constitution.” (citations omit-
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does not violate the Eighth Amendment, a state court is not 
free to hold that the death penalty is, as a matter of federal 
constitutional law, unconstitutionally cruel and unusual pu-
nishment.345 Similarly, there is little doubt that if the Court 
were to decide that some provision of the Bill of Rights did not 
constrain state government, states courts would not be free to 
hold otherwise, and the Court would reverse them if they did. 
“[A] state court can neither add to nor subtract from the man-
dates of the United States Constitution”346 as it is interpreted 
by the Court. 
Consolidation has been facilitated by the radical change in 
the modern era in the United States Supreme Court’s statutory 
authority to review state court decisions. Under the 1789 Judi-
ciary Act, the Court could only review the holding of a state su-
preme court rejecting a federal constitutional claim against 
state government. Today, the Court is authorized to hear any 
decision by a state supreme court presenting a federal issue.347 
The Court’s formerly limited jurisdiction permitted state courts 
to expand federal constitutional rights beyond those recognized 
by the federal judiciary. The modern Court’s plenary jurisdic-
tion means that any inconsistent state court decision—
expanding or contracting federal rulings—is subject to correc-
tion.348 
 
ted)); State v. Gomez, 163 S.W.3d 632, 651 (Tenn. 2005) (“Like all Tennessee 
courts, this Court is bound by the United States Supreme Court’s interpreta-
tion of the United States Constitution . . . .”), vacated on other grounds, 127 S. 
Ct. 1209 (2007). 
 345. See, e.g., Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 380 (1989) (affirming a 
state court conviction and holding that the death penalty imposed on juveniles 
does not violate the Eighth Amendment), abrogated by Roper v. Simmons, 543 
U.S. 551 (2005); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 187, 207 (1976) (affirming a 
state court conviction and holding that the death penalty is not a per se viola-
tion of the Eighth Amendment). 
 346. North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 376 (1979) (citation omitted). 
 347. 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a) (2000). The statute provides that decisions of a 
state’s highest court may be reviewed by the Supreme Court: 
where the validity of a treaty or statute of the United States is drawn 
in question or where the validity of a statute of any State is drawn in 
question on the ground of its being repugnant to the Constitution, 
treaties, or laws of the United States, or where any title, right, privi-
lege, or immunity is specially set up or claimed under the Constitu-
tion or the treaties or statutes of, or any commission held or authority 
exercised under, the United States.  
Id. 
 348. Id. 
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Within this general pattern, the Warren Court played a 
particularly significant role in consolidation, with expanded 
readings of constitutional rights, especially rights of criminal 
defendants, and aggressive incorporation of those rights 
against the states,349 backed up by broad understanding of fed-
eral jurisdiction.350 Though the Burger Court and the Rehn-
quist Court pruned some of the Warren Court’s innovations351 
(and the Roberts Court will likely prevent new growths),352 the 
overall legacy is state governments which are bound by an ar-
ray of constitutional rules articulated and enforced by the Su-
preme Court. Significantly, even though it now reviews only a 
very small number of cases, the Court has remained effective in 
monitoring state courts to ensure they adhere to the Court’s 
own interpretations of the Federal Constitution.353 Perhaps 
most strikingly, where there is doubt about whether a state 
court has based its decision on state law (over which the state 
court is authoritative) or on federal law, the Court presumes 
the latter, and the decision is subject to review.354 Early state 
 
 349. On these Warren Court developments, see DONALD A. DRIPPS, ABOUT 
GUILT AND INNOCENCE: THE ORIGINS, DEVELOPMENT, AND FUTURE OF 
CONSTITUTIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 47–69 (2003); A. Kenneth Pye, The 
Warren Court and Criminal Procedure, 67 MICH. L. REV. 249, 254–56 (1968). 
 350. See Ann Althouse, Tapping the State Court Resource, 44 VAND. L. REV. 
953, 957 (1991) (“Many legal scholars believe that the Warren Court increased 
access to federal courts to give an advantage to the individual who claims a 
violation of her rights and the Burger-Rehnquist Courts have restricted access 
to federal courts to cut back on those rights.” (footnote omitted)); Erwin Che-
merinsky, Parity Reconsidered: Defining a Role for the Federal Judiciary, 36 
UCLA L. REV. 233, 234–35 (1988) (discussing how the Warren Court expanded 
habeas corpus for state prisoners and the scope of relief under 42 U.S.C.  
§ 1983, limited the circumstances in which federal courts should abstain, and 
minimized the preclusive effect of state court judgments). 
 351. See David J. Bodenhamer, Reversing the Revolution: Rights of the Ac-
cused in a Conservative Age, in THE BILL OF RIGHTS IN MODERN AMERICA: 
AFTER 200 YEARS 101, 102 (David J. Bodenhamer & James W. Ely, Jr. eds., 
1993); Chemerinsky, supra note 350, at 235 (discussing how the Burger Court 
had greater confidence in state processes and so narrowed the scope of federal 
jurisdiction); Yale Kamisar, The Warren Court and Criminal Justice: A Quar-
ter-Century Retrospective, 31 TULSA L.J. 1, 13, 29–30, 36, 43 (1995). 
 352. See Owen Fiss, Between Supremacy and Exclusivity, 57 SYRACUSE L. 
REV. 187, 192 (2007). 
 353. Michael E. Solimine, Supreme Court Monitoring of State Courts in the 
Twenty-First Century, 35 IND. L. REV. 335, 359 (2002) (“Whether under an ex-
panded or shrunken docket . . . the Supreme Court has been able, to a tolera-
ble degree, to carry out the monitoring function.”). 
 354. See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1040–41 (1983) (holding that in 
order for the Court to deny jurisdiction on the ground that a state court deci-
sion rested on an independent and adequate state law ground, the state court 
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courts worked independently with the Federal Constitution. 
Modern state courts are, and are expected to be, “faithful 
agents of the Supreme Court in applying federal law.”355 
B. INDIVIDUAL AND INSTITUTIONAL COSTS 
To be sure, there are benefits to these modern develop-
ments. Individual rights are more secure with the incorporation 
of the Bill of Rights against the states; with courts, especially 
federal courts, holding state government accountable for violat-
ing the Bill of Rights; and with Congress empowered to enforce 
the Fourteenth Amendment’s requirements. Still, even with 
constitutional rights better secured overall in the modern era, 
some rights are probably less protected than they might be. In 
settling constitutional rights for the entire nation, the United 
States Supreme Court typically proceeds with unique caution. 
Studies show, for example, that the Court is not often ahead of 
political changes.356 While recent work on the Rehnquist Court 
indicates it was more likely to correct “liberal errors” than 
“conservative errors” by the state courts,357 the Court’s general-
ly cautious approach is likely independent of the justices’ own 
political leanings. Within the range of results they find satis-
factory, Supreme Court justices, across the spectrum, can be 
expected to opt for narrow rather than broad outcomes. The 
justices understand that they are setting rules for a diverse na-
tion, that those rules impose costs on state and local govern-
ment,358 and that it is normally better to postpone deciding 
 
must make clear in its opinion independent reliance upon state law). 
 355. Solimine, supra note 353, at 363. 
 356. See, e.g., GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS 
BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? 338 (1991) (arguing that the Supreme Court’s 
decisions in the areas of segregated schooling, reproductive freedom, and 
women’s rights were at most a recognition of the ways in which society was 
already evolving and concluding that “courts can almost never be effective pro-
ducers of significant social reform”). 
 357. Kilwein & Brisbin, supra note 9, at 183 (reporting that the Warren 
and Burger Courts were more likely to correct “conservative errors” and the 
Rehnquist Court more likely to correct “liberal errors” by state courts and con-
cluding that, as a result, “at the beginning of the twenty-first century, crimi-
nal defendants, minorities, seekers of expressive freedom, and unions might 
find less relief than they might have secured from state courts three decades 
earlier”). 
 358. See Robert F. Utter, Swimming in the Jaws of the Crocodile: State 
Court Comment on Federal Constitutional Issues when Disposing of Cases on 
State Constitutional Grounds, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1025, 1042 n.115 (1985) (“Due 
to the size and diversity of the country, the Court must limit its decisions to 
constitutional norms capable of achievement nationwide.”). 
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more than is necessary for the satisfactory disposition of the 
case at hand.359 
In the antebellum era, state courts could apply federal con-
stitutional protections more stringently in light of local condi-
tions and needs. The United States Supreme Court, with power 
to review a denial of a federal constitutional right, set a nation-
al floor, but state courts could exceed that floor and impose 
stronger constraints on state government. Today, state courts 
are no longer free to take into account whether and how local 
conditions require more expansive protections than the Su-
preme Court is inclined to enforce. For example, although a 
state may have a long history of abusive searches and seizures 
by the police, the state court cannot today insist the police fol-
low more stringent procedural requirements under the Fourth 
Amendment and impose more severe remedies if the police vi-
olate the rules. If a state has a religious minority that has ex-
perienced disadvantages, the state court cannot apply First 
Amendment protections that exceed what the Supreme Court 
has adopted. In deciding whether a state’s punishment is cruel 
and unusual under the Eighth Amendment, a state court can-
not look to the views and sensibilities of that state’s own resi-
dents and invalidate laws the Supreme Court would uphold.360 
An expansion made in light of a state’s own needs and condi-
tions is subject to correction. 
Consolidation is, of course, designed to produce uniformity. 
From a modern perspective, a deficiency of the early courts was 
that individual federal constitutional rights varied around the 
country—turning uniform law into what Justice Antonin Scalia 
has recently referred to as a “crazy quilt.”361 Today, a single 
body of federal constitutional law, generated by the United 
States Supreme Court through power to review all state court 
 
 359. See generally CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL 
MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME COURT (1999). 
 360. The Court has not ignored the possible benefits of states applying dif-
ferent requirements above a national floor. See, e.g., Meachum v. Fano, 427 
U.S. 215, 229 (1976) (holding that, absent some misconduct on the part of 
prison officials, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does 
not entitle a state prisoner to a hearing when transferred to a prison in which 
conditions are less favorable, and writing that “[t]he individual States . . . are 
free to follow another course, whether by statute, by rule or regulation, or by 
interpretation of their own constitutions” if they “decide that prudent prison 
administration requires pretransfer hearings” and that “[o]ur holding is 
[merely] that the Due Process Clause does not impose a nationwide rule man-
dating transfer hearings”). 
 361. Kansas v. Marsh, 126 S. Ct. 2516, 2531 (2006) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
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decisions on federal constitutional issues, means that citizens 
do not live with different federal constitutional rights depend-
ing on the decisions of their state courts. Uniformity is also 
promoted when, rather than generating their own rules, federal 
diversity courts today determine how a case would be adjudi-
cated under state law in state court.362 
Still, the value of uniformity should not be exaggerated. 
Even today, though uniformity may be touted as an important 
value, our legal system tolerates a good deal of inconsistency 
and nonuniform outcomes even as to matters of federal consti-
tutional interpretation. Everyone knows that the Fourth Cir-
cuit is not the Ninth Circuit—it is, for example, no coincidence 
that, in the war on terror, enemy combatants have been held in 
Charleston and Norfolk rather than in San Francisco.363 The 
United States Supreme Court, which now controls its own 
docket, reviews only a tiny fraction of cases.364 Therefore, a con-
flict among the holdings of circuit courts does not necessarily 
 
 362. See Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938) (“Except in matters 
governed by the Federal Constitution or by Acts of Congress, the law to be ap-
plied in any case is the law of the State. . . . There is no federal general com-
mon law.”); see also Guar. Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 109 (1945) (“[I]n all 
cases where a federal court is exercising jurisdiction solely because of the di-
versity of citizenship of the parties, the outcome of the litigation in the federal 
court should be substantially the same, so far as legal rules determine the out-
come of a litigation, as it would be if tried in a [s]tate court.”); Erie, 304 U.S. at 
75 (explaining that the defect of applying general law in diversity cases was 
that “[i]n attempting to promote uniformity of law throughout the United 
States, [it] prevented uniformity in the administration of the law of the 
State”). 
 363. See Susan N. Herman, Yasser Hamdi and the Fourth Circuit’s Legal 
No-Man’s Land, JURIST, Jan. 13, 2003, http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/forum/ 
forumnew84.php (suggesting, in a discussion of the detention of Yasser Hamdi 
at a naval brig in Norfolk, Virginia, that “the government . . . anticipated that 
this most conservative [F]ederal Court of Appeals would defer to its claim of 
executive prerogative”). 
 364. JOHN G. ROBERTS, JR., 2005 YEAR-END REPORT ON THE FEDERAL 
JUDICIARY 7 (2006), available at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/publicinfo/ 
year-end/year-endreports.html (reporting that during the Supreme Court’s 
2004 Term, 7496 cases were filed; 87 cases were argued; and 85 were disposed 
of in 74 signed opinions); David M. O’Brien, A Diminished Plenary Docket: A 
Legacy of the Rehnquist Court, 89 JUDICATURE 134, 134 (2005) (“A major lega-
cy of the Rehnquist Court . . . will remain a sharply diminished plenary dock-
et.”); Richard A. Posner, The Supreme Court, 2004 Term—Foreword: A Politi-
cal Court, 119 HARV. L. REV. 31, 35–36 (2005) (estimating that the Supreme 
Court reviewed 0.12% of the potentially reviewable state and federal decisions 
reached in 2003 and concluding that “the extraordinary growth in the ratio of 
lower court to Supreme Court decisions” means that “it is no longer feasible 
for the Court to control the lower courts by means of narrow, case-by-case de-
terminations . . . [and, i]nstead, it must perforce act legislatively”). 
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lead to Supreme Court review; when circuit conflicts are not re-
solved, or not resolved promptly, federal constitutional law var-
ies around the nation.365 So too, even in our current system, dif-
ferences among state supreme courts in their interpretations of 
the Federal Constitution might not be immediately resolved.366 
Members of the Supreme Court have themselves recognized 
this feature of the modern judicial system.367 
Viewed from a different perspective, the consolidation of 
constitutional law is in fact inconsistent with federalism. Con-
solidation displaces the role of state courts, a part of state gov-
ernment, in the federalist scheme. Though they apply federal 
law, state courts are not lower federal courts any more than the 
state legislatures are subunits of Congress368 or the state gov-
ernors agents of the federal executive branch.369 The historical 
practice of allowing state courts some leeway to interpret inde-
 
 365. See John Harrison, Federal Appellate Jurisdiction Over Questions of 
State Law in State Courts, 7 GREEN BAG 353, 356 (2004) (“Federal law is noto-
riously non-uniform among the different circuits, and the Supreme Court is 
apparently sufficiently indifferent to this fact that it leaves many inter-circuit 
conflicts unresolved.”); Michael E. Solimine, The Future of Parity, 46 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 1457, 1483 (2005) (stating that “[e]ven narrowly focused federal 
rights often have nonuniform application, simply by virtue of various federal 
district courts, and federal appellate courts . . . coming to different conclusions 
on the same issue” and “[c]ircuit splits on federal law are not an uncommon 
phenomenon, and not all such splits are . . . resolved by[ ] the Supreme 
Court”). But see JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., LONG RANGE PLAN FOR 
THE FEDERAL COURTS 46 (1995) (“Current empirical data . . . indicate that in-
tercircuit inconsistency is not a problem.”); Arthur D. Hellman, By Precedent 
Unbound: The Nature and Extent of Unresolved Intercircuit Conflicts, 56 U. 
PITT. L. REV. 693, 792 (1995) (concluding, based on an analysis of 210 cases of 
circuit conflicts that the Supreme Court did not review during the 1988, 1989, 
and 1990 terms, that most conflicts were eventually resolved by subsequent 
decisions or litigation or otherwise do not persist). 
 366. See LARRY W. YACKLE, RECLAIMING THE FEDERAL COURTS 98 (1994) 
(“[T]he Supreme Court no longer has the capacity to sit as a court of error in 
routine cases.”); Barry Friedman, Under the Law of Federal Jurisdiction: Allo-
cating Cases Between Federal and State Courts, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1211, 
1241 (2004) (noting “the Supreme Court’s limited capacity to superintend the 
fifty state court systems”).  
 367. See, e.g., Merrell Dow Pharms. Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 827 
n.6 (1986) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (writing that the United States Supreme 
Court “cannot even come close to ‘doing the whole job’” of “correct[ing] errone-
ous state-court decisions”). 
 368. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 177 (1992) (invalidating 
a provision of the Federal Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments 
Act because the Constitution prohibits commandeering state legislatures). 
 369. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 933 (1997) (invalidating 
provisions of the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act because the Consti-
tution prohibits requiring state executive officials to enforce federal law). 
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pendently the Federal Constitution reflected the importance of 
state courts in our constitutional design. In addition, consolida-
tion undermines the benefits of experimentation that are a fea-
ture of American federalism. Allowing state courts to adopt 
more expansive readings of constitutional rights would gener-
ate information about how rights might be structured in vari-
ous ways and the effects of different choices. There would be, 
therefore, gains to the system as a whole: approaches and out-
comes in one state could be watched by other states, and feder-
al courts could also draw upon the lessons of localized experi-
mentation.370 
Consolidation has also weakened state constitutional law 
as developed and applied by the state courts. Requiring state 
courts to enforce the Bill of Rights as defined and policed by the 
Supreme Court has left state constitutional law in the modern 
era relatively undeveloped. This is for two reasons. First, the 
incorporation of federal constitutional protections has displaced 
state constitutional law as the principal source of individual 
rights.371 Second, rather than decide independently what provi-
sions of state constitutions mean, modern state courts have 
tended to hew to the Supreme Court’s understandings of ana-
logous provisions in the Federal Constitution.372 The trend is 
 
 370. See, e.g., Ann Althouse, How to Build a Separate Sphere: Federal 
Courts and State Power, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1485, 1505 n.116 (1987) 
(“[D]isuniformity created by various judges applying federal law . . . inform[s] 
and enrich[es] the uniform interpretation ultimately supplied by the Supreme 
Court.”); Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underen-
forced Constitutional Norms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212, 1251 (1978) (“A number 
of ‘reforms’ in criminal procedure imposed as a matter of federal constitutional 
law by the Warren Court were already well established as a matter of state 
law in a significant number of states.”). 
 371. See, e.g., Althouse, supra note 370, at 1490 (“As long as state courts 
were engaged in absorbing these new standards [incorporated by the Four-
teenth Amendment], they left analogous provisions in state constitutions un-
explored.”). 
 372. See, e.g., Robert M. Pitler, Independent State Search and Seizure Con-
stitutionalism: The New York State Court of Appeals’ Quest for Principled De-
cisionmaking, 62 BROOK. L. REV. 1, 322 (1996) (describing as “disturbingly in-
adequate” the approach to search and seizure of the New York courts under 
the state constitution); Robert F. Williams, In the Glare of the Supreme Court: 
Continuing Methodology and Legitimacy Problems in Independent State Con-
stitutional Rights Adjudication, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1015, 1017 (1997) 
(“[M]any state courts . . . collapse state and federal constitutional analysis, 
and . . . decide cases as though the two constitutions were the same.”); Robert 
F. Williams, State Courts Adopting Federal Constitutional Doctrine: Case-by-
Case Adoptionism or Prospective Lockstepping?, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1499, 
1502 (2005) (reporting that, in the “clear majority of cases,” state courts inter-
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not entirely in one direction. State courts have, on occasion, 
read state constitutional provisions more generously than the 
United States Supreme Court understands coordinate federal 
provisions.373 Notably, in very recent years, state courts have 
invoked state constitutional provisions to invalidate state laws 
prohibiting same-sex marriages.374 The Minnesota Supreme 
Court also deserves special mention. In a 2005 voting rights de-
cision,375 the court set out a roadmap for interpreting provi-
 
preting state constitutions follow federal constitutional doctrine). Justice Hans 
Linde of the Oregon Supreme Court has been especially critical of state court 
decisions on state constitutional issues that merely track Supreme Court deci-
sions on federal constitutional issues. See State v. Kennedy, 666 P.2d 1316, 
1322 (Or. 1983) (writing that state courts’ adoption of federal constitutional 
doctrine represents the “non sequitur that the United States Supreme Court’s 
decisions under such a text not only deserve respect but presumptively fix its 
correct meaning also in state constitutions”). 
 373. See, e.g., State v. Sullivan, 74 S.W.3d 215, 222 (Ark. 2002) (invalidat-
ing under the state constitution pretextual arrests and noting that “[w]e de-
part from the standards established by the federal courts and rely instead on 
independent state grounds to determine what, in Arkansas, constitutes unrea-
sonable police conduct warranting suppression”); People v. Haley, 41 P.3d 666, 
672–77 (Colo. 2001) (relying on a state constitutional search and seizure provi-
sion as providing broader protections than the Fourth Amendment and invali-
dating as unreasonable a “dog sniff ” of an automobile); Powell v. State, 510 
S.E.2d 18, 21–26 (Ga. 1998) (striking down a state sodomy law on state consti-
tutional privacy grounds, interpreted more broadly than federal protections); 
Ascher v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 519 N.W.2d 183, 186–87 (Minn. 1994) (hold-
ing that random sobriety checkpoints, without the police having an objective 
individualized articulable suspicion of criminal activity before stopping a driv-
er, violate the state constitutional protection against unreasonable searches 
and seizures, although the Supreme Court, in Michigan Department of State 
Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 447 (1990), had held such checkpoints do not vi-
olate the Fourth Amendment). 
 374. See Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 961, 969 
(Mass. 2003) (holding that the state’s ban on same-sex marriage did “not meet 
the rational basis test for either due process or equal protection” under the 
Massachusetts Constitution and redefining civil marriage to allow two persons 
of the same sex to marry); Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d 196, 220–21 (N.J. 2006) 
(holding that New Jersey’s statutory ban on same-sex marriage violates equal 
protection guarantees of the state constitution but that this violation could be 
cured by the state’s authorizing same-sex civil unions instead of same-sex 
marriages); Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 870, 886 (Vt. 1999) (holding that 
same-sex couples are entitled “to obtain the same benefits and protections af-
forded by Vermont law to married opposite-sex couples” under the Common 
Benefits Clause of the Vermont Constitution, “its counterpart [to] the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment”). Not all state courts have 
held a ban on same-sex marriage to violate the state constitution. See, e.g., 
Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1, 18, 20 (N.Y. 2006) (holding that the New 
York ban on same-sex marriage does not violate the due process or equal pro-
tection provisions of the New York state constitution). 
 375. Kahn v. Griffin, 701 N.W.2d 815 (Minn. 2005). In this case, the federal 
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sions of the state constitution more broadly than the Federal 
Constitution.376 The decision emphasized federalism’s “double 
source of protection for . . . rights,”377 cited the role of “the high-
est court of this state”378 in providing “‘the first line of defense 
for individual liberties,’”379 and invited litigants to aid in the 
development of state constitutional law.380 Yet these examples 
of state court independence are notable because they are un-
 
district court certified the question: “Does the Minnesota Constitution provide 
greater protections to the right to vote than does the United States Constitu-
tion such that failure to hold prompt elections following decennial redistricting 
violates . . . the Minnesota Constitution . . . [or state statutory law]?” Id. at 
818. The Minnesota Supreme Court answered the certified question in the 
negative. Id. at 836. 
 376. See id. at 828–29. The court summarized its approach as follows: 
 [W]e will not, on some slight implication and vague conjecture, de-
part from federal precedent . . . . But, when we reach a clear and 
strong conviction that there is a principled basis for greater protection 
of the individual civil and political rights of our citizens under the 
Minnesota Constitution, we will not hesitate to interpret the constitu-
tion to independently safeguard those rights. . . . [W]e are most in-
clined to look to the Minnesota Constitution when we determine that 
our state constitution’s language is different from the language used 
in the U.S. Constitution or that state constitutional language guaran-
tees a fundamental right that is not enumerated in the U.S. Constitu-
tion. . . . We take a more restrained approach when both constitutions 
use identical or substantially similar language. But we will look to 
the Minnesota Constitution when we conclude that the United States 
Supreme Court has made a sharp or radical departure from its pre-
vious decisions or approach to the law and when we discern no persu-
asive reason to follow such a departure. We also will apply the state 
constitution if we determine that the Supreme Court has retrenched 
on Bill of Rights issues, or if we determine that federal precedent does 
not adequately protect our citizens’ basic rights and liberties. 
Id. at 828 (footnotes and citations omitted). It is too soon to gauge the effects of 
the court’s articulation of its commitment to state constitutional principles 
and of the circumstances under which it will depart from federal case law. For 
a useful analysis of the Minnesota Supreme Court’s approach and some optim-
ism about its likely effects (coauthored by one of the court’s members), see 
Paul H. Anderson & Julie A. Oseid, A Decision Tree Takes Root in the Land of 
10,000 Lakes: Minnesota’s Approach to Protecting Individual Rights Under 
Both the United States and Minnesota Constitutions, 70 ALB. L. REV. 865 
(2007). 
 377. Kahn, 701 N.W.2d at 824 (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Wil-
liam J. Brennan, Jr., The Bill of Rights and the States: The Revival of State 
Constitutions as Guardians of Individual Rights, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 535, 552 
(1986)). 
 378. Id. at 828. 
 379. Id. 
 380. Id. at 829 (“[O]ur recent focus on our state constitution has increased 
the possibility that it may be relevant to any given case. Litigants who appear 
before our court can and should be of significant assistance when we address a 
provision of the state constitution.”). 
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usual. As Michael Solimine reports, “systematic studies demon-
strate that most state courts, when presented with the oppor-
tunity, have chosen not to depart from federal precedents when 
interpreting the rights-granting provisions of state constitu-
tions. . . . [T]he majority of state courts, on most issues, engage 
in an analysis in lockstep with their federal counterparts.”381 
Not only have state courts lost a voice under the Federal Con-
stitution—they are out of practice speaking under their state 
constitutions as well.382 
In light of a growing recognition of these concerns, there is 
expanding interest in enhancing the constitutional roles of ent-
ities besides the Supreme Court. Commentators have explored 
and debated the potential of state constitutions for protecting 
individual rights;383 the possibilities of dual enforcement of fed-
eral constitutional norms by federal and state courts;384 and the 
 
 381. Solimine, supra note 353, at 338. 
 382. See, e.g., Cathleen C. Herasimchuk, The New Federalism: Judicial 
Legislation by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals?, 68 TEX. L. REV. 1481, 
1481 & n.4 (1990) (writing that a hurdle for Texas courts to begin reading the 
protections for criminal defendants in the state constitution more expansively 
is that “for more than 100 years the Texas criminal courts have interpreted 
the state and federal constitutions identically”). 
 383. Justice William Brennan, for example, thought that in the post–
Warren Court period, state constitutions existed as important sources for pro-
tecting individual liberty. See Brennan, supra note 377; William J. Brennan, 
Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. 
REV. 489 (1977). By contrast, Professor Gardner takes a more pessimistic view 
of the possibilities of state constitutions. See James A. Gardner, The Failed 
Discourse of State Constitutionalism, 90 MICH. L. REV. 761, 763 (1992) 
(“[S]tate constitutional law today is a vast wasteland of confusing, conflicting, 
and essentially unintelligible pronouncements.”); see also Schapiro, supra note 
338, at 1415 (“State court experience . . . has demonstrated the unfortunate, 
but unsurprising, truth that elected [state] judiciaries have difficulty protect-
ing individual rights against majoritarian forces.”). In an argument that reso-
nates with the themes of this Article, Kermit Hall contends that the decline in 
the vibrancy of state constitutions coincided with the rise of federal constitu-
tional law in the post–Civil War era. See Kermit L. Hall, Mostly Anchor and 
Little Sail: The Evolution of American State Constitutions, in TOWARD A 
USABLE PAST: LIBERTY UNDER STATE CONSTITUTIONS 388, 402–03 (Paul Fin-
kelman & Stephen E. Gottlieb eds., 1991). 
 384. Solimine, supra note 365, at 1457 (“In the dual enforcement of consti-
tutional norms in the United States, state governmental institutions, and par-
ticularly state courts, are entrusted with adjudicating federal constitutional 
and statutory rights.”). Invoking the concept of parity, scholars have vigorous-
ly debated whether federal and state courts are equally well suited to enforc-
ing federal constitutional rights. See, e.g., MICHAEL E. SOLIMINE & JAMES L. 
WALKER, RESPECTING STATE COURTS: THE INEVITABILITY OF JUDICIAL 
FEDERALISM 34–62 (1999) (arguing that empirical evidence shows that federal 
rights are as likely to be protected in state court as in federal court); Burt 
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prospect of the nonjudicial branches of government interpreting 
and enforcing constitutional provisions,385 particularly when 
the courts do not fully enforce constitutional norms.386 These 
programs, each motivated by pessimism about the modern 
state of constitutional practices, are, in a general sense, con-
gruent with the historically vibrant system of constitutional 
law I have explored in this Article. Each seeks to create a site 
of constitutional decision making that will stand strong and 
apart from the Supreme Court and its understanding of the 
Federal Constitution. However, none of these other approaches 
takes sufficient account of the modern consolidation of four bod-
ies of constitutional law into just two. Until this development 
and its implications are fully understood, reform remains 
doubtful. In particular, efforts to push state courts to work in-
dependently in deciding state constitutional law issues are like-
ly to fail in a context in which state courts, deciding federal 
constitutional issues, follow so closely in step with the United 
States Supreme Court. 
Finally, consolidation helps account for the enormous ten-
sion that is characteristic of our current regime. When federal 
constitutional rights are ultimately dependent upon the United 
States Supreme Court, and it reviews a very small number of 
cases, the stakes in any decision by that Court are exceedingly 
high. The Court’s ruling sets the standards for the entire na-
tion; there might not be another opportunity to revisit an issue 
for many decades. In this context, it is no surprise that modern 
confirmation battles are ferocious. Were federal constitutional 
rights less in the hands of the Court (or, as is sometimes the 
 
Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1105 (1977) (arguing that 
state courts do not protect federal constitutional rights as forcefully as do fed-
eral courts). 
 385. See, e.g., MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE 
COURTS (1999) (arguing against the courts having a monopoly on constitution-
al law and in favor of giving the Constitution to Congress to interpret and pro-
tect). 
 386. Lawrence Sager argues that valid yet underenforced constitutional 
norms exist: institutional constraints prevent the federal courts from enforcing 
otherwise valid and enforceable constitutional rights to their fullest extent. 
See Sager, supra note 370, at 1213–28. It, therefore, falls on both Congress 
and the state courts to enforce these rights more completely. See id. at 1242–
63. The Supreme Court should defer to congressional judgments recognizing 
expanded constitutional rights and refrain from reviewing state court deci-
sions construing constitutional rights more broadly than corresponding federal 
interpretations. See id. at 1242–43; see also LAWRENCE G. SAGER, JUSTICE IN 
PLAIN CLOTHES: A THEORY OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL PRACTICE 84–128 
(2004). 
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case, a single justice),387 some energy would shift away from 
this single institution. Similarly, a more active role for state 
courts (or other entities) in federal constitutional interpretation 
would temper the oft-heard criticism that judges, particularly 
federal judges, are unaccountable and undermine democracy. 
Such criticisms are less salient if responsibility for applying the 
Federal Constitution is, as it once was, shared by state court 
judges who are elected to office for fixed terms.388 
  CONCLUSION   
The familiar story of the Constitution—its “biography”389—
is one in which freedom marches forward. Less than perfect at 
inception and requiring some fundamental transformations to 
fulfill its promises, the Constitution has over time deepened its 
liberties and expanded their reach.390 It is impossible to deny 
that the Constitution is today a better document and the nation 
a better place with the end of slavery,391 with the requirement 
that the states accord people equal protection and respect due 
process,392 with increased access to voting,393 and with a com-
mitment to the political equality of women.394 At the same 
time, the modern consolidation of constitutional law produces 
costs: once-robust sources for protecting rights and for produc-
ing constitutional innovations have disappeared. Our predeces-
sors protected freedom by dividing up and dispersing power  
 
 387. See Linda Greenhouse, In Steps Big and Small, Supreme Court Moved 
Right, N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 2007, at A1 (reporting that in the Court’s 2007 
Term, Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, who dissented only twice in the 68 cases 
with signed opinions, and who was in the majority in all 24 of the 5-4 cases, 
“assumed Justice Sandra Day O’Connor’s former position at the Court’s cen-
ter”). 
 388. The benefit should not be exaggerated. See Michael E. Solimine & 
James L. Walker, State Court Protection of Federal Constitutional Rights, 12 
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 127, 161 (1989) (writing that “state courts are, like 
federal courts, ultimately anti-majoritarian political institutions” and that un-
der Long “[t]he Supreme Court can [usefully] serve as an appropriate check on 
excessive and unsound decisions on federal law by state courts”). 
 389. AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY (2005). 
 390. See, e.g., Thurgood Marshall, Reflections on the Bicentennial of the 
United States Constitution, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1, 2 (1987) (“[S]everal amend-
ments, a civil war, and momentous social transformation [were needed after 
1789] to attain the system of constitutional government, and its respect for the 
individual freedoms and human rights, that we hold as fundamental today.”). 
 391. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII. 
 392. Id. amend. XIV. 
 393. Id. amends. XV, XIX, XXIV. 
 394. Id. amend. XIX. 
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rather than by centralizing it in a single entity. Recognizing the 
important place of the Bill of Rights in the early state courts al-
lows for a more complete assessment of the different choices we 
have made and for a richer conversation about the possibility of 
reform. 
